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An important lesson learned from the widely-known Gettier cases in epistemology is 
that no matter how well-justified our beliefs are, knowledge can never be secured—
for there could always be some information unbeknownst to us that would undermine 
our epistemic statuses. In the thesis, I devise a specific approach to epistemic 
evaluations addressing this problem—inspired by Richard Foley’s (2012) ecumenical 
account of adequate information on knowledge, as well as Crispin Wright’s (1993, 
1994) notion of superassertibility on truth. In a nutshell, I suggest that one knows just 
in case one’s belief forming process remains intact upon any expansion of information 
regarding the epistemic situation. Call this the adequately informed process view on 
knowledge (AP). 
 
Reflecting the interplay between cognitive agency and the external world in the notion 
of knowledge, the AP account is twofold. On the one hand, it requires a specific display 
of cognitive process on the agent’s part. Particularly, the belief-forming process must 
be one such that, an ideal epistemic agent following all relevant epistemic norms would 
consider it acceptable to form the target belief via that process. Call this epistemic 
standard acceptable ideality. On the other hand, such acceptable ideality needs to 
take into account all relevant information available in the case, such that one’s process 
is deemed acceptably ideal overall in lights of everything that holds in the world. 
 
The proposed account of AP adopts a holistic and ecumenical approach to epistemic 
evaluations. Firstly, I champion the idea that epistemic phenomena are what I call 
“gestalt phenomena”, in that the epistemic significance of the entire epistemic situation 
cannot be fully appreciated by individually evaluating the significance of its 
constituents (such as beliefs, justification, cognitive processes etc.). Instead, any 
impacts of particular epistemic components should be put under the context of the 
entire epistemic situation for evaluation. Following such a view, I discuss a few 
examples of how taking the overall knowledge evaluations as merely consisting in its 
individual epistemic components has created problems for some of the existing 





Secondly, following Foley, I maintain that knowledge in its nature is ecumenical. The 
main idea is that while there is only one concept of knowledge—characterised by AP 
as meeting the acceptable ideality standard considering all available information—
there can be many ways to achieve such an epistemic standard (in that one’s cognitive 
agency can be acceptably ideal for various reasons). AP does not champion any 
particular epistemic feature as constituting knowledge by itself. Some agency would 
score better on having certain epistemic goods and some on others. According to AP, 
S’s belief is adequate if the belief forming process’ “overall score” of ideality given all 
available information is acceptable. 
 
The thesis consists of three parts. Part 1 (Chapters 1 and 2) consists of the introduction 
of the two approaches and articulation of my positive view. Part 2 (Chapters 3 and 4) 
consists of theoretical comparisons and further motivations for holism in epistemic 
evaluations. Part 3 (Chapters 5 and 6) consists of applications of the proposed 




In this research project, I consider a new way of thinking about the concept of 
knowledge. Traditionally, knowledge is taken as a truth that one believes in and does 
so with good grounds. However, many philosophers now do not consider this account 
to stand—no matter how good one’s grounds are, there always seem to be cases 
where one’s belief formation is infelicitous due to information unbeknownst to one, 
rendering one’s belief true for reasons unrelated to the grounds one possess. The 
theory I proposed attempts to block this from happening—in order for me to know 
certain things, the way I come to form the target belief must withstand any challenges 
from information unbeknownst to me, to the extent that I would still form the said belief 
in that way after everything is uncovered. I call this the adequately informed process 
(AP) view. 
 
My thesis consists of three parts. Part 1 involves articulating the new theory. Chapter 
1 discusses an account outlined by Richard Foley (2012) that also concerns about the 
unbeknownst information. I suggest that while Foley’s insights about information are 
on point, his theory does not work because it leaves out an important aspect of 
knowledge—our belief forming processes. Chapter 2 introduces the AP view by adding 
belief forming processes to Foley’s view. I argue that not only does AP account for 
numerous difficult cases, it also aligns with our common understandings of knowledge 
and information, as well as enjoys some theoretical supports from Crispin Wright’s 
(1993, 1994) works on the notion of truth. 
 
Part 2 (Chapters 3 and 4) consist of comparisons between AP and other accounts of 
knowledge. I suggest that AP differs from other accounts in evaluating knowledge 
holistically. Chapter 3 compares AP with an older account called defeasibility—which 
suggests that one’s grounds for the belief cannot be undermined by any further truths. 
While the defeasibility view fails in accounting for cases where these truths are 
misleading, AP would fare better on this score for taking the entire situation into 
account instead of paying attention only to the misleading truths. Chapter 4 considers 
the interactions between AP and virtue epistemology (VE)—which suggests that we 
know when our true beliefs are creditable to our cognitive abilities. While I argue that 
we don’t deserve credit for everything we know, I maintain that AP and VE complement 
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well with one another—a weaker form of VE helps us explain why our knowledge 
belongs to us; while AP helps us evaluate holistically cases where only part of our 
ability is displayed. 
 
Part 3 (Chapters 5 and 6) concerns the applications of AP and its versatility. In Chapter 
5 I consider a popular view that there cannot be lucky knowledge, and argue that given 
certain plausible assumptions AP can encompass safety or sensitivity—principles that 
effectively avoid elements of luck. Chapter 6 further explores the idea that AP is 
compatible with a variety of theoretical assumptions in the literature, and apply the AP 
model to justification (the grounds/reasons for one’s beliefs). Depending on the 
theoretical assumptions that one prefers, the AP view on justification can give a variety 
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Towards a New Way of Epistemic Evaluations 
 
0.1 The Gettier legacy 
The goal of this research project is to explore the nature of knowledge. To investigate 
the nature of knowledge, one cannot overlook the legacy of Gettier counterexamples—
and the widely regarded failure in addressing them in contemporary epistemology.1 
Traditionally, epistemologists endorsed the ‘tripartite’ account of knowledge as 
justified true belief.2 In comes Gettier (1963) who allegedly found counterexamples to 
the JTB account. The situation quickly escalated. What Gettier had illustrated are not 
merely two exceptional instances of JTB failure—rather, they seem to point to a more 
worrying note that in general, no matter how well-justified our true beliefs are, there 
could always be some information unbeknownst to us that would undermine our 
epistemic statuses. 
 
Naturally, theorists began to look beyond JTB for other positive epistemic features that 
might capture the notion of knowledge, paying great efforts to avoid Gettierisation—
but to little avail. As we add dosage (of more epistemic goods) to buff the original 
theory up, new counterexamples emerged to crack even the buffed-up theories. More 
of the same went on as we were caught up with this game of formulating theories and 
devising cases against them. Curiously, while the cases devised differ from one 
another, the mechanisms in them for undermining knowledge are somewhat similar—
no matter what criteria (outlined by the targeted theories) the hero’s belief has met in 
the story, opponents always manage to suggest some aspects of the story 
unbeknownst to the hero to the effect that the hero falls short of knowing. We have 
since moved on. We fought for decades against these viral cases, perhaps coming to 
                                                          
1 Not all epistemologists are that pessimistic. There are also strong attempts to capture the nature of 
knowledge (or simply to address the Gettier problem) on the market. I shall examine some prominent 
accounts of knowledge in later chapters. 
2 Upon reflections, however, it is not entirely clear how exactly did the classical JTB account emerge, 
and whether there were pre-Gettier epistemologists who explicitly endorsed such a view. As Gettier 
himself remarked, Plato only ‘seems to be considering some such definition’. Indeed, Dutant (2015) 




a rather pessimistic diagnosis that the quest of accounting for knowledge had became 
too broken to carry on—like a deeply sickened man having taken too much antibiotics 
and could no longer put up with the strongest disease in town.3 
 
While we must take our lesson from the Gettier literature, I maintain that we should 
not lose our hope just yet. Instead, this project sets to explore new ways of 
approaching the problem—inspired by our previous failures. While Gettier cases 
undermine knowledge in a variety of ways depending on the theories they targeted, 
there seems to be a general trend in the dialectic. We start with a troubling case that 
poses problem to our original theory (e.g. the classical Gettier cases on the JTB 
account). We then identify the epistemic drawbacks (negative epistemic features) the 
case display (e.g. there being a false lemma held by the agent)—or, put differently, we 
identify the lack of certain epistemic good in the case. Finally, we suggest that the 
lacking epistemic good is essential to knowledge, and the case’s lacking it explains 
why knowledge falls short (e.g. the no-false-lemmas account of knowledge). 
 
0.2 Two reorientations 
What we have learned at the very least from our battles with Gettier cases was that 
the above strategy hasn’t served us well. In this thesis, instead of looking into particular 
epistemological problems with the cases and specific epistemic goods in the cognitive 
agency, I argue that it is the very approach of epistemic evaluations that requires a 
reorientation—more specifically, there are two reorientations that I wish to explore. 
 
0.2.1 The Instance-Generalisation Approach 
Firstly, I shall argue for a ‘case-driven’—instead of ‘theory-driven’—approach to 
formulating an account of knowledge. Traditionally, the dialectic of addressing the 
Gettier problem seems to be heavily theory laden. By this I mean that particular 
epistemological features always take centre stage in the discussion—a case meets 
some epistemic criteria and yet still falls short of knowledge, a further epistemic good 
is suggested to capture the essential nature of knowledge, and thus forming a new 
account. This traditional approach seeks to establish a robust relation between 
                                                          
3 Again, not everyone is that pessimistic on the prospect of this quest. However, the general 




particular epistemic features (be it justification, reliability, or aptness etc.) and our 
knowledge judgments in epistemic cases. Call this the Theory-Instantiation Approach 
(TIA). 
 
Before introducing the so-called ‘case-driven’ approach, here is a quick disclaimer: by 
differentiating itself from the theory-driven TIA I do not mean that the new approach is 
completely non-theoretically laden. Admittedly, as the proposed account of knowledge 
is developed certain epistemic features would become relevant, and I would inevitably 
test the theory against a range of ‘instances’ (i.e. epistemic cases) to determine 
whether it stands. In this regard, the new approach is not so different from the 
traditional one. What characteristically defines the reorientation, however, is that it 
places ‘instances’, not ‘theories’, as the primary focus to start our quest. Instead of 
looking particularly at various epistemic features as a cure for the problem, the new 
approach looks for commonalities across epistemic cases to diagnose how knowledge 
is systematically undermined.4 Note that this approach is indebted to the legacy of the 
Gettier literature—the latter offers a ‘corpus’ of epistemic cases that serve as the data 
for our observation. To begin our quest of investigating the nature of knowledge from 
‘instances’ (as suggested), I propose that we can try to collect a variety of epistemic 
cases and look at them without any theoretical lens (alas, to our best efforts). If we 
can identify commonalities among bona-fide cases of knowledge ascriptions and those 
among problematic knowledge undermining cases, perhaps we would be able to tell 
why the good cases are good without theoretical presumptions. Working out why the 
good cases are good does sound like what an informative account of knowledge would 
do. Call this way of formulating theories the Instance-Generalisation Approach (IGA). 
Ambitious as it is, this is the approach this project aims to explore. I’ll leave it for the 
readers to decide whether I’d been successful in keeping with the theoretical neutrality 
spirit of IGA, when everything is said and done. 
 
One can understand this reorientation as a change from a vertical to a horizontal 
consideration of epistemic cases—what IGA essentially does is to shift our attention 
                                                          
4 Of course, the study of commonalities in Gettier cases is not a novel idea. Zagzebski (1994), for 
example, notoriously offer an analysis of the general structure of Gettier cases. Note that while 
Zagzebski employs this idea to illustrate the inescapability of the problem, the current project in turn 
suggest that understanding the commonalities would help addressing the problem. 
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from diving into individual epistemic cases and their epistemic features to overviewing 
the shared feature(s) across a wide range of (bona-fide and problematic) epistemic 
cases. What commonalities might be found across cases? As hinted earlier, while 
discussions of cases vary across different epistemic features they focus on, there 
seems to be a mechanism for undermining knowledge that is common to all epistemic 
cases—that despite whatever epistemic good the hero possesses, he/she always has 
a somewhat misguided understanding towards the epistemic situation due to some 
information unbeknownst to him/her. In this thesis, I shall investigate how blocking this 
unbeknownst information element in the story would impact on one’s epistemic 
status—and whether it would shed light on the nature of knowledge. 
 
0.2.2 Holistic epistemic evaluation 
Secondly, I shall argue for a holistic—instead of analytic—approach to epistemic 
evaluations. It is clear that earlier works in the Gettier literature took the quest at hand 
to be the analysis of knowledge. More specifically, they aim to articulate a set of 
individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions of knowledge, and by so doing, 
suggest that the notion of knowledge can be broken down into more conceptually 
primitive components. While more sophisticated accounts today are generally less 
explicit in this endeavour, the spirit of the conventional practice remains—in the sense 
that one epistemic component or another (be it reliability, safety, aptness etc.) is being 
championed in the account, and is suggested to have captured the nature of 
knowledge. In the above discussion I have characterised the traditional practice 
(outlined by TIA) as bringing particular epistemic features into centre stage. In the new 
approach to epistemic evaluations, not only do I propose to move on from the focus of 
epistemic features, I also suggest that we should reconsider our emphasis on this 
‘particularity’ as well. Let me elaborate. 
 
In accounting for the nature of knowledge in terms of unbeknownst information, this 
study does not aim to investigate any particular components ‘constituting’ knowledge 
as it were. In fact, I challenge the extent to which these constitutive components 
capture the nature of knowledge. By contrast, I argue that the epistemic phenomenon 
that is knowledge is a kind of holistic phenomenon such that its instantiations can be 
fully evaluated only when the entire epistemic situation is being considered as a whole. 
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Further clarifications are in order: note that I am not arguing here that we cannot 
identify individual epistemic conditions (as we traditionally do) that are necessary to 
knowledge. In fact, I even concede that examining these epistemic conditions would 
considerably enhance our understanding of the notion of knowledge.5 That being said, 
the position I wish to advocate is that studying these epistemic components can only 
take us so far in the quest of capturing the nature of knowledge. Even if we have 
identified all individual epistemic components for a given case, they wouldn’t suffice 
for a complete understanding of the epistemic situation at hand—to achieve that we 
would need to consider how the individual components relate to each other (rather 
than how they operate on their own) in the case. It is in this specific sense that the 
proposed approach for epistemic evaluations is holistic. 
 
The idea behind this holistic approach is inspired and motivated by the overemphasis 
of individual epistemic components in the existing debate—and the problems it faced 
as a result (or so I argue). In the coming chapters I shall discuss a few examples of 
how taking the overall knowledge evaluations as merely consisting in its individual 
epistemic components has created problems for some accounts of knowledge—and 
how taking a holistic perspective might shed light on the situation. More generally, I 
argue that any accounts of knowledge that attempt to evaluate epistemic statuses by 
considering specific epistemic goods (such as reliability, safety, and aptness etc.) of 
individual components (such as target beliefs, pieces of evidence, cognitive processes 
etc.) will face challenges of various sorts for the fact that other relevant facets in the 
epistemic situation had not been given their due attention. 
 
Similar with the remarks in IGA, this is not to say that the epistemic significance of 
individual components are to be disregarded in epistemic evaluations. In fact, as the 
proposed view develops many of them will come into play across different epistemic 
situations. Again, the proposed reorientation rests on the shift of emphasis—instead 
of taking epistemic components as the focus of discussion, it takes epistemic 
evaluation as a dynamic matter that cannot be assessed out of context. Put differently, 
I argue that the significance of epistemic cases cannot be fully appreciated when we 
                                                          
5 For example, taking safety as a necessary condition tells us that knowledge is essentially 
incompatible with epistemic luck. 
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fix our gazes at particular epistemic components which consist in them. Consider a 
vivid example in epistemic defeat. Under the holistic framework I argue that it is difficult 
to determine the epistemic significance of an individual defeater without considering 
its place in the entire epistemic case—such a significance seems to hang much on the 
defeater’s interconnected relationship with other state of affairs in the situation (after 
all, defeaters can be further defeated, and their epistemic significance would change 
upon further defeat). As a result, any individual epistemic evaluation of a defeater 
would be misguided—in chapter 3, for example, I argue that this is how the problem 
of misleading defeat emerged. 
 
0.3 Structure of the thesis 
This thesis considers a new account of knowledge developed from the Instance-
Generalisation Approach and the holistic approach. I argue that knowledge construed 
under the proposed view is by its nature holistic and ecumenical. 
 
The thesis consists of three parts. Part 1 (Chapters 1 and 2) consists of the introduction 
of the two approaches and articulation of my positive view. 
 
In Chapter 1 I discuss Richard Foley’s (2012) insight that in knowledge undermining 
cases the agent always lack an important information. I suggest that Foley’s adequate 
information account (developed from this insight) is an example of IGA, and enjoys the 
advantage of being an ecumenical view with versatility in tackling ‘knowledge stories’ 
(in Foley’s term) in the literature. Nevertheless, I argue that the account falls short for 
its lack of a belief forming process on the agent’s part, which I consider as essential 
for epistemic evaluations to be possible in the first place. 
 
In Chapter 2 I introduce the holistic approach to epistemic evaluation as well as the 
element of belief forming process to the adequate information account, thus motivating 
my own positive view of adequately informed process (AP). Roughly, one knows when 
one’s belief forming process survives the scrutiny of relevant epistemic norms in the 
entire situation. I further motivate the view by suggesting that it resonates with the 
notion of superassertibility discussed by Crispin Wright (1993, 1994), as well as how 
knowledge is commonly construed in many other instances of our cognitive lives. 
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Part 2 (Chapters 3 and 4) consists of theoretical comparisons and further motivations 
for holism in epistemic evaluations. 
 
Chapter 3 discusses the relation between AP and defeasibility accounts of knowledge. 
I argue that the latter runs into problems with misleading defeat and defeat iterations 
because it assesses the epistemic significance of propositional defeaters individually 
and thus out of the entire situation. AP, in contrast, by considering the epistemic role 
of particular defeaters within the whole case, does not face the problem of defeat 
iterations and is able to give the desirable verdicts in cases of misleading defeat. 
 
Chapter 4 explores the connections between AP and virtue epistemology (VE). In the 
discussion of cases that I called ‘passive testimony’, I argue that contrary to what VE 
suggests, in particularly friendly epistemic situations one’s cognitive success does not 
need to be creditable to one’s cognitive agency. Instead, I suggest a ‘minimal’ ability 
condition that one’s success needs only be a product of the agency in order for one to 
claim epistemic ownership. I argue that on the one hand such a condition fits well with 
AP as a prerequisite for epistemic evaluations, and on the other hand, the holistic 
approach of AP can be instrumental in evaluating certain tricky instances of partial 
competence manifestations troubling VE. 
 
Part 3 (Chapters 5 and 6) consists of applications of the proposed theoretical 
framework and its ecumenical nature of epistemic evaluations. 
 
Chapter 5 is an example of how the AP as an ecumenical theory can be applied in 
various forms. In particular, I discuss the anti-luck platitude of knowledge and how AP 
might accommodate this platitude. The chapter first elucidates how knowledge is 
incompatible with the easy possibility of errors, and thus an anti-luck condition that 
offers appropriate modal protection from errors is essential to any accounts of 
knowledge. Following that, I demonstrate the ecumenicity of AP by arguing that it can 
encompass either the safety principle or the sensitivity principle (depending on one’s 
theoretical commitments), by assuming certain epistemic norms. 
 
Chapter 6 is a speculative attempt to articulate the AP view on epistemic justification, 
and to further explore the relation between AP and different norms of belief one might 
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commit. It is suggested that one’s belief is justified when it is acceptably ideal (with 
regards to relevant norms) given one’s total evidence. Not only do knowledge and 
justification fit well intuitively with each other under the AP view, they also resonate 
with the more familiar distinction of objective and subjective oughts in moral philosophy. 
Furthermore, I argue that such an ecumenical account of justification demonstrates its 
versatility in applications, allowing for a variety of hybrid renderings that result in 













Knowledge and Adequate Information 
 
1.1 Foley’s adequate information account 
In the introduction it is advertised that the current project would adopt the Instance-
Generalisation Approach (IGA) and look for commonalities in epistemic cases without 
any theoretical presuppositions. What then might the commonalities be? Problems 
arise when we attempt to answer this. First, there is no guarantee that epistemologists 
have a consensual verdict regarding the data—especially for complex Gettier cases 
where good and bad epistemic features are meddling with one another. Even if we 
grant that epistemologists have somewhat reliable judgments on instances of 
knowledge and ignorance, there is no guarantee that these instances add up to any 
observable commonalities—indeed, what we consider instances of bona fide 
knowledge seem to be so distinct from one another. One might ask, for example, what 
interesting commonalities might lie within a case of calculating correctly a 
mathematical equation and a case of learning the temperature tomorrow from the 
weather reporter? 
 
While I do not claim that I had the answers to these challenges, we must start 
somewhere. One less interesting but worth considering response is that knowledge 
instances as variant and distinct as these might really have less epistemically 
significant features in common than we expected as it turns out. Granted, the two 
cases mentioned above are both instances of knowledge, but could it be that they 
attained this ‘knowledge’ status in different ways, undergoing different mechanisms, 
and thus displaying different epistemic features? Note that this wouldn’t prevent one 
to formulate an informative account of knowledge. Indeed, Richard Foley (2012) 
presented an ecumenical account of this sort, offering an ingenious observation with 
regards to epistemic instances—while we may come to know for a variety of reasons, 
there is still a commonality among knowledge stories in that, whenever we ascribe 
knowledge to one, one does not lack important information regarding the proposition 
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known. In this chapter I shall look into Foley’s account of knowledge developed from 
this insight. 
 
Let’s revisit typical exchanges in Gettier literature under the Theory Instantiation 
Approach (TIA) paradigm. First, consider an account of knowledge. Then narrate 
some counterexamples in which the epistemic status of an agent in the described 
situation cannot be accounted for under the targeted account. More sophisticated (and 
complex) theories follow to account for these difficult cases, only to face further 
oppositions from more counterexamples of their own. 
 
Regardless of whether or not one considers TIA had made any progress, one 
undeniable legacy of the Gettier literature is that it provided us with an abundance of 
epistemic cases of various sorts. Indeed, this offers IGA the ‘data’ it needs to begin 
with. Without the accumulation of Gettier counterexamples displaying various 
epistemic features, it might be difficult to find a legitimate starting place for the said 
approach—now, since we have been relatively unsuccessful in addressing these 
epistemic cases, why not look into them to see whether there are any common 
features on their part contributing to their vicious triumphs so far? Thus, we start our 
quest from investigating the commonalities among these problematic ‘instances’ (or, 
as Foley describes them, ‘knowledge stories’) that concerned us. 
 
According to Foley, discussions of counterexamples in the Gettier literature is 
analogous to storytelling. The narrator who introduces the new case to the literature 
has constructed the story carefully, describing certain situations surrounding the hero 
in his believing P. The aim of the storytelling is to elicit certain reactions on the 
audience part—particularly, to convince the audience (i.e. fellow epistemologists) with 
regards to the hero’s epistemic status. This can go either way—the story can suggest 
that knowledge is undermined even though the target account is satisfied, rendering 
the account too weak; or that knowledge is intact despite the said account falls short, 
rendering the account too strong. Most stories aim to achieve the former, so let’s take 
a look at how the stories achieve this aim. 
 
Insofar as the target account is unambiguously laid out, one might think it wouldn’t be 
too difficult to tell a story to the effect that fellow epistemologists would concede that 
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the account is satisfied. However, things aren’t always that simple. Proponents of the 
target view may well protest that the account offered by the storyteller wasn’t 
accurately articulated, resulting in more ramifications to the debate. This happens 
more often than one might think as contemporary accounts of knowledge are often 
perplexed. Also, the account might even be deliberately vague to some extent—by 
this I mean it is not always a definitive matter that the conditions (unambiguously laid 
out) in the account are met in some situations. In these hard cases it would be tricky 
to determine whether or not the account is met even if everything has been cleared 
up. However, this is not the focus of Foley’s discussion on the game of general 
knowledge stories—we may leave the complexity of these issues to debates regarding 
specific accounts. Let’s grant for the sake of argument that the hero of the story had 
satisfied a particular account of knowledge, how then does the storyteller elicit the 
desired knowledge judgements from the audience? Foley suggests that the storyteller 
highlights an epistemic shortcoming of the hero—namely, certain information about 
the situation the hero missed out (probably not to his fault). Of course, we seldom are 
perfectly informed about everything while claiming to know certain things—however, 
the crucial move for the storyteller is to suggest that the lacking information is of 
epistemic importance in the situation. This involves storytelling techniques. Consider 
what Foley discussed (my italics): 
 
The most basic (technique) is selectivity. Real situations are lush, whereas 
stories are selectively incomplete. The storyteller decides which of a potentially 
limitless set of details about characters and settings to omit and which to include, 
and what emphasis to put on those that are included. The ways in which these 
storytelling decisions are made pull the reactions of listeners in one direction or 
another. It is no different with knowledge stories. Stories in which a character has 
a true belief can be told to make gaps in her information seem important, but they 
can also be told to diminish the significance of whatever gaps there are. Call the 
latter a “narrow telling.”1 
 
Stories weren’t supposed to be a complete account of what happened. Propositions 
in stories weren’t supposed to be treated equally. Instead, they vary in importance to 
                                                          
1 Foley (2012), p. 15. 
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the storyline. Naturally the storyteller would highlight the more important details and 
omit the less important ones. What’s more intriguing is that, according to Foley, not 
only can storytellers create ‘information gaps’ (details of the story which is 
unbeknownst to our hero in the story), they can also emphasise or diminish the 
significance of these gaps. To illustrate, Foley retold the barn façade county in such a 
way that the nearby fake barns—and the fact that George (our hero) is unaware of 
them—are less significant to the story: 
 
Imagine that the barn where he has stopped his car was the location of an 
especially important event of his childhood. It was his memory of this event that 
motivated him at great time and expense to return to the region and seek out this 
specific location. Since he has no interest in the other locations he has passed 
through or in the other barns he has apparently been seeing, he has paid scant 
attention to them. It is this particular location that was the sole purpose of his 
trip.2 
 
When the story is retold this way, it does seem less important that George is unaware 
of the facades in the vicinity. Foley also suggested that we the audience ‘may be more 
ready to concede that he knows’. Indeed, after the modification, one could make a 
case that George’s belief is now safe—given the way George looks exclusively for this 
barn, he wouldn’t have easily believed falsely. As safety is often considered as what 
undermines George’s knowledge in the original case, retelling the story as such indeed 
made knowledge ascription more plausible. Such results are particularly intriguing 
when one considers how the retelling is not intended to be theory-laden in the first 
place—Foley didn’t seem to have safety in mind, or aims to make George’s belief safe 
for that matter, when he made the modification. Instead, Foley only aims to alter what 
is important in the story, and safety comes into play. As a general remark, by seeking 
commonalities among epistemic cases in a pre-theoretical lens we may discover that 
certain theoretical features (e.g. safety) would fall in line when they become relevant 
in specific cases. It might turn out that certain account of knowledge emerged from 
this non-theoretically laden approach wouldn’t introduce any new epistemic feature to 
our epistemic evaluation, but instead outline a new way of thinking about existing 
                                                          
2 Ibid, p. 15-16. 
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features, and how to determine their epistemic significance across various situations. 
Keeping this remark in mind, let’s take a closer look to Foley’s particular account. 
 
As Foley believed that the agent’s information gap is essential in knowledge 
ascriptions, his account tries to put restrictions on information gaps. He suggested that 
to know one must have adequate information. Without specification such adequacy is 
left theoretically vague. However, Foley thinks that such adequacy could be tested 
negatively, in that there are no important information gaps3—i.e. one must not lack 
important true beliefs (he takes information just as true beliefs). 4 In other words, 
Foley’s account of adequate information consists only in true beliefs, and nothing 
(categorically different from true beliefs) more. To know P one needs only to have 
enough true beliefs with regards to P. To determine what is ‘enough’, one needs only 
to make sure that there is no true belief important to P that the agent lacks. On the 
other hand, if S has a true belief that P that falls short of knowledge, S must have 
missed out certain other true belief(s) important to P. Foley gave the following account: 
 
If S has a true belief P but does not know P, then it ought to be possible to identify 
a proposition Q such that (i) Q is an important truth and (ii) S does not believe 
Q.5 
 
This, as Foley suggested, is an important shared feature among Gettier 
counterexamples—it seems that we can always identify in Gettier stories some 
important information the hero lacks—something that holds ‘unbeknownst to S’. 
Without at least implicitly hinting such lack of information in the story it is very hard to 
imagine how some true belief falls short of knowledge.6 In the following section I shall 
                                                          
3 According to Foley, there is always an information gap between the agent and the real situation—as 
he describes, the world is “lush” with facts “radiate out in all directions”, therefore no matter how well 
informed one might be, it is almost certain that there is some truth about the situation one would 
missed out. What is essential is that the facts missed out are not important. 
4 Ibid, p.3-4. 
5 Ibid, p. 8. Note that (ii) should be taken as ¬Bs(Q), which include disbelief, suspension of judgment, 
and being not aware of Q. 
6 At the first glance, the account might look affined to positions such as ‘no false lemmas’. Upon 
reflections, however, the two are significantly different—while no false lemmas is an ‘inward looking’ 
view demanding no false assumptions from what the agent believes, adequate information is ‘outward 
looking’ in requiring that there can be no important truth external to the agent’s beliefs. In this regard, 
it can be argued that adequate information is related to defeasibility theories in some way—note that 
this will be addressed in chapter 3. For now, another distinctive feature to bear in mind is that Foley’s 
view is advocated to be ecumenical—there can be many reasons a piece of information is important; 
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examine how this account of knowledge tackles some of the usual suspects in Gettier 
literature. 
 
1.2 Adequate information at work 
In the introduction we mentioned how the Gettier game developed in the previous 
decades—how new accounts learned from previous failures in devising their own 
theoretical frameworks. As a result, one can expect that a theory developed partly out 
of the lesson of previous troubling cases would competently tackle the latter—it is, 
after all, the new vaccine developed to cure those diseases. Consider safety theory 
for example. It looks much more promising and fitting when addressing the barn 
façade case as well as the trash chute case (which Sosa devised to undermine 
sensitivity in favour of safety); perform just well enough to fend off many other cases7; 
and fall short in Temp-style cases (targeted specifically at safety). 
 
As Gettier counterexamples are designed to target particular theories, each of them 
has an underlying agendum in play—to highlight how some specific epistemic feature 
fails to capture the notion of knowledge. This makes it difficult for certain theory to 
accommodate all Gettier cases perfectly8. Indeed, since the cases are designed to 
hinder different (specific) theories by highlighting a variety of epistemic shortcomings, 
any account which champions particular epistemic goods is bound to fluctuate in 
performance across them. However, adequate information is no such theory—Foley 
did not champion any epistemic goods among others. Instead, it is a main feature that 
the adequate information account remains ecumenical. As Foley puts it, ‘knowledge 
is a mutt. Proper pedigree is not required’.9 A piece of information can be important 
                                                          
whereas I take it that no false lemmas view pertains specifically to the agent’s inferences from false 
assumptions. 
7 I believe there are cases where safety does give the correct verdict but may not necessarily be 
offering the best diagnosis. Consider the classic 10-coins case where Smith believes truly that the 
person who is hired has 10 coins in the pocket. Surely he could have easily believed falsely, having 
not counted the coins in his own pocket—but the better explanation of Smith’s error seems to run 
along lines like ‘Smith has mistaken the person who would be hired’, which in principle could happen 
independently from his doxastic modal profile (just as in Temp-style cases). 
8 By this I do not mean to claim that no account on the market is able to give the ‘desirable verdicts’ in 
all cases. However, as I shall elaborate further there seems to be a gap between getting the verdicts 
right and offering the best explanation for knowledge ascriptions in the cases. The idea here is that 
since different counterexamples target on different epistemic features, it is not to be expected in an 
account of knowledge that it offers the best explanations (of why they know/fails to know) to every 
counterexamples—the explanation an account gives would fit better in some cases than in others. 
See fn. 7 for an example. 
9 Ibid, p. 5 
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for many reasons. This allows versatility in Foley’s account to offer the best 
explanations across scenarios—suggesting that particular pieces of information 
(important on different scores) are lacking. To observe this ecumenical approach at 
work and appreciate its versatility, let’s run the account against several commonly 
discussed Gettier cases. 
 
BARN FAÇADE George is driving through the country. As he looks through the 
window he sees a barn-shape building across the field, thus coming to believe 
that ‘there’s a barn in the field’. The building he spotted is indeed a genuine 
barn—however, unbeknownst to him, there are many fake barns in the vicinity, 
so cleverly disguised that, visitors who had not taken a closer look would most 
likely mistaken them as barns. It turns out that George is looking at one of the 
few genuine barns in the area.10 
 
With regards to identifying barns it is of course important to notice that there are barn 
façades in the vicinity. The fact that George lacks this information undermines his 
knowledge because such a situation would call for a more cautious belief forming 
practices on George’s part regarding his barn beliefs. More generally, George does 
not seem to have enough grasp of the situation with regards to the truth of the targeted 
belief. Now, it would seem that barn façades awareness in the environment is 
important not because lacking it would lead to certain misunderstandings (as in 10-
coins case, see fn. 7); rather, so doing would result in risky belief formations with false 
beliefs in many close worlds. It would therefore be apt to consider that the safety 
principle is in play to explain the information importance in this particular case.11 As 
we consider more cases, we can appreciate the adequate information as an 
ecumenical approach—since different stories have different emphases, the lacking 
information in the cases are important for different reasons (i.e. various epistemic 
features would be in play), it is argued. 
 
                                                          
10 The original case was credited to Carl Ginet and was first published by Goldman (1976). 
11 Again, this shows how IGA would go back to particular theoretical features in application. Granted, 
adequate information has not assumed any predominant feature to begin with. This doesn’t mean that 
these epistemic features from other accounts cannot be in play when explaining why certain 
information is important. 
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FAKE SHEEP Smith is in the country and sees a sheep-shaped object across 
the field. He thus forms the belief that ‘there is a sheep in the field’. As it turns 
out, he’s looking at a rock that is incredibly sheep-like in shape from distance. 
Smith nonetheless believes truly, however, because there indeed is a sheep in 
the field, hidden behind the rock and not visible from Smith’s location.12 
 
Smith obviously missed the information that the object he saw was a rock rather than 
a sheep. Such missing information is important because it would have prevented him 
from the ill-formed belief that there is a sheep in the field (in virtue of looking at a 
rock).13 Without this information he had mistaken his perception of the rock as an 
evidence for a sheep, thus believing truly for the wrong reasons. One of the main initial 
responses to Gettier cases is that knowledge must not be derived from false grounds. 
One could tell a story in such a way that the missing information is important in light of 
intuitions along this line of thoughts (or others, see fn. 13). 
 
TEMP Temp forms his beliefs about the temperature in the room by consulting a 
thermometer. His beliefs, so formed, are highly reliable, in that any belief he 
forms on this basis will always be correct. Moreover, he has no reason for 
thinking that there is anything amiss with his thermometer. But the thermometer 
is in fact broken, and is fluctuating randomly within a given range. Unbeknownst 
to Temp, there is an agent hidden in the room who is in control of the thermostat 
whose job it is to ensure that every time Temp consults the thermometer the 
“reading” on the thermometer corresponds to the temperature in the room.14 
 
Temp’s beliefs accord with the actual temperature robustly—he could not have easily 
formed a false belief regarding temperature. However, they operate under a 
mechanism unknown to Temp—his beliefs are reliable not because of the 
thermometer at work but the thermostat manipulated by the hidden agent. This missing 
                                                          
12 Adapted from Chisholm (1966). 
13 Indeed, depending on one’s theoretical endeavour, there could be many ways to highlight the 
importance of the missing information. For example, defeasibility theorists may offer an equally 
plausible story that the importance stems from the information’s ability to defeat Smith’s justification. 
While I do think some theories fit better with particular cases than others, I do not claim that all Gettier 
cases have one and only one corresponding theory that offers the best explanation—sometimes two 
theories might fare equally well. 
14 Pritchard (2012), pp. 260. 
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information is suggested to be important—so much so that it undermines knowledge 
of these safe beliefs. As a general remark, it is suggested that any instances of 
knowledge require appropriate connections between the agent and the state of affairs. 
Such connections can have different manifestations—be it the right kind of evidence, 
an appropriate causal link or an appropriate competence in the belief formation. 
Depending on the theoretical framework(s) the storyteller commits to, the missing 
information is important as Temp’s doxastic outcomes (robustly true as they may be) 
have nothing to do with the relevant features possessed by the agent. 
 
Cases could pose challenge to theories of knowledge in another direction—instead of 
telling a story where knowledge is undermined for factors the theory fails to account 
for, one could present bona fide instances of knowledge where the criteria set by the 
theory are not met. As a theory of knowledge it would be worth seeing how Foley’s 
adequate information account fares in cases of this kind. The general observation is 
that when one knows one does not lack any important true beliefs. Take Foley’s own 
example of some quiz contestant’s true belief that the Battle of Marathon took place in 
490 BCE. Suppose she learnt this fact in her high school history class and correctly 
recalled it, suppose also that she only remembers this fact and nothing else relating 
to the battle, it seems that we would still be happy to ascribe knowledge to her—at 
least with regards to the date. Indeed, in the context of a quiz game, not much else 
matters other than the fact in concerned—the defining feature of ‘knowing the answer’ 
is simply to give the truth of the answer of the question asked. Since the contestant 
has the true belief and her memory (we assume) is functioning normally, it is hard to 
deny her knowledge despite the limitation of her epistemic status on that matter. Now, 
Foley offers a straight forward explanation from his account—since in the context of a 
quiz game there’s no important information other than the correct answer itself, the 
contestant’s does not lack important information. In other words, in this particular 
situation merely one piece of information (the answer) is considered adequate. 
Consequently, the contestant knows the answer—not because her epistemic standing 
is particularly good regarding the question; but simply because it is enough for a quiz 
game.15 
                                                          
15 This diagnosis might create trouble, it would seem. If only the target belief is relevantly important in 
this context as Foley claimed, presumably one cannot have that true belief and fail to know—that is, 
one cannot be Gettiered in a quiz setting. Indeed, as we will see in the coming section this ties in with 
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1.3 Potential challenges 
In the following section I shall raise a few concerns regarding Foley’s adequate 
information view. The first problem concerns whether the information’s importance is 
determined in solely intellectual terms, or do practical concerns play a role on that 
matter. While such discussion inevitably touches on the controversy between 
traditional invariantists and pragmatic epistemological views (including contextualism 
and subject-sensitive invariantism), my objection here is more of a clarificatory remark 
on Foley’s position. As Foley endorsed a pragmatic reading on information importance 
for epistemic evaluations, my argument against him will focus on how it need not be 
the case given the ecumenical spirit of the adequate information account. Thus, the 
section here does not aim to positively establish an invariantist position, but rather to 
make a negative claim—that adequate information is not committed to any pragmatic 
epistemological views. Such clarification would be relevant in the next chapter as I 
discuss the ecumenical nature of my own account. 
 
The second and the third problems, on the other hand, point to the same, more serious 
concern with regards to Foley’s view. In particular, by understanding knowledge 
merely in terms of true beliefs, I argue that adequate information has difficulties in 
elucidating a sensible connection between information—why particular ones, but not 
others, are relevant to the target belief in the knowledge story. Indeed, this is a major 
motivation to consider a new account (as I shall articulate in chapter 2). 
 
1.3.1 Practical importance 
In the last sections, I had presented Foley’s negative test that supposedly would 
demystify when information is considered ‘adequate’—whenever knowledge is 
undermined, S must lack certain important information. While it is quite clear what 
‘lacking an information’ amounts to, one might still question what information is 
‘important’ in Foley’s lights. It could be argued that the vagueness of Foley’s account 
merely shifts from what pertains to ‘adequacy’ to that pertains to ‘importance’. When 
and why is some information more important than others in a story? It seems that 
                                                          




without addressing this question the negative test cannot be any more illuminating 
than the ‘adequate information’ slogan. 
 
Foley did elaborate further on this score. As he sees it, in order to determine the 
importance of some truth, both practical and intellectual factors must be taken into 
account. If, both factors considered, a truth is ‘important enough’, then S must be 
aware of it in order to attain knowledge. Consider the example Foley discussed: 
 
(T)here is no purely intellectual measure for how important a piece of information 
is. Information about the atomic numbers of various chemical elements is 
generally regarded as more important than information about how many grains 
of salt there are in a shaker of salt, but not because the former is intrinsically 
more significant and not solely for intellectual reasons either. Its importance 
derives rather from complex links with our lives in all their detail, and in particular, 
with the full range of human concerns and values.16 
 
One must examine the above claims with caution. Granted, it is undeniable that the 
value and significance overall of a piece of information cannot be determined solely 
from intellectual measures. However, this does not mean that we cannot single out the 
intellectual from the practical and maintain that when it comes to determining 
values/importance of the information pertaining to the epistemic, it is solely the former 
that is in play. Here is an attempt to distinguish between pragmatic and intellectual 
importance. 
 
While we could appreciate how the atomic numbers of various chemical elements are 
more important than the amount of salt in our kitchen, we could illustrate the former’s 
significance in two distinctive levels. The atomic numbers can be important to us 
because they have wider range of implications and applications in our lives. In other 
words, such information is more useful with regards to our human concerns. On the 
other hand, a scientist can consider it more important to our intellectual concerns 
because it is instrumental to a wider variety of our other inquiries—it leads us to a 
                                                          
16 Foley (2012), p. 25-26. My italics. Note that this is a familiar line of argument in epistemology 
against the more traditional view which maintains that epistemic values can be determined purely in 
intellectual/truth-aiming terms. For responses, see Pritchard (2016a) and Treanor (2013, 2014). 
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better understanding of more things compared with the grains of salt information.17 
This marks the distinction between pragmatic and intellectual importance. The 
pragmatic importance of information seems to be a normative matter with regards to 
human concerns and values; whereas the intellectual importance thereof is veritic in 
nature—it concerns first and foremost truths, not about itself (it is very odd at least to 
ponder on the importance of a statement on its own truth), but other related statements. 
Keeping this distinction in mind we can even appreciate how the amount of salt in 
kitchen might be considered more important than fundamental chemical knowledge 
under appropriate contexts. Suppose I have to know whether there is more salt than 
pepper in my kitchen, the amount of salt is certainly one of the two important pieces 
of information required to settle this inquiry, more (intellectually) important than the 
atomic number of sodium, even though the latter generally has much wider 
implications to other truths. By the same token, suppose it is my mother’s birthday and 
I wish to bake the perfect cake for her, the amount of salt I have would be more 
(pragmatically) important than some cold universal chemical facts to me. Interestingly 
this seems to match with what Foley himself had remarked—the importance (of both 
sorts) of information in these cases really depends on how the story is unfolded. 
However, this does not seem to hinder us from clearly distinguishing between the 
intellectual and the practical—and maintaining that solely intellectual factors are 
considered when it comes to the epistemic importance of the information.18 
 
Perhaps Foley had not been fully elaborative in his pragmatic appeal. Traditional 
pragmatic approaches to knowledge do not merely highlight how one’s belief(s) might 
be significant in practical measures. Rather they give a story as to how such 
significance carries epistemic relevance. Take the atomic number of some chemical 
compound for example. It no doubt is useful to certain aspects of our lives—but this is 
not what pragmatic epistemologists claim. Rather, the claim is that certain aspects of 
the epistemic status of a belief depends on the pragmatic importance of it—not in the 
veritic sense that it supports/disproves propositions (like intellectually important 
information), rather in the normative sense that our valuing the proposition demands 
                                                          
17 Treanor (2013, 2014) made a similar point in his Gold miners analogy. 
18 This only suggests that invariantist is a viable view and should not be taken as a move against 
contextualism/pragmatic encroachment. The debate between the two is beyond the scope of this 
project. I wish only to establish that Foley’s adequate information account, much aligned with his 
ecumenical flavour, does not commit oneself to any of the two views. 
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higher levels of epistemic standard for its truth. Foley did express similar thoughts in 
a pair of cases he discussed: 
 
Consider a foreman who works in a factory that makes highly noxious chemicals 
and who is responsible for the air purification equipment at the factory. He is 
aware that the equipment is exceedingly well engineered and aware also there 
has never been a problem with it during the two years it has been in operation. 
His job nonetheless requires him to inspect the equipment daily, which he does 
on his morning rounds. There is a warning light on the equipment that is green 
when the equipment is working properly and red when it is not purifying the air. 
The foreman is unaware that the warning mechanism has just shorted so that 
even if there were a problem with the equipment, the green light would remain 
on. He could have disconnected the purifier elements to check whether the 
warning light is functioning properly, but he does not. He looks at the light, sees 
that it is green, and believes that the equipment is purifying the air just as it 
always has…Moreover, he is correct. The equipment is working perfectly. 
 
Consider now another story that is in most ways analogous, only the stakes are 
not nearly so high. The same foreman before going to work at the factory each 
day uses an electric toaster to toast a piece of bread. The toaster has a small 
light that is green if the toaster is working properly and red if the coils are not 
heating sufficiently to toast bread. The make of his toaster has an extremely high 
reliability rating, and the foreman has never had a problem with it in the two years 
he has owned it. Unbeknownst to him, however, the warning mechanism…has 
just shorted in such a way that the light would be green even if the heating coils 
were not working…he could have gone to the trouble of disconnecting the coils 
to test whether the warning light is functioning properly, but he does not. He 
pushes the handle of the toaster down, the green light illuminates, and he starts 
to prepare his coffee, believing that his bread is toasting as usual, and indeed it 
is.19 
 
                                                          
19 Ibid, p. 26-27. I had not made any changes to Foley’s original cases since the details the narrator 
gave is of paramount importance to Foley’s account. 
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Foley suggests that we are more inclined to grant knowledge in the latter case than in 
the former, due to the higher stakes involved in erring in the factory. In other words, 
the insensitivity of the green light in telling whether the machine is functioning normally 
is more important information in the factory case than in the toast case, since the 
consequence is more severe. While Foley’s verdicts on the cases may be on point, I 
do not agree that they necessarily have to do with the differences in stakes. In his 
argument for the foreman’s knowledge about the toast, Foley emphasised that the 
foreman ‘has lots of evidence about the reliability of the toaster and…the stakes of his 
being wrong are minor’. I suspect it is solely the former that alters the verdict for his 
knowing the toast. In the story there are many other pieces of evidence for the toasting 
of the bread, more importantly, Foley deliberately downplayed the problematic 
evidence—it is not even clear whether the foreman had paid attention to the green 
light, let alone basing his belief on it. On the other hand, although the factory’s air 
purifier is also suggested to be very reliable, the story specifically highlights that the 
foreman is required to check on the light in his belief formation.20 Thus, the problem 
here seems to be that the cases are not that analogous in epistemically relevant 
respects. If we retell the story to highlight the role of the greenlight in his toast belief 
formation, the differences in verdict would no longer be so apparent. Suppose the 
foreman is in charge of toasting breads for the family, and is requested by his wife 
specifically to check the green light, the light is on despite failing to indicate the 
functionality of the toaster. The foreman looks at the light and forms the belief that the 
toaster is functioning properly—and it is, making toasts for the family as usual despite 
the malfunctioning green light. The thing is, I would be inclined to think that knowledge 
is undermined in such a story—the foreman does not seem to have acquired the true 
belief the right way (whatever it is). Indeed, such a case standing alone seems to be 
just another classic Gettier mishap. 
 
Note that the conclusion I’d like to draw here is negative—I think Foley’s take on the 
cases, and thus his pragmatic take on information importance, are misguided. In 
particular, the importance of information the foreman lacks don’t seem to depend on 
stakes, but rather on the way he forms the belief. We are certain in the factory case 
                                                          
20 The story hadn’t offer the foreman clues other than the green light to detect a chemical hazard. I 
think it is safe to assume that detecting a burnt toast would be an easier task. 
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that knowledge is undermined not because the consequences of errors are severe, 
but rather because it is clearer that he relies on an erroneous process (checking the 
shorted lights) to form his belief(s). While I’m sympathetic to the traditional invariantist 
view myself, it is not the purpose of the project to establish such view. All in all, rather 
than asserting that the correct adequate information account is an invariantist one, I 
wish to maintain a weaker claim that it does not commit one to either direction on this 
score (pace Foley). Thus, in the coming chapter I would not be discussing further how 
there cannot be pragmatic factors in one’s epistemic evaluations. I would instead 
postulate that my ecumenical view can really accommodate both stances, depending 
on one’s theoretical commitments. 
 
1.3.2 Informing the hero and closing the gap 
George spotted a real barn in the field. His knowledge is undermined because he lacks 
the information that the area is surrounded by barn façades indiscernible from real 
barns at distance. Suppose now George is being informed about this—being aware of 
the nearby façades he still thinks that the barn he’s looking at is genuine, and continue 
to believe (truly) that there’s a barn. Opponents of adequate information might suggest 
that merely closing the information gap is not enough. Presumably we are still reluctant 
to grant George knowledge in this retold story. If anything one could argue that the 
better informed George even becomes epistemically blameworthy for still believing 
that the barn is genuine. Indeed, there seems to be certain ‘defectiveness of 
justification or whatever’, as Foley puts it, in the case. If it is really the case that George 
doesn’t know because he lacks certain information, one would naturally think that had 
he been given that piece of information knowledge would have been secured. On the 
same token, as adding the information doesn’t ‘fix’ George knowledge, we might have 
reasons to suspect that the information is not that ‘important’ to knowledge after all. 
 
Foley did address this concern. It is important to note that this is not a direct challenge 
to the adequate information account. Foley never said in the account that adding the 
important information would grant one knowledge. Instead, he emphasised that it is a 
negative test—if one fails to know there ought to be an identifiable important 
information the agent had missed. When George is aware that there are many barn 
façades in the area, this effectively becomes a new story—and having the important 
36 
 
information (of the original story) does not guarantee George adequate information 
now. There might be other important information he lacks in this new story that 
undermines his knowledge. As Foley suggested, the information George lacks in this 
new story is how the object he spotted looks from the rear and sides. 21  Such 
information becomes important only after the story was retold. Given that this is a barn 
façade county looking at the other sides is the best way to check whether certain object 
really is a barn—without the check it would be too risky to have barn beliefs with so 
many fakes nearby. A lesson to learn from this is that the importance of information in 
stories seems to be a dynamic matter. Some other information might rise to relevance 
when the story is retold. As a result, adding the originally important information to the 
hero’s beliefs is not guaranteed to close the information gap—new gap may (or may 
not22) arise. 
 
While I concede that the story Foley gave is plausible, one could nevertheless argue 
that better alternatives are available. In 1.2 I briefly discussed how a theory could work 
in some cases (as in giving the right verdict) while not capturing its core issue (see the 
case of safety in fn. 7). I suspect similar things hold for this new barn story. Foley did 
bring up the issue of ‘defective justification’ of some sort but then suggest that it could 
be explained in terms of lacking some information. It strikes me that the latter is really 
derivative of the former. Let me elaborate. When George is said to lack knowledge 
because he lacks the information about the object’s rear and sides, the reason why he 
needs this information (or in Foley’s terms why it is important) goes back to George’s 
justification of his barn belief—his justification is defeated (by the fact that it is a barn 
façade county) and he needs to look at the rear and sides to verify the barn he saw as 
authentic (thus defeating the original defeater of his justification). This is not to say 
that Foley’s account is derivative of the defeasibility account of knowledge. In fact, the 
theory involved in explaining (in the best lights) the significance of information vary 
from case to case (as shown in 1.2). However, in all of the cases it seems that the 
explanation inevitably involves some norm(s) of belief formation on the agent’s part, 
be it the defeasibility of justification, reliability/safety of one’s processes, or aptness of 
                                                          
21 Foley (2012), p. 23. 
22 One could imagine cases where no other information is lacking in the new story and adding the 
missing information closes the gap for good. For example, if George in the new story is further 
informed how the rear and sides look for the thing he saw, we would grant knowledge to him as to 
whether it is a barn (or a façade). 
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cognitive successes. It is my opinion that the importance of information really derives 
from these norms of belief forming practices. Without looking back to the explanatory 
roles played by the norms, the adequate information story consisting only in true 
beliefs is essentially incomplete. This point would become even more apparent in the 
next section. 
 
1.3.3 Relevant information 
In 1.3.1 I had discussed how information under Foley’s account might be important to 
our target belief—on practical and intellectual levels. However, the link between the 
two propositions still isn’t entirely clear. The question I have in mind is this: now the 
hero has a target belief and there is important information he lacks—how are the two 
related with regards to, say, supporting/defeating one another’s truth? Why is some 
information, but not other, relevant to our target belief? 
 
According to Foley, important truths could be found ‘in the neighbourhood of P’23. 
Admittedly this is somewhat vague, but it does suggest certain conceptual or 
spatiotemporal ‘closeness’ between the important truths and P. Foley elaborate such 
closeness in later chapters: 
 
Some propositions are so closely connected with P that it is neither possible for 
P to be true without their also being true nor for S to believe P without also 
believing them. At the other extreme are truths so distant conceptually, spatially, 
temporally, or causally that they play no discernible role in her believing P or in 
P’s being true. Between these two extremes are truths that play some role...either 
in P’s being true or S’s believing P.24 
 
This discussion needs a bit more unpacking, in order for us to appreciate how one 
truth is ‘close’ to another in Foley’s lights—that I have particular visual perception of a 
barn, or that there are façades in the spatial vicinity, are close to my belief that there’s 
a barn; that Brown is in Barcelona, on the other hand, is far off in relation to my barn 
belief(s). That the number 621 was drawn, or that there are altogether 1000 balls in 
                                                          
23 Ibid, p. 8. 
24 Ibid, p. 29. 
38 
 
the draw, are close to the truth that ticket 126 is a loser; while there being 52 cards in 
a deck is again some remote truth to the lottery. These cases are relatively 
unproblematic because the contrasting propositions I bring up are obviously far off. 
However, if spatial closeness is one of the criteria, are propositions like there being a 
fake sheep inside the barn, or there being a dead beetle inside the number 621 ball, 
close to the target propositions respectively? Spatially they are even closer than the 
fake barns and other balls in the vicinity, why do our intuitions suggest that they are 
not relevant (I suppose that we do) to the target beliefs? Consider the following three 
truths. i. Smith completed university at age 23; ii. Smith met his wife at the university; 
iii. Smith has a bachelor degree. All of them hold for Smith and are personal 
information about him. Supposedly they are close in one way or another (e.g. Smith 
wouldn’t have met his wife had he not attended the university). Why does i (but not ii) 




Explaining the links between one belief supporting another is no easy task. It often 
involves complex belief forming processes not necessarily explicable, let alone be 
aware of, on the agent’s part. I mentioned above that Foley’s account of knowledge 
consists only in true beliefs (i.e. information in Foley’s terms). Thus, the natural move 
for Foley to illuminate such links is to suggest (as he does) that ‘how truths are 
connected is itself information, indeed, often crucial information’25. However, if we take 
these complex links between truths as merely more truths, thereby reducing our belief 
forming processes to true beliefs, one can argue that we are left with a very implausible 
view. Here is why. 
 
For one thing, if this information is so crucial we certainly need it in order to know. But 
the links between truths, as I have suggested, are exceedingly complex. The concern 
here is that we are left with an overly intellectualised account of knowledge. Suppose 
I’m a chicken-sexer, where the link between my perceptual experiences of the chicks 
and my chicken-sex-beliefs is not explicable (at least to our present knowledge), what 
is the true belief that I need to hold in order for me to know the chicken-sex? Put aside 
                                                          
25 Ibid, p. 32. 
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this more controversial case and consider our everyday empirical knowledge—S 
believes that there’s a barn and this belief is supported by S’s visual perception of the 
barn. What other important true beliefs must a layman adult agent possess to link up 
the support? Is something like ‘usually things I see suggest that they exist’ suffice? Or 
does he need to have the complete knowledge of their neurological processes behind 
a successful visual recognition (presumably this is very crucial to his seeing the barns)? 
Do agents normally (even implicitly) hold these beliefs when they recognise a barn? 
 
Also, reducing the links between propositions to just more truths had not settled the 
problem of explaining the relevance of information. Consider this. In order to explain 
how some information is relevant to the target belief, we must consider the links 
between them. Now Foley characterises them as more information themselves, and 
suggest that they are ‘crucial’. How then are they in turn relevant to the relevance (and 
also to the target belief)? We will need yet more true beliefs explaining such relevance. 
It seems that considering the links as just more information only moves the issue to a 
higher order—even worse, it has introduced a regress of relevance of information. 
Once again we may ask ourselves—does an average person really hold higher order 
relevance beliefs as such, when recognising a barn? 
 
1.3.3.2 Reducing cognitive agencies to true beliefs 
I hope these concerns, together with my discussion in 1.3.2, had made a case that 
how the agent connects their information to P, or more generally the agent’s belief 
forming processes, are not reducible to true beliefs. Even if there are responses to 
address the over-intellectualisation and the regress of relevance, there will still be 
elements in our epistemic practices that cannot be captured merely by true beliefs. It 
seems to me that in epistemic activities there are more characteristics on the hero’s 
part, as a rational cognitive agent, than the aggregate of his doxastic attitudes to 
propositions. 
 
Suppose Omni has an eidetic memory helping her to store and retrieve her true beliefs 
with impeccable precision. She has also processed every information there is (either 
experienced herself or testified from others). As a result, she is an all-knowing being. 
Suppose now that Omni decided to share her information with Oppy, by inducing every 
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true belief she possesses to Oppy’s brain (for the purpose of the discussion let’s grant 
that the information includes even the links between every belief, and their higher order 
links and so on). What’s peculiar is that, as Oppy’s beliefs are induced, his cognitive 
faculties have nothing to do with those beliefs (except perhaps for storing them in 
memory). Yet he is nevertheless in possession of the complete information of the 
universe and the connections between the information. If knowledge consists only in 
information, Omni and Oppy must be on par when it comes to what they know. 
However, I would like to think that this is not the case—Omni is an all-knowing agent 
but Oppy is not. Indeed, the epistemic status of Oppy does not resemble a human 
knowing agent commonly construed. If we say that Oppy knows everything, we seem 
to be using the word ‘know’ metaphorically—like what we do when some non-agential 
entities are in possession of some information (e.g. Google knows that the Battle of 
Marathon took place in 490 BCE; AlphaZero knows the variations for a particular 
opening etc.).26 
 
1.3.3.3 The beetle in the box 
Consider another story discussed by Foley himself that causes trouble in the opposite 
direction. Suppose S has the true belief that there’s a beetle in the box. She has no 
other information regarding this beetle belief. However, she does not lack important 
information either, for it is stipulated that there is no other information relevant to the 
story—the world is so simple that there is always a box and a beetle (there is no rich 
history where the two come into existence), and that the beetle is always in the box. 
Now the negative test of the account is met—there is no lacking important information 
(for there is no important information in the first place, the only relevant truth in the 
story is the target belief itself). On the other hand, Foley concedes that S does not 
know—she has this one belief but nothing else to support its truth at any measure.27 
 
One less interesting response to this challenge, as Foley suggests, is to admit that the 
negative test does not always capture adequate information. In other words, this test 
on adequacy has ‘restricted applicability’ and only works under the premise that the 
                                                          
26 See chapter 4 for a more detailed discussion on why our epistemic status must be a product of our 
own cognitive agencies. 
27 Unlike the chicken sexer, S is not said to be a ‘box expert’ who is known for producing reliable 
beliefs about what’s inside boxes. 
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world is considerably rich in information. Thus it is incapable of tackling extreme cases 
such as this. This doesn’t mean adequate information fails—S certainly does not have 
enough information for that matter. ‘It is the world that is lacking, not S’, as Foley 
remarks. The world, Foley suggests, is ‘informationally deprived’ with regards to P 
such that P cannot be known. Foley termed this situation as a knowledge block.28 
 
Is this really the case? Can P hold in the world and at the same time the world is 
informationally deprived with regards to whether P? Upon reading the case my first 
reaction is—is there really no other important information in the Beetle case? Now at 
least there is the situation which the beetle is located in a certain place inside the box. 
Possessing such information (say, if S were to look inside the box) would certainly 
grant support to S’s beetle belief—just as the rear and sides looks of the barn would 
verify the authenticity of the barn. To this end, Foley adds that there is no such 
information either. It is mandated that the box cannot be opened (in fact, let us grant 
that it is metaphysically impossible to open it) and there is no other way such that one 
can test if a beetle is inside. But now I feel that it is not the world that is lacking—only 
that the bits of world relevant to P is not accessible to us (much like someone builds a 
wall along the two sides of the barn front, circumcising its back and sides—now if it is 
a true barn the rear and sides surely still exists in the world, it’s just that there’s no way 
for us to see it). After all, there exists a beetle in the box in this world (impossible to be 
seen by us) which corresponds with the truth ‘there is a beetle in the box’—how is the 
world lacking? It seems that we need to differentiate here between what the world 
lacks and what the world holds but is inaccessible to us. The latter would still be 
information of the world—in fact, information that we necessarily lack. To this effect, 
Foley’s own counterexample to his account would not stand. S (necessarily) lacks the 
information about the situation inside the box. Thus, S does not know P—indeed P is 
unknowable. 
 
This, however, does not mean that Foley’s account is particularly well placed in 
addressing the case. As argued in 1.3.2, I do not think that the above explanation 
captures the core reason why S cannot know. Sure, S lacks the information about the 
situation in the box, but this piece of information is important because it provides 
                                                          
28 Ibid, p. 45. 
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support for the truth of his beetle belief that she otherwise lacks. As I see it, the 
straightforward explanation for S’s ignorance is that her belief forming process is in 
some way infelicitous. She has no support whatsoever regarding the truth of his beetle 
belief, nor is her belief a result of any norms of belief forming practices as an epistemic 
agent. These, I suppose, provide the explanation behind the importance of any given 
information. 
 
1.4 Concluding remarks—going beyond adequate information 
This chapter presents a critical account of Foley’s adequate information view. While I 
ultimately part ways with Foley, it is his insightful observation about the Gettier 
literature (and knowledge in general) that motivated this project in the first place. All in 
all, I find his discussions about the commonalities of knowledge stories, as well as the 
thought that knowledge hindrance stems from the agent’s lack of grasp of the total 
story to be generally on point—I only disagree on how one should unpack these ideas. 
Specifically, moving forward I would like to achieve two aims in my positive account. 
Firstly, to explore an invariantist-pragmatist friendly approach to determine the 
importance of information. Secondly, to introduce belief forming processes on the 
agent’s part that i. connects information to the truth of the target belief and ii. is not 





Motivating Knowledge as Adequately Informed 
Process 
 
2.1 Revisiting knowledge stories 
The main goal of this chapter is to motivate my own positive account of knowledge. 
As remarked in chapter 1, I concede that Foley’s approach to knowledge is broadly 
speaking on point. One knows if one possesses enough information. I also suggested 
that Foley’s view is missing a crucial part in belief forming processes. While this 
chapter would introduce process to adequate information—thus addressing 
challenges to Foley’s account (together with other difficult cases), this is not all that 
the proposed view is about. In particular, it is not enough for an account of knowledge 
to merely extensionally capture instances of knowledge—a good account needs to 
‘capture’ the ‘nature’ of knowledge, to explain why meeting particular epistemic criteria 
is essentially tied to the concept of knowledge as well. I take this to be true for the 
proposed account—not only does it offer apt verdicts to a wide class of knowledge 
stories, the key idea that one’s belief formation exhibits an adequate ‘grasp’ regarding 
the whole story (unpacked in a specific way) strikes me as a helpful elucidation of what 
knowledge by its nature amounts to. Thus, this chapter shall address a number of 
epistemic cases, and discuss independent motivations for the account connecting 
knowledge with the agent’s adequate grasp of the epistemic situation. 
 
Before giving a positive account of what is considered ‘adequate’, more could be said 
regarding the knowledge stories in Gettier literature. Following what I characterised as 
the Instance-Generalisation Approach, I shall discuss what I consider the important 
common features, and lack thereof, among these knowledge stories—when compared 
to bona fide cases of knowledge. 
 
Foley takes it that whether we ascribe knowledge to the hero in a knowledge story 
depends on what information he/she lacks. More could be said regarding how this trick 
is done in the stories. To highlight how the hero lacks certain information, necessarily 
44 
 
there is something that we know but the hero doesn’t. Much like a Shakespearean 
dramatic irony, I believe it is the imbalance of information between us and the hero 
that generates corresponding knowledge judgments the narrator so pleased—while 
our hero is unable to adequately grasp the situation, we as the audience are always 
in the epistemic position to say that the hero is lacking something important in forming 
his/her true belief(s). This is why one of the most common phrases in knowledge 
stories is ‘unbeknownst to S…’, followed by some details of the story given exclusively 
to the readers but not the hero. As a result, regardless of how well justified the hero’s 
belief is and what other epistemic virtues he/she demonstrates, the storyteller can 
always point to the unbeknownst information (privileged to the readers) and suggest 
that had S been aware of such information, S would not have arrived at the target 
belief the way he/she does (the audience, knowing that S is mistaken about the 
situation in some way, surely would have formed the target belief in a different way). 
This counterfactual statement, I suppose, plays an important role in illustrating how 
the missing information is epistemically important—the lacking information matters 
because having it would alter the way S forms his/her target belief, one way or another. 
 
This is how my account differs from Foley’s in a nutshell: The importance of certain 
information is determined not by practical concerns but by the role the information 
plays in one’s belief forming process. In his book, Foley asks ‘when is true belief 
knowledge?’ Similarly, the question I would like to tackle is this: ‘when does a belief 
forming process produce knowledge?’ Let’s suppose that in knowledge stories the 
narrator along with the audience has access to the entire situation (at least regarding 
P) while the hero does not. If the hero grasps that situation adequately regarding the 
truth of P, his knowledge of P follows; on the other hand, if more needs to be said 
about P in the situation (than the hero is aware), then his belief forming process falls 
short. I shall explain more on what ‘adequacy’ amounts to, as well as on the 
information gap between us and the hero. 
 
Although it is essential in knowledge stories that there’s a gap of information between 
us and the hero, such imbalance doesn’t mean that knowing is a comparative matter. 
The hero does not lack knowledge because he is less informed than us. ‘We’ 
comprises of both the storyteller and the audience of the story—supposedly the two 
are informationally on par, in principle the storyteller has not withhold anything from 
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the audience. More importantly, ‘we’ are supposed to have a full grasp of the 
situation—there is (in principle) no information the storyteller missed out with regards 
to the target belief in the situation. As far as I can tell in the literature, ‘we’ always know 
as to whether P, and this is why ‘we’ seem to always be able to identify what the hero 
lacks in the story. 
 
Consider TEMP (see 1.2) for example. While ‘we’ (the narrator as well as the readers) 
agree that Temp lacks knowledge, we are surely in the position to know the 
temperature of the room in the case for ourselves—via the broken thermometer, 
knowing that the hidden agent would adjust the thermostat according to its reading. If 
this is so, knowledge would be achieved just in case the epistemic status of the hero 
is raised to the same heights as ourselves. Imagine the agent in the story is tired of 
getting victimised in every case that he requested the narrator not to withhold any fact 
from him about his own situation, so the narrator granted his wish. Here is an example 
where, in Foley’s terms, ‘the knowledge gap is closed’. Consider this modified case of 
TEMP. 
 
TEMP’ Similar to TEMP, but Temp’ in this case was informed by the hidden agent 
that the thermometer is broken, but he assured Temp’ not to worry, as he would 
be responsible for adjusting the thermostat according to the thermometer’s 
random reading, ensuring the broken device to accord with the room’s 
temperature. Temp’ trusted the agent and continued to form temperature beliefs 
based on the reading on the thermometer. 
 
The hidden agent informs Temp’ just as the narrator did to the audience about the 
whole story. Regarding the epistemic situation in TEMP’, our hero and we are on the 
same page. As a result, Temp’ surely knows the temperature as he is well aware that 
what grounds the truth of his beliefs is not the thermometer (not a normally functioning 
one at least) but the diligence of the hidden agent, just as we do. 
 
The moral of this new story isn’t that in order to know we need to achieve certain 
epistemic standard of others. As remarked the significance of the narrator’s (and 
audience’s) epistemic status is just that they have a grasp of the entire situation. Thus, 
it strikes me that what matters to knowledge is not how the hero’s epistemic standard 
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fares against that of other agents; but rather how it fares in face of the entire situation. 
When is the hero’s information ‘enough’? When do we have information gaps? Instead 
of asking whether the hero lacks some important information, ask ourselves whether 
unveiling the entire situation to the hero would make any impact on his/her belief 
formation—if the hero would continue to form the target belief(s) the same way1, such 
a process is good enough for knowledge; if the hero needs to employ a different 
process, the original way is all in all not good enough under the situation. This is the 
spirit of the adequately informed process account of knowledge (AP)—S knows that P 
just in case S’s belief forming process remains intact after unveiling the entire situation. 
In my opinion this is an important lesson from many knowledge stories in the literature. 
Knowledge is undermined not because of the information gap between us and the 
hero, rather the failure of the hero to fully grasp the situation and employ his belief 
forming process accordingly. 
 
The plan of this chapter goes as follows. Section 2.2 searches for theoretical 
inspirations of articulating the AP view as an epistemic analogue of the notion of 
superassertibility; section 2.3 outlines the account and makes further elucidations to 
some of its key features; section 2.4 explores further motivations for endorsing AP—
arguing that it addresses a variety of knowledge stories and resonates with the ways 
knowledge (or other epistemic states) are construed in other fields; section 2.5 
summarises the chapter and discusses the plan for the next part of the thesis. 
 
2.2 Theoretical inspiration of AP: Superassertibility and truth 
Why suggest knowledge as belief formation evaluated in face of the entire situation? 
Granted, following the IGA, there is no doubt that ‘unbeknownst to S’ (and hence the 
imbalance of information) is an element common to Gettier cases. However, the 
counterfactual statement ‘had S been aware of the entire situation S would have 
altered the way he/she comes to believe P’2, while striking me as quite naturally 
extending the knowledge stories discussion in explaining S’s common epistemic 
defects, can look ad hoc to other’s eyes. We can’t literally identify such counterfactual 
                                                          
1 That is, insofar as he is a responsible agent and wouldn’t just disregard new information he learned. 
A specific requirement on normative epistemic ideality would be introduced as I articulate the account. 
2 Or, put differently, ‘if we were to form the target belief, having grasped the entire situation we would 
not have came to P the way S did.’ 
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claims in knowledge stories—why should we interpret the commonalities of the stories 
this way? Why favour this take, for example, over Foley’s supposition that what 
matters in knowledge stories is having all the important information in our human 
concerns? I believe this is where theoretical considerations may step in—in IGA we 
begin our quest from observing common features among instances, but mere 
commonalities do not make an account of knowledge, at some point we have to 
conceptualise them to yield meaningful epistemic claims. 
 
To begin with, one obvious advantage of the adequate process over Foley’s adequate 
information is the introduction of belief forming processes (not reducible to true beliefs) 
on the agent’s part. As discussed in 1.3 one of the drawbacks of Foley account is the 
lack of belief formation element. The proposed account on the other hand does not 
follow this more radical approach of reducing knowledge to some true beliefs—instead 
it takes belief forming processes as an essential facet of our epistemic evaluations. 
How then do we come to this specific articulation of belief formation, where one’s 
belief-forming process is evaluated with regards to the entire epistemic story? One 
response is that, as discussed in 2.1, this stems from Foley’s insight on selective 
storytelling, or as I take it, the observation that knowledge stories generally involve an 
agent who (emphasised by the narrator) suffers from defective belief formation 
because he/she does not have an entire grasp of the situation. But now I wish to 
discuss another independent support for AP. Far from being an ad hoc 
characterisation, AP really resonates with certain notion in the literature, albeit not from 
the epistemological tradition—Crispin Wright’s superassertibility theory of truth3. 
 
Wright’s notion of superassertibility comprises of an epistemic aspect—the statement 
must be warrantedly assertible by the agent (as Wright puts it, the agent must engage 
in a ‘bona fide investigation, governed by an exercise of the his/her rationality and 
other appropriate faculties’ 4 ); and a veritic aspect—as a theory of truth 
superassertibility requires the said agent’s warrant to be ideal in a specific sense so 
as to ensure that the agent is not mistaken about the statement (‘we have to be able 
to foreclose on the possibility that rational subjects, carrying through a genuine 
                                                          
3 See his full discussion in Wright (1993) Realism, Meaning and Truth (2nd ed.) and Wright (1994) 
Truth and Objectivity. 
4 Wright (1993), p. 413. 
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investigation in the appropriate way, could mistakenly arrive at a state of information 
which justified the assertion of that statement’5, italics in original). In what specific 
sense does he take ‘ideal’ to mean? According to Wright, if P is superassertible, the 
body of knowledge one has warrants the assertion of P and would not cease to warrant 
it no matter how ‘favourable’ one’s circumstances are and how one’s body of 
knowledge is enlarged.6 
 
Wright describes ‘favourable circumstances’ as ones where ‘both the subject and the 
background conditions are optimal for the acquisition of knowledge’7. It is noteworthy 
that in his discussion one’s circumstance need only be ‘sufficiently favourable’ and is 
something one could improved upon (it could become more favourable as our 
epistemic position advances). Michael Lynch offers a more elaborative story on the 
epistemic position of superassertible statements (or what he calls ‘superwarranted 
beliefs’8): 
 
(S)uperwarrant does not posit an idealized “End of Inquiry”. A superwarranted 
belief is one that is warranted by some state of information available to ordinary 
inquirers, which, in fact, would never be defeated or undermined by subsequent 
increases of information also available to ordinary inquirers.9 
 
Lynch’s reading is consistent with Wright’s characterisation of ‘favourable 
circumstances’. In short, Wright does not require the warranted assertion to be 
epistemically ideal/optimal—it could be sufficiently favourable (ordinarily rational agent 
with appropriate faculties, engaging in a bona fide investigation, under normal 
background conditions) insofar as it stays warranted in the most ideal circumstance 
(i.e. would not cease to be warranted no matter how the circumstances and the body 
of knowledge are improved). This idea resonates with AP’s requirement on 
knowledge—our belief-forming process needs not be epistemically impeccable, it can 
                                                          
5 Ibid, p.413. 
6 Ibid, p. 414-415. 
7 Ibid, p. 414. This characterisation is not circular as superassertibility is meant to account for truth 
instead of knowledge. 
8 Lynch (2009). Lynch named the notion ‘superwarrant’ instead. Also, the subject of the predicate ‘is 
superwarranted’ is a belief in Lynch’s account instead of an assertion. Despite their differences I shall 
treat Lynch’s discussion on his notion as equally applicable to Wright’s superassertibility—I believe 
there is no significant need to differentiate the two notions for my purpose. 
9 Lynch (2009), p. 38-39, italics in original. 
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be an ordinary process insofar as it stays ‘warranted’ (in Wright and Lynch’s terms, I 
shall explain what this amounts to for AP in the coming section) no matter how much 
our epistemic circumstances are improved. I shall model superassertibility in my 
development of the AP view in what follows. 
 
2.3 Adequately informed process and knowledge 
2.3.1 Outlining the account 
There are numerous efforts to capture the intuitive notion of superassertibility. Wright, 
for example, suggested that for a statement to be superassertible is ‘for the actual 
world to contain the materials whereby not merely can a flawless case be made for 
asserting it but this case will survive no matter how much more thereafter we come to 
know.’10 Wright considers superassertibility as ‘the generalization of mathematical 
provability’ because it provides warrant that is itself ‘flawless’ and ‘conclusive’, thus 
‘must stand unimpugned by the discovery of other proofs.’11 In his later work he 
characterised superassertibility as having a warrant (or being able to warrant) that 
‘would survive arbitrarily close scrutiny of its pedigree and arbitrarily extensive 
increments to or other forms of improvement of our information.’12 A more recent work 
by Lynch (2009) described superwarrant beliefs as being ‘continually warranted 
without defeat’ at every ‘successive stage of inquiry’13. While displaying minor verbal 
differences, I take these to be the overall account of superassertibility, and consider 
the adequately informed process as its close relative—an epistemological counterpart 
if you will. Instead of articulating a theory of truth, AP is employed to formulate a theory 
of knowledge. One knows that P just in case one comes to believe P via an adequately 
informed process—i.e. a way of belief formation that would survive any increments of 
information or other improvements on epistemic conditions (such as enhancements of 
the agent’s cognitive capacity, betterments of the epistemic environment etc.). More 
precisely: 
 
                                                          
10 Wright (1993), p. 415. 
11 Ibid, p. 415. 
12 Wright (1994), p. 48. 
13 Lynch (2009), p. 38, italics in original. 
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AP: S knows that P just in case S comes to believe P via process M in the actual 
world, and is ideally permitted to continue believing P via M had S obtained the 
information regarding the entire situation U. 
 
More can be said about the nature of M and U (I trust that there is relatively little 
mystery as for S and P). While I maintain that M is a cognitive process irreducible to 
propositions (as discussed in 1.3), I am more sympathetic to reducing beliefs regarding 
our agency and epistemic environment to information. Suppose we grant this, U can 
then be represented as a set of propositions—consisting of the totality of information 
regarding P. I believe AP thus construed reflects how knowledge by its nature is an 
interplay between agency and the world. AP states that knowledge is a doxastic output 
(with propositional contents) of one’s mental process, to which such process is 
scrutinised in light of the total state of affairs (consists of a set of true propositions). 
Simply put, it is an evaluation of our cognitive performance in the world. When we say 
knowledge is a relation between mind and world, what’s in play is not merely the agent 
and a true proposition, rather it amounts to the agent’s epistemic position in face of 
the complete situation about the truth of P in the world. 
 
Another matter that certainly requires further elucidation in the account is this: what 
does ‘ideally permitted’ amount to? While (from the notion of permission commonly 
construed) it clearly suggests some deontic gestures, more unpacking is needed. 
According to AP, S’s process M is good enough (for knowledge) if it is acceptable in 
the ideal epistemic situation regarding P (say, if an ideally rational epistemic agent 
with perfect information would come to believe P via M). As noted by Lynch, M here 
needs not itself be an idealised epistemic practice—it is meant to be achievable by 
ordinary agents while deemed acceptable in the most ideal epistemic circumstances. 
Let’s consider further what this acceptable ideality amounts to. 
 
Suppose an ideal epistemic agent Si and you both know that there’s a sheep in the 
field. You learned this from your friend across the field. Does AP rule that Si also 
learned the fact in the very same way? Presumably having the full grasp of the 
situation Si wouldn’t need to learn anything about the field from others—as an ideal 
epistemic agent who has access to all information, there surely are numerous ways 
she could arrive at the sheep belief. She could have trusted someone’s testimony (just 
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as in your case); she could have visually recognised the sheep behind the rock for 
herself; or heard it bleating in the vicinity. When AP judges that S in ideal 
circumstances would form the belief P via M, it isn’t suggesting that M is the only way 
to P that S must adopt. Rather, when AP is satisfied, M is among one of the many 
ways which S in ideal epistemic circumstances would adopt. Suppose possible worlds 
are ranked by a set of epistemic normative ideals N.14 Call all worlds which satisfy N 
ideal epistemic worlds (W i). AP is satisfied if S would form the belief via M in at least 
one Wi. 
 
Even this more articulated version of AP might face challenges. As I have supposed, 
M only needs to be acceptably ideal. Although we could put our hero’s epistemic state 
under the scrutiny of ideal circumstances, it is important to bear in mind that our hero 
is no ideal agent. Indeed, it would be too demanding to expect any knowledge yielding 
M to ideally satisfy all epistemic norms we desire—we need our account to be able to 
tolerate less-than-perfect but nevertheless acceptable processes. Consider the 
following example. Hong Kong is mainly comprised of an island and a landmass 
connecting to mainland China. As a populous city millions of citizens travel across 
these two places, and there are three crossed-harbour tunnels available. Suppose 
Stephanie lives in the eastern part of the landmass and works at the eastern part of 
the island. The best way of transportation is of course to pass through the eastern 
tunnel. However, she is not aware of this option, and had been crossing the central 
tunnel everyday.15 Had it came across Stephanie that she could have saved much 
time crossing the eastern tunnel she would definitely adopt this improved way. 
However, this is not to say that our now enlightened Stephanie would no longer 
consider her original way a viable option. It surely wasn’t an ideal route, but it got 
Stephanie from home to work for years. There could be many ways to travel from one 
point to another, some ways are decidedly favourable than others, while it is unclear 
that there is one way that is rightfully ‘the best’. Similarly, not all Ms are epistemically 
on par, when everything is uncovered, S might consider another process M’ as a better 
                                                          
14 Note that since AP is ecumenical the member(s) of N is left unspecified. Epistemologists might 
endorse different norms if they so pleased (see discussion in 2.3.3.3, as well as in the forthcoming 
chapters 5 and 6). 
15 People living in Hong Kong would appreciate what a sad story this is—indeed, even people from 




way than M—but it doesn’t follow that M would fail the AP test. The question AP asks 
is whether M survives as a viable option. Suppose we attempted to solve an equation. 
As we check the solution we discover that the model answer is much simpler and more 
elegant—our teacher awards us the marks nevertheless, as this doesn’t damage the 
integrity of our original proof. As long as we had not made any mistaken steps, some 
unnecessary detours are tolerable to the ideal standard of our maths teacher. 
 
In 2.2, I discussed how superassertible statements can be possessed by ordinary 
inquirers—what makes them ‘super’ is that these ordinary warranted assertions 
survive no matter how one’s epistemic situation is improved. The requirement of AP 
is similar on this score. We wouldn’t demand M to be ideal for S to know—we only 
need M to be acceptable under the most ideal circumstances. Following the above 
formalisation, call the innermost sphere of possible worlds ranked under N ideal 
epistemic worlds (W i), such that Ms in these worlds have met N perfectly; call the 
sphere outer to the innermost acceptable epistemic worlds (Wacc), while Ms in these 
worlds are not considered as perfectly aligning with N, they are nevertheless 
acceptable under N. AP is satisfied just in case S forms the belief via M and in at least 
one Wacc S would continue to form that belief via M. 
 
2.3.2 Contrasting superassertibility 
Despite being inspired by Foley’s insights on information and Wright’s notion of 
superassertibility, there are some noteworthy facets that are unique in AP. In this 
section I shall compare AP with its counterpart in superassertibility (putting aside of 
course the obvious distinction that they concern different subject matters)—by 
highlighting the differences I hope that one can better understand AP as an epistemic 
view. In the next section I shall contrast AP with Foley’s adequate information, and 
consider why the former should be preferred as an account of knowledge. 
 
One issue stemming from their subjects of inquiry is the modality of their warrants. 
Superassertibility, insofar as it seeks to capture truths, demands only that the warrant 
for asserting a statement is possible—without demanding any subject actually 
possessing the said warrant (indeed, Wright’s theory of truth posits only that all truths 
are knowable, but not necessarily known); while AP concerns the actual (not merely 
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potential) epistemic state for particular agents, and as a result requires the actual 
possession of the warrant (or more generally, belief-forming process) that ‘survives 
the scrutiny’ for knowledge ascriptions. 
 
On a related note, it is also important to bear in mind that Wright’s (as well as Lynch’s) 
notion involves warrant as an essential component while AP characterises our 
epistemic activities with a less intellectually laden mechanism—belief-forming 
processes. In chapter 1 I expressed my reservations towards the prospect of reducing 
cognitive agency to information, such as putting in words how a chicken sexer comes 
to his beliefs. It is noteworthy that such chicken sexing process would not be 
considered as warranted in Wright’s light either, as his notion of warrant carries the 
traditional flavour of justification which provides rational support for the assertion16. As 
Wright admitted, ‘any reliabilist conception of knowledge’ which ‘abrogate all 
connection between knowledge and the possession of reason to believe’ would not 
amount to warranted assertions in his view. On the other hand, AP is compatible with 
reliabilism and other forms of broadly externalist views of justification—and thus has 
no problem granting chicken sexing as a knowledge conducive process. A process 
would be adequate so long as it remains intact upon unveiling the entire situation (such 
that an ideally situated epistemic agent would continue to form the target belief via that 
process), regardless of whether the agent is in the position to offer reasons for the 
belief17. To summarise, vis-à-vis warrant, AP is stronger than superassertibility in 
terms of modality (the agent must indeed possess the process), but weaker in terms 
of intellectualism (it releases the agent from giving rational supports in the process). 
 
As a notion which is intentionally devised to understand truths, superassertibility does 
offer ‘stability’ and ‘absoluteness’ (in Wright’s terms) to the truth values of the asserted 
statements—such that their warrants ‘cannot be defeated or improved’18. I believe that 
this aspect of superassertibility naturally extends to AP as well—the modifications I 
                                                          
16 Wright (1994), p. 58. 
17 While I am myself sympathetic to the externalist reading of the account, I don’t see why M in AP 
couldn’t be taken as an internalist notion. This would involve arguing for some principle along the lines 
of ‘all agents in an ideal epistemic situation must form their beliefs via processes that provide rational 
supports’. This, along with AP, would suggest that all knowledge conducive processes must be 
warranted (in Wright’s lights). I am unsure whether such principle involves any commitments beyond 
what the internalists are willing to make. Thus, I leave to the readers to judge whether such view is 
plausible. 
18 Wright (1994), p. 45. 
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made for AP strike me as bearing only epistemic significance that would not have 
compromised the truth conduciveness of M in superassertibility. The process 
satisfying AP still ‘conclusively’ verifies P, just as superassertibility ‘proves’ the truth of 
the targeted statement. Not only is the truth condition embedded in this account of 
knowledge, it would supposedly block any possible Gettierisation as, by definition, an 
adequate process would ‘foreclose on the possibility’ that one is mistaken about the 
statement19. 
 
2.3.3 Contrasting adequate information 
2.3.3.1 Introducing process 
One of the most notable differences between adequate information and adequate 
process, as their name suggest, is the introduction of cognitive agency in the latter. I 
had argued that what makes Foley’s adequate information account unsatisfactory is 
the missing of cognitive processes on the agent’s part, to connect the information S 
possesses and the truth of the targeted belief (see 1.3.2 and 1.3.3). Although adequate 
information suggests to account for such connection with more true beliefs, there are 
genuine concerns that corresponding propositions are not always identifiable. 
Adequate process allies with the more traditional view on this score, suggesting that 
our epistemic activities essentially involve certain mental processes of ours (albeit less 
intellectual than Wright’s warrant) which are responsible for forming our beliefs. Such 
process is sui generis, and is therefore irreducible to true beliefs. Indeed, it is hard to 
imagine obtaining a set of true beliefs would amount to a belief-forming process on the 
agent’s part. Unlike true beliefs which are propositions, a belief-forming process 
seems to be some kind of mechanism—like a coffee machine—with information as 
input and propositional attitudes as output. It would be quite odd to suppose that the 
mechanics of the coffee machine is reducible to coffee of some sort. Likewise, a belief 
forming process of an agent is a metaphysically different entity compared to beliefs, 
with its aim to take in information, process it and produce true beliefs. In AP view, it is 
this mechanism that connects between information and the truth of P. 
 
It might be helpful to understand more about the workings within various 
mechanisms—how exactly do certain cognitive process produce true beliefs? As a 
                                                          
19 Wright (1993), p. 413. 
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matter of fact, the general idea that our beliefs are the product of cognitive processes 
echoes with the conventional view within psychology. Moreover, certain efforts had 
been made in neuropsychology to identify certain cognitive processes responsible for 
belief formation (Halligan and Marshall 1994; David and Halligan 2000; Young 2000; 
Halligan and David 2001; Connors and Halligan 2015), however, this empirical inquiry 
is not the chief concern of AP. Instead, it only matters to AP that there exist certain 
cognitive mechanisms which in normal circumstances produce true beliefs—an 
epistemic agent needs only to possess the mechanisms, not necessarily to understand 
them (at least not for a broadly externalist reading of AP). This aligns with many other 
epistemic theories on the market—each suggesting different epistemic evaluations of 
belief forming processes. To name a few, process reliabilism highlights the truth 
conduciveness of the process, postulating that a process that produces many true 
beliefs (over false ones) is what constitute justification; virtue theoretic approaches 
suggests the value of knowledge lies in how our cognitive agency plays a significant 
role in attaining true beliefs; Plantinga’s proper functionalism suggests that beliefs are 
warranted if the cognitive faculties responsible for producing them function ‘properly’ 
or ‘according to its design’; adequate process, in this regard, argues that what matters 
to epistemic evaluations is the ‘survivability’ of the relevant process vis-à-vis the entire 
situation. 
 
2.3.3.2 Holism and analyticity of knowledge 
Speaking of the entire situation, a noteworthy characteristic of adequate process is its 
holistic take on epistemology. Foley is on point in supposing that knowing is a matter 
of having enough information. The issue however is with his emphasis on the 
epistemic importance of individual true beliefs. I would like to suggest that the idea 
that one’s epistemic status could be assessed by attending to some particular 
proposition is misguided. One of the key hypotheses of the AP view is that to fully 
evaluate whether one knows, we must consider the epistemic situation at hand as a 
whole. Indeed, this is one of the main proposals I would like to champion in the 
research project: a ‘gestalt’ approach in epistemic evaluations. The basic idea is that 
epistemic phenomena are gestalt phenomena—while they are constituted by 
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individual epistemic components (information in S’s possession20, cognitive processes, 
epistemic environment), the full epistemic significance of the entire phenomenon 
cannot be accounted merely by evaluating its individual components. 
 
To illustrate, consider how the importance of information seems to be a dynamic 
matter as the story unfolds—suppose George sees a barn (at the front), presumably 
how the rear and the sides of the barn look (RS) would not bear any importance in his 
barn belief; suppose now that someone testifies to him that this is a barn façade county, 
RS would become an important piece of information (that George lacks); suppose 
further that it turns out that the testifier is lying, there really are no fake barns in the 
vicinity, from this perspective George would again cease to consider RS to be 
important for his barn belief. The holistic approach of AP suggests that the epistemic 
importance of information in this case can only be determined under the context of the 
whole story (that George looks at a real barn, is told that he’s in a barn façade county, 
and that the testifier is lying). 
 
Admittedly, more evidence will be needed to convince one to embrace this holistic 
approach. While I do have more to say in support of the approach, I plan to discuss 
this in later chapters more explicitly. In particular, in chapters 3 and 4 where I compare 
the AP view with the defeasibility view and virtue epistemology respectively, I shall 
present how certain difficult cases for the two views can benefit from the holistic 
approach in AP. I hope these explanatory advantages would make holistic 
epistemology a more attractive theoretical option with a wide range of applications—
but for now I beg the readers to simply keep an open mind. 
 
If this holistic assumption for epistemic evaluations should stand, it would provide a 
possible alternative explanation against knowledge being analysable—the epistemic 
phenomenon of knowledge is not reducible to more basic concepts, not because 
knowledge is conceptually primitive21, but rather that the phenomenon is not meant to 
be broken down in the first place. There is no denying that we can identify some 
essential components constituting knowledge (and make a case that these 
                                                          
20 I’m following Foley’s terminology here. I do not intend however to distinguish between S’s 
information and S’s evidence for my purpose. 
21 See Williamson (2000). 
57 
 
components are epistemically more basic)—such as relevant information, competent 
cognitive processes, and friendly epistemic environment. However, one could 
maintain that understanding the full epistemic significance of knowledge cannot be 
achieved by fixing our gazes at the epistemic goods of its more basic individual 
components.  
 
2.3.3.3 Practical and intellectual importance of information 
In chapter 1 I outlined two characteristics that set the proposed theory apart from 
Foley’s account—to introduce belief forming process and be invariantist-friendly. 
While AP does not specifically postulate anything in favour of traditional invariantism, 
the idea is that AP is theoretically neutral in this matter and is thus compatible with 
either views. It comes down to whether we include practical considerations into our 
epistemic evaluation of the hero’s entire situation. Consider DeRose’s (1992) bank 
case. Contextualists’ proposal about the significance of practical stakes stems from 
the intuition that the severe consequence (to the hero’s personal interests) of the bank 
closing on Saturday carries epistemic importance in the whole story, such that it 
demands higher epistemic standards (e.g. gathering more evidence) for knowledge 
ascriptions. Traditional invariantism, on the other hand, denies this significance of 
practical stakes in determining the hero’s epistemic status. This disagreement does 
not hinder any of the parties from embracing AP—traditional invariantists, for example, 
could hold that knowledge is achieved just in case the agent’s process remains intact 
when the entire intellectually related situation is unveiled (while contextualists 
welcome both intellectual and practical considerations in assessing the entire 
epistemic situation). Put differently, under the AP account, contextualism (or subject-
sensitive invariantism) and traditional invariantism disagree not on whether our belief 
formation should be evaluated against the entire situation, but rather on what in the 
entire situation is epistemically relevant. 
 
This remark has more general applications which highlight the ecumenical nature of 
AP. The adequately informed process view, in its bare-bones, is theoretically neutral 
in many regards. Apart from the traditional invariantism/pragmatism opposition, a 
proponent of AP could be an internalist or externalist (see fn 17), a reliabilist, a modal 
epistemologist, a virtue theorist, or what have you. The only constraint AP applies is 
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that the agent’s process cannot be voided as the whole story uncovers. However, this 
constraint says nothing about what undermines a process in an epistemic situation. 
One can make a case for their own theses, if they so please, on what features are 
epistemically significant to belief formation. This involves rules that agents should 
follow in ideal epistemic situations (recall the evaluation of the ‘entire situation’ involves 
how an ideal epistemic agent with perfect information would evaluate M). In other 
words, one can ‘beef up’ the AP account with various epistemic norms one champions, 
to specify the epistemic ideals the agent’s process is measured against (see fn 14). In 
chapter 5 I would attempt to beef up my own AP account, taking safety as an example, 
and demonstrate how the principle can be embedded in AP given certain epistemic 
norms22. 
 
2.3.4 Closing the knowledge gap and supervenience 
As discussed in chapter 1 and section 2.1, Foley talked about closing the knowledge 
gap in his adequate information account. That is, how an epistemic agent can turn 
from ignorance to knowledge by improving his epistemic status—he simply needs to 
acquire more information. This mechanism of closing the knowledge gap by adding 
certain epistemic goodness seems to hold for other accounts of knowledge too. In 
defeasibility theories it is assumed that the hero would come to know had he obtained 
undefeated justification; for safety it is supposed that the hero would come to know 
had he became protected from easy errors; in virtue epistemology knowledge might 
be obtained had the agent’s cognitive competence played a more significant role in 
the success etc. Of course, this is hardly surprising—after all, they are meant to 
account for knowledge, adding the corresponding epistemic goodness required by 
them would surely change one’s ‘knowledge status’ (i.e. from ignorance to knowledge). 
While these theorists (apart from Foley) didn’t seem to have in mind such mechanism 
of closing knowledge gaps, I believe that the knowledge gap talk applies to them just 
as well. 
 
                                                          
22 It is worth noting that the chapter serves more purposes than demonstrating AP’s ecumenical 
applicability, as I am sympathetic to safety myself—I hope that the discussion of the relationship 
between safety and AP, as well as the epistemic norm I will suggest, make a case for why safety, or 
more generally an anti-luck element, is (as Pritchard calls it) an ‘important platitude’ of knowledge. 
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Another way of unpacking what an account amounts to with regards to changing the 
‘knowledge status’ of the hero is by articulating a certain supervenience thesis. 
Consider adequate information. If what is essential to closing the knowledge gap is to 
add more information on the agent’s part, the agent’s knowledge status cannot change 
without a change in his/her information acquired, holding the external epistemic 
environment constant23. As a general remark, all accounts of knowledge seem to have 
an underlying supervenience thesis of some sort—that one’s knowledge status cannot 
change without an improvement of one’s specific epistemic feature (be it one’s 
justification, doxastic modal profile, or aptness, for example). In this regard, the AP 
view holds a knowledge-process supervenience assumption (KPS): holding the 
external situation constant, one’s knowledge status cannot change without a change 
in one’s belief-forming process. This thesis turns out to be relevant in the coming 
section (2.4.1) and in future chapters as I discuss how AP tackles various epistemic 
cases. While closing the knowledge gaps by perfectly informing numerous Gettier 
victims in the cases, there will be times where the now-knowing agent seems to be 
employing the same belief-forming process as he previously did. To defend KPS (and 
thus AP), the main objective is to maintain that in these cases a different process must 
be in play for the enlightened agent. Without further ado, let’s review the epistemic 
cases covered in chapter 1 and see how AP tackles them. 
 
2.4 Further motivations for AP 
2.4.1 Resolving difficult cases 
2.4.1.1 Addressing knowledge stories 
In the coming section, I will take a look at some of the difficult epistemic cases 
discussed in chapter 1 and suggest how AP tackles them accordingly. The general 
idea of the test is to identify the belief forming method (M) in the story, hypothesise 
that all relevant information in the story is given to the hero, and see if the hero would 
still come to the corresponding beliefs via M. 
 
 
                                                          
23 Of course, if we were to retell the story so drastically such that the external epistemic environment 
is no longer unfriendly, the agent’s knowledge status would change (consider if there really are no 
fake sheep or fake barns in the vicinity, one’s original perceptual experience surely amounts to 
knowledge). However, this is not the type of scenarios we took interest in. 
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FAKE SHEEP (see 1.2) 
Smith comes to his sheep belief by perceiving a sheep-shaped object in the field and 
taking it as a sheep. Had he been informed that the object is actually a rock, Smith 
would no longer come to that sheep-belief by such perception. Suppose Smith gets 
closer to the object and recognises that it is actually a rock, but much to his surprise 
he discovers also that behind the rock lies a real sheep. Smith in this case would have 
grasped the entire situation (as far as the FAKE SHEEP story goes)—he would still 
hold the sheep-belief, not by the sheep-like-rock perception, but instead by the sheep-
perception he gained looking behind the confusing rock. Indeed, Smith doesn’t even 
need to form his belief via perceptual recognition. Suppose he gains the information 
from testimony—say his friend who had just passed through the field clarifies the state 
of affairs to him, Smith would still form the sheep belief, by testimony of his friend (that 
there’s a real sheep behind the sheep-like rock). So it wouldn’t matter how you expand 
the story to inform Smith—either way his original M would have lost its epistemic 
integrity, and Smith would no longer form his beliefs via M. 
 
BARN FAÇADE (see 1.2) 
George comes to his barn belief by perceiving a barn-shape building across the field. 
Had George been informed that the area is filled with fake barns that only have the 
façades, the mere front look of the barn-shape building would no longer be good 
enough to support his barn belief. Suppose a countryman passes by and tells George 
about the surrounding fake barns. George would think that his original belief formation 
is too risky—just looking from the front the building he spotted could easily be a fake. 
Indeed, this is why Foley’s modified barn case adding the environmental information 
alone fails to close the information gap (see 1.3.2). Now suppose further that George 
walks to the object and examine the rear and the sides, discovering that it is one of 
the rare genuine barns in the area. After all these hassles, George retains his barn 
belief, but we wouldn’t say that he comes to his belief via his original process—he 
couldn’t just look at the front, in such epistemic environment it is only when he checks 




TEMP (see 1.2)24 
Temp comes to his temperature belief(s) by reading a thermometer in the room. Had 
he been informed that the thermometer is broken, he would no longer rely on the 
thermometer regarding temperature beliefs—at least not the way he did before he 
realised its defects. Here comes the tricky bits. In TEMP, the ‘process’ of learning 
temperatures from the broken thermometer is indeed reliable—a hidden agent controls 
the thermostat so that the temperature of the room corresponds to the thermometer’s 
random readings. Suppose Temp is aware of all this, wouldn’t he continue to form his 
temperature beliefs by reading the thermometer (not for trusting the functionality of the 
device but for trusting the diligence of the hidden agent)? Granted, Temp could safely 
continue to form temperature beliefs by looking at the thermometer display. What I 
wish to argue here is that, a very different M is in play as he continues to do that. 
Although his displaying behaviour remains unchanged, the cognitive processes 
manifested by the behaviour had shifted upon learning the whole story. Temp’s original 
M involves reading what the thermometer displays and assuming that the functioning 
device reflects the temperature of the room; the new process (M’) involves reading 
what the thermometer displays and assuming that the room temperature changes in 
accordance with the random thermometer readings. If we take our cognitive process 
to consist in the explicit behaviour as well as these tacit assumptions, it is clear that 
Temp would no longer adopt M for forming his temperature belief(s)—after all there is 
no functioning device to rely upon in the epistemic situation.25 
 
BEETLE (see 1.3.3) 
It is unclear how S comes to her beetle belief in Foley’s story. Her belief is not 
grounded by any perceptual or testimonial evidence whatsoever. Indeed, it is said that 
she walked into a room, saw a small, sealed box, and then holds the true belief that 
                                                          
24 It is worth noting that TEMP may not be considered a ‘Gettier case’ for no luck is involved in Temp’s 
temperature beliefs, whereas standard Gettier cases all seem to be lucky one way or another. As my 
discussion often includes a wide range of cases (not necessarily involve luck), I would avoid 
characterising them as Gettier cases but simply refer to them as ‘epistemic cases’ or ‘knowledge 
stories’ (following Foley). 
25 Borrowing from the archery analogy in virtue epistemology: Compare an expert and a novice archer 
shooting the same target. As a matter of luck, the novice exercised an exact replica of the expert’s 
shot. However, we wouldn’t grant that the novice and the expert had gone through the same shooting 
process—yes, their shoots turn out to be physically identical, but the expert took the shot by adjusting 
his aim and strength in accordance with wind speed and distance etc.; while the novice took the shot 
randomly without considering any relevant factors. 
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‘there’s a beetle inside the box’ out of nowhere. Foley thinks that S does not know, but 
lacks no important information because the world offers none for S to learn about. In 
1.3.3 I argued that the latter claim is dubious. But putting this matter aside, I don’t think 
AP would be satisfied either way. Whether or not S lacks any information, her 
epistemic situation surely isn’t ideal—she lacks a belief forming process that connects 
her to her beetle belief. At best, her belief formation would be characterised as wishful 
thinking or guesswork. These Ms, I suppose, would never be adopted in any ideal 
epistemic situations. 
 
On a more general note, if the observations from Foley and I are correct that what 
does the trick for knowledge stories is the imbalance of information, the AP 
requirement of M surviving any informational expansion should be able to fend off any 
Gettierisation of our epistemic situations. The narrator would have a hard time devising 
a case that S satisfies AP but falls short of knowledge due to something unbeknownst 
to him—for if AP is satisfied, the narrator herself would also have formed her belief the 
same way as the hero. Consider the awkward position of the narrator when closing 
the knowledge gap if KPS doesn’t stand—she would be conceding that to know P she 
herself would come to believe P the same way as a Gettiered victim (who lacks 
knowledge) does. 
 
These are the cases we considered so far in the previous chapter. Undoubtedly, given 
the vast amount of literature on the matter, many other cases have been left out here. 
While I do not plan to exhaustively discuss all epistemic cases regarding knowledge 
in this thesis, I would certainly go through more cases in the coming chapters as I 
examine different accounts of knowledge and specific counterexamples troubling 
them—more importantly, I shall highlight how AP as a holistic approach should tackle 
those cases. For now, I wish to discuss more on determining changes in one’s belief-
forming process. 
 
2.4.1.2 More on KPS and ‘the same process’ 
The critical strategy for AP to block knowledge stories is to suggest that had S been 
adequately informed about the story, S would not have formed the belief by the same 
process. A potential way to challenge this view is to articulate a knowledge 
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undermining case where the hero’s M has certain merit (e.g. truth preservation) such 
that he would form the belief(s) the same way he did even after unveiling the whole 
situation. Indeed, AP is incompatible with cases such as these. Thus, I have to 
maintain that such cases cannot be genuinely articulated. The idea is that when 
closing the information gap and turning a Getterised scenario into an instance of 
knowledge, S’s process must have changed. In other words, holding the external 
situation constant one cannot change one’s knowledge status about P without also 
changing one’s process to P (KPS). 
 
Considering how widely successful epistemologists have been in devising 
counterexamples that satisfy specific theories of knowledge, it is difficult to see how I 
would be able to pre-empt these cases for good. Can one really argue that these cases 
are impossible to articulate? Instead of giving a knock-down argument, I would like to 
offer a ‘sceptical’ take against the possibility of these cases—consider knowledge 
stories which one could make the best case that the processes involved are the same 
(between knowledge and ignorance), then suggest that even in those cases a change 
of process is in place. If even these cases involve a change in M, we have good reason 
to think that one cannot close the information gap without changing one’s process. 
 
Consider cases discussed above, I take it that both BARN FAÇADE and TEMP 
arguably involve the same processes upon S learning the entire story—unlike many 
other knowledge stories which involve completely different processes, George still has 
veridical visual perception of the barn that at least partially constitutes his barn belief 
formation and Temp continues to form his temperature beliefs by looking at the 
thermometer. However, I had argued that neither of their original processes remain 
intact and new processes are actually in play respectively. Let’s push further and make 
the process as similar as possible upon closing the information gap. 
 
When discussing TEMP I suggest that while both reading from the thermometer, 
before learning the whole story Temp forms his temperature beliefs by assuming that 
the functioning thermometer reflects the room temperature; whereas after being 
informed about the broken thermometer and the hidden agent Temp forms his 
temperature beliefs by assuming that the room temperature ‘reflects’ the random 
thermometer reading. However, the intuition of the two being distinctive processes 
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might stem from the unnecessary ‘direction of fit’ difference between the two26. To 
avoid this aspect of the case meddling with our intuition, consider the case of Temp’’ 
where the hidden agent managed to adjust the broken thermometer (and did it invisibly) 
according to the room temperature. To this effect, the broken thermometer functions 
just as it normally does—reliably indicating the temperature of the room. What is 
notable here is that upon learning the situation, the process involved in forming the 
temperature beliefs might be considered even closer to the original process—Temp’’ 
checks with the thermometer, assuming that it reliably reflects the temperatures of the 
room. 
 
I don’t think this modification of TEMP would reverse our existing verdict—it seems 
that Temp’’ is just as epistemically undermined as Temp, something is intervening 
between the process and the truth to the effect that knowledge is undermined. If AP 
were to stand, what could have differentiated the new process from the original? 
Granted, Temp’’ seems to have acted the same way all along when arriving at his 
temperature beliefs. However, I argue that we can indeed differentiate the 
epistemological underpinnings behind the belief-forming processes before and after 
he learns the whole story. While both trusting that the thermometer readings would 
indicate true temperatures of the room, Temp’’ is relying on a very different source of 
information after learning the whole story—before he depended on the reliable build 
of the thermometer by its factory (which, unbeknownst to him, had disappointed him); 
afterwards he relies on the promise of the (no longer) hidden agent (who Temp’’ 
reckons to be very dependable, let’s suppose—as Temp’’ is said to be informed about 
the entire situation). Insofar as we consider shifting our source of information a change 
in belief forming process, Temp’’ original M would not have survived unveiling the 
whole story—again, there is no normally functioning thermometer to rely upon. 
 
Is there a general rule for determining whether there’s a change in process while 
closing the knowledge gap? What differentiates the processes Temp’’ employs before 
and after according to AP? Before noticing the hidden agent, Temp’’ falls short of 
knowledge because his process is not acceptable in the most ideal epistemic situation 
(a perfectly informed ideal epistemic agent would not form the temperature beliefs via 
                                                          
26 Pritchard (2007, 2012) 
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his process); while after being informed the whole story the new process (trusting the 
hidden agent) is deemed acceptable. Let’s conjecture this as the general rule—in 
cases where a knowledge gap is closed, a change in process is always reflected in a 
change in its alignment with N (from previously unacceptable worlds to Wacc at the 
least). On the other hand, if we can identify a significant change in conformity to 
particular norms of belief formation, it is a good indication that a change in one’s belief-
forming process is in order. In the case of Temp’’, I argued above that the perfectly 
informed Temp’’ relies on a different source of information in his belief formation, 
constituting a different process. Note that this change in sources of information 
highlights a better alignment with epistemic norms—presumably one should 
appropriately identify one’s source of information (the hidden agent instead of the 
broken thermometer) when forming beliefs. Violating this rule is what makes original 
Temp’’ ideally unacceptable for knowledge attribution (he did not know what/who 
actually informs him)—and what differentiates his process from that of the perfectly 
informed Temp’’27. 
 
2.4.2 Motivations from other fields: Information imbalances and epistemic situations 
One knows just in case one’s belief forming process remains intact upon unveiling the 
entire situation—or, as Wright puts it, ‘survives any information expansion’. On the 
other hand, when knowledge is undermined, certain information deficiency must have 
deemed one’s process inadvisable in the eyes of an ideal agent. So far I have 
discussed two independent reasons in support of this view—it summarises well the 
common problem spotted in knowledge stories; and enjoys theoretical backings from 
Wright and Lynch’s works on truth. I would like to make an additional note that the 
view also resonates with the ways epistemic states are commonly construed in 
numerous professional fields and everyday situations. As mentioned above, Wright 
considers superassertibility as a generalisation of mathematical provability. An 
                                                          
27 Note that I do not take this as a general rule for individuating processes. In principle, there can be 
different processes that align with N equally well (I suppose, or at least, that any belief-forming 
process must have a unique alignment pattern with regards to N is a stronger thesis I do not need 
here). KPS only requires that we can identify a change of process whenever there is a change in 
knowledge status (i.e. whenever one closes the knowledge gap, turning an instance of ignorance to 
knowledge), rather than identifying a change of process at any time. I maintain that the strategy I 
employ here stands for this specific task. Whenever we identify a significant change in conformity of 
certain epistemic norms such that one’s belief formation becomes ideally acceptable, one’s underlying 
belief-forming process cannot remain the same. 
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adequately informed process, much like a mathematical proof, would stand by itself 
and withstand any additional scrutiny it faces. While the survivability of S’s belief 
forming process is an important facet of AP, let’s flip our attention to the other side of 
the account—what is unbeknownst to S in knowledge stories. Indeed, the tie between 
epistemic states and what I called the ‘informational imbalances’ in certain situation 
might be tighter than we think, observable even outside the context of epistemological 
debates. 
 
Many human activities involve making decisions based on what we know, to achieve 
some specific goals. Presumably we always hope to achieve our goals but only 
sometimes do so. The less interesting explanation of our failures is that the world does 
not always go our way despite our efforts. The explanation worth looking at, however, 
is that we are not making the right decision in a particular situation. When it comes to 
decision making processes, there are again two most obvious potential explanations 
for failure—that our rationality falls short or that our understanding of the situation is 
insufficient. Both issues are at the heart of what epistemology concerns, however, it is 
the latter that I would like to address here. 
 
According to AP, one’s grasp of the situation is represented as the information in one’s 
possession being measured against the totality of relevant information. As it turns out, 
many activities that involve decision making are particularly cautious on the extent to 
which the participating parties are being informed about the situation. In finance, a 
prominent hypothesis of an efficient market is that all information is transparent (thus 
accessible) to participating parties, which in turn determines the prices of every stock 
and commodity in the market. Indeed, one of the chief objectives of financial regulatory 
authorities is to ensure the fluid exchange of information such that no ‘player’ is 
informationally deprived (at least in terms of availability, agents may of course differ in 
diligence of learning all information—however, it is the job of the authorities to at least 
make the information as widespread and easily accessible as possible). In the context 
of stock exchange, it seems fair to say that the agents’ epistemic states are tied 
intimately with their informational standings. 
 
In psychological research, a key experimental design on studying human behaviours 
involves creating informational imbalances. Prior to the experiment, it is common for 
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researchers to withhold the true purposes or main hypotheses of the study from the 
subjects. This is to avoid what psychologists called ‘demand characteristics’—that the 
results would be contaminated by the subject’s intention to behave in accordance with 
(or, if they are not feeling cooperative, in contrast with) the hypothesis. What’s more, 
withholding information (or occasionally even deceiving subjects with false information) 
is sometimes an essential part of testing the hypothesis. In social psychology, for 
example, group dynamics are often studied by putting together experimental subjects 
with confederates. In Asch’s classic experiment (1951), subjects were grouped with 
many other confederates (unbeknownst to them—they take the confederates to be 
subjects just as themselves), and were tested if they would conform with the 
confederates in giving obviously wrong answers to some perception tasks. Information 
imbalance between subjects and confederates is created to devise potential 
circumstances of conformity. The confederates were fully informed about the situation 
as well as the experimental hypothesis; while the subjects were simply under the 
impression that the study investigates visual perception in groups. In this context, 
again, epistemic states are evaluated just in terms of information about the entire 
situation—‘how well informed the subjects are’ and ‘what the subjects know/ do not 
know’ are often interchangeable as far as the study is concerned. Indeed, after the 
experiment ethical protocols often require a debriefing session with the informationally 
deprived subjects, informing them with the entire situation and the true purpose of the 
research, thus ‘closing their knowledge gaps’. 
 
Not every one of us could be a ‘player’ in the stock market or a researcher in 
psychology. However, it seems to me that the close connection between our 
information standings and epistemic states extends beyond professional fields and is 
fairly apparent in some everyday scenarios as well. Speaking from experience, as 
someone who studies epistemology and enjoys playing board games with friends, I’m 
surprised at how many times competing in a game is a matter of having a better 
epistemic position (or, a better grasp of the situation) over your opponents. In particular, 
being in a favourable epistemic position is often a matter of gathering enough 
information and preventing others from doing so. To pick a better known example, 
imagine it is Christmas and you are playing Cluedo with your family. How does the 
game work and how do you get to know about the truths behind the murder? The 
game starts off when every detective is equally informationally deprived (alas, you get 
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the same amount of different information, but none of you have enough information 
regarding the murder to begin with)—you aim to gather enough information, or ‘clues’, 
from each other (and doing so faster than everyone else). The game ends when you 
know the murderer (as well as the weapon and the room), i.e. gathering enough 
information in the situation to deduce them. 
 
Indeed, detective novels in particular have put much emphasis on balancing the 
informational standings among the narrator and the readers so as to ensure a ‘fair play’ 
in the epistemic competition of uncovering the murderer. In van Dine’s seminal 20 
Detective Rules, the first and foremost rule of detective novels states that ‘The reader 
must have equal opportunity with the detective for solving the mystery. All clues must 
be plainly stated and described.’28 This effectively rules that the readers must be 
informationally on par with the detective. 
 
While the scenarios discussed above vary in one way or another, a key theme 
common in them seems to be that the epistemic statuses of agents in respective fields 
are all closely tied to the level of information they possess, whereas any epistemic 
discrepancies between agents are often cashed out in terms of information imbalances 
(just as what we observed in knowledge stories, see 2.1). Admittedly, this does not 
speak specifically in favour of the AP view. However, it does offer reasons for us to 
consider the general approach of epistemic evaluation which investigate the relation 
between knowledge and information. 
 
2.5 Concluding remarks—moving forward 
In this chapter I had introduced the adequately informed process view. It is an 
ecumenical account that is invariantist-friendly with belief forming process as an 
irreducible component (pace Foley). I had outlined three attractive features of this view. 
First, it is based on what I consider the essential common feature in knowledge stories 
(i.e. the hero’s informational deprivation vis-à-vis the entire situation) and is thus 
effective in addressing them. Second, it receives theoretical support from Wright and 
Lynch’s works on truth, thus inheriting the robust connections between the agent’s 
process and the truth of the propositions. Third, the connection between epistemic 
                                                          
28 Van Dine (1928). 
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states and the information about the situation resonates with many epistemically 
related activities in other fields of our lives. 
 
The second part of my thesis consists of theoretical comparisons. I would discuss 
some of the more prominent accounts of knowledge and evaluate how AP fares 
against them, or whether AP accommodates well with them. In addition to comparing 
theories, I confess that my wider goal is to promote AP and articulate my view more 
completely. In this chapter I outlined the ‘Gestalt’ approach to understanding 
epistemological phenomena as an important facet to my AP view. This idea would 
return in chapters 3 and 4. In chapter 3 I shall discuss the older defeasibility theories 
of knowledge, due to the similarities between AP and this line of accounts. I shall 
evaluate how AP would tackle the potentially troubling misleading defeater cases, and 
suggest the importance of assessing our epistemic situation (U) holistically. In chapter 
4, I shall offer a critical discussion on virtue epistemology, and discuss how a holistic 
approach to cognitive processes (M) would have benefitted certain virtue theoretical 



















Adequately Informed Process and Defeat 
 
3.1 Introductory remarks 
In previous chapters I had described the new approach to epistemic evaluation and 
developed my positive account of knowledge from it. This chapter marks the second 
part of the thesis—I shall examine how the articulated adequately informed process 
(AP) view fares against other theories, and by doing so highlight the advantages of 
treating epistemic evaluation as a holistic matter. This chapter in particular discusses 
the defeasibility theories of knowledge. 
 
One should have particularly good reasons to motivate a reassessment of a theory of 
knowledge as old as defeasibility. As one of the earlier attempts to offer a reductive 
account of knowledge, defeasibility account(s) proposed that knowledge is true belief 
with undefeated justification. 1  At first glance, such a claim appears to be very 
sensible—if there is some other fact that would speak against one’s existing 
justification without one realising it, it seems that we wouldn’t want to grant one 
knowledge; by the same token, it seems right to think also that if one indeed knows 
such and such, one’s justification for the belief cannot be undermined (rendered 
unjustified2) by further facts. 
 
Despite its prima facie plausibility, the defeasibility view has been shown to be 
ultimately unsatisfactory in light of some emerging difficult cases (which I shall address 
in coming sections). Now, are there any particular motivations for reconsidering this 
view? For one thing, although few now would think that defeasibility is a promising 
account3, many nevertheless consider it to be an important facet of knowledge—
indeed, even externalist theories had attempted to incorporate a defeasibility condition 
                                                          
1 This idea will be unpacked in 3.3. 
2 A common view on justification is that it comes in degrees. Thus, it seems that a belief can become 
less justified without being unjustified altogether. In the case of defeasibility accounts I take it that its 
proponents (Lehrer and Paxson 1969, Klein 1971) took interest only on propositions that render one’s 
original justification unjustified. 
3 Klein (2004), however, still seems to champion this account. 
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of some sort to their views.4 Along this line, Pritchard (2016b) also suggested that ‘it 
is incumbent upon any theory of knowledge to explain how it handles cases involving 
epistemic defeaters’.5 In this regard, my chapter aims to achieve similar goals. 
 
More importantly, as far as the current project is concerned, the adequate process (as 
well as Foley’s adequate information) view does seem to share certain affinity with 
defeasibility accounts—if one’s existing process (or warrant in Wright’s term) survives 
the scrutiny of any further expansion of evidence (or, for Foley, there’s no important 
information one lacks), doesn’t it mean just that one’s belief remains undefeated in the 
whole story? Lynch (2009) is more explicit in his characterisation of superwarrant that 
one’s belief must be ‘continually warranted without defeat’ at every stage of inquiry.6 
If AP is the epistemic counterpart of Lynch’s superwarrant (or Wright’s 
superassertibility), it would be natural to suppose that the tie between AP and 
defeasibility is close as well. It is not difficult to see how intimate the relation is between 
adequate information and defeat. Indeed, one might go so far in considering that the 
two notions are describing two sides of the very same creature—while the epistemic 
significance of defeat is negative by nature (i.e. the negative impact it brings to our 
knowledge/justification), adequate information (in spirit)7 seems to capture the positive 
picture of the idea (the epistemic good of one’s process/warrant remaining intact, or 
undefeated). It strikes me that the distinction between defeasibility and AP is a matter 
of perspective—rather than individual propositions, AP takes interest in the epistemic 
performance of one’s process in the case as a whole. Such a distinction will prove to 
be helpful when confronted with difficult cases. 
 
Due to their affinity I believe that the relation between the two views is worthy of a 
deeper exploration. I shall first carry an overview of various types of defeater in the 
literature. Many of them would be relevant to the following discussions. Then I shall 
consider defeasibility as an account of knowledge, comparing it with the proposed AP 
view. I shall examine the strengths of the two conditions, and determine if they entail 
                                                          
4 Goldman (1979) added defeasibility condition as an additional clause to his reliabilist view; 
Grundmann (2009) offered a modified version incorporating defeat while, as he argued, ‘stays with 
the reliabilist spirit’. 
5 Pritchard (2016b), p. 3065. 
6 Lynch (2009), p. 38. 
7 I concede that superassertibility offers an even closer analogue here as they both hold an internalist 
commitment on warrant. 
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one another. Along the way, some difficult cases for the defeasibility view will be 
discussed, and I shall suggest how AP would be able to tackle them. At the end I will 
relate the issues in this chapter with the wider theme of this thesis and make some 
remarks on the holistic approach to epistemic evaluations. 
 
3.2 Types of defeat 
With regards to what constitutes defeat, Bergmann (2006) distinguished between a 
propositional defeater and a mental state defeater. Both defeaters play the role of 
undermining one’s justification. However, as their names suggest, while a 
propositional defeater is a proposition (that holds in the world) that need not 
necessarily be accessible to the agent’s mind, a mental state defeater (also known as 
psychological defeater, see 3.2.3) must be one’s mental state—either in the form of a 
belief or an experience.8 It is a common view that even propositional defeaters (which 
defeat without the agent necessarily possessing them) would suffice in undermining 
knowledge—indeed, defeasibility accounts of knowledge (Lehrer and Paxson 1969; 
Klein 1971, 1976) speak only of propositional defeaters. As this chapter concerns 
defeasibility’s relation to an account of knowledge, I will follow suit and take defeaters 
to mean propositional defeaters unless stated otherwise. 
 
3.2.1 Mechanisms of defeat 
Regarding how defeaters defeat justification, the distinction between rebutting and 
undercutting defeaters, credited to John Pollock (1974), remain the centre of 
discussion in literature. A rebutting defeater for one’s justification of a proposition P is 
a reason for one to believe ¬P, or some proposition Q that is incompatible with P. 
While an undercutting defeater for P is a reason that undermines the connection 
between P and one’s justificatory grounds of believing it. 
 
Consider some examples for the two types of defeaters. Suppose George spots a 
barn-like object in the field and forms the belief that there’s a barn. Suppose further a 
local farmer next to him tells him that the object he sees is actually a barn façade. 
George would then possess a rebutting defeater for his barn belief—he had obtained 
a reason to believe the negation of P (a barn façade is, of course, not a barn). Consider 
                                                          
8 Bergmann (2006), p. 154-156. 
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yet another case. Suppose Mary walks into a museum and sees a vase appearing to 
be red in colour, and forms the belief that the vase is red. A security guard then walks 
to her and informs her that the vase has been irradiated with a set of red lights. Mary 
ceases to believe that the vase is red, for she now possesses an undercutting defeater 
for her belief—note that unlike the case of rebutting defeaters, this is no evidence that 
the vase is not red; instead, she had a reason to no longer believe that what she sees 
supports P (her red-vase experience could very well be due to the red lights after all).9 
 
Further studies investigated the relation between rebutting and undercutting defeat 
(Casullo 2003, 2016; Sturgeon 2014). In particular, Pryor (2013) suggested that when 
one possesses a strong reason to believe ¬P or incompatible proposition Q that defeat 
one’s belief that P, one would naturally question one’s original grounds for believing P 
and no longer consider it as a reliable indicator of P’s truth. Thus, it is argued that 
rebutting defeaters have a tendency to collapse into undercutting defeaters. 10 
However, such a relation doesn’t apply in the other direction, apparently—for 
undercutting defeaters do not seem to constitute a rebutting defeat in any obvious way. 
Having a good reason that one’s grounds is not a reliable indicator of P’s truth is not 
by itself a reason to believe ¬P or some incompatible proposition Q. 
 
3.2.2 Genuine and misleading defeaters 
Suppose S is justified in believing P. However, S’s justification is defeated by a 
proposition D. Suppose a further twist of event that D is in turn defeated by new 
evidence D’. In virtue of what originally undermines S’s justification is itself defeated, 
it seems plausible to consider that S’s original justification for P remains intact after 
all11. Defeaters like D, despite being true propositions, are not considered as carrying 
the same epistemic significance of undermining justification as genuine defeaters 
(those that are not further defeated by other propositions), and are commonly viewed 
as ‘misleading’. Consider for example the barn façade case discussed above. 
Suppose the local farmer is actually a jokester who lied to George about there being 
barn façades. The alleged defeater of the farmer’s testimony would then be 
                                                          
9 For more discussion on the mechanism of defeat, see interlude. 
10 Pryor (2013), Pritchard (2016b) 
11 Lehrer and Paxson (1969), who first introduced cases of this sort, were in favour of this position; 
Harman (1973), on the other hand, argues that this is not always the case. 
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misleading—and George’s original justification regarding his barn belief should not be 
undermined after all. 
 
The significance of genuine and misleading defeaters would take centre stage in the 
coming discussion, as defeasibility theories of knowledge in the literature had heavily 
debated on such issue as well. I take it to be conventional to say that at least all 
genuine defeaters are knowledge undermining 12 . However, the extent to which 
misleading defeaters undermine justification, and ex hypothesi knowledge, had led to 
extended debates among the proponents and critics of the defeasibility view. 
Defeasibility theorists like Klein (1971, 1979) as well as Lehrer and Paxson (1969) 
maintained that knowledge is not defeated by misleading defeaters, while Harman 
(1973) argued that some misleading defeaters can undermine knowledge if certain 
social epistemic underpinnings were involved. Levy (1977, 1978) further suggested 
that the characterisation of when a defeater is misleading, as well as when a 
misleading defeater undermines knowledge, are both overwhelmingly difficult tasks 
that make the prospect of any defeasibility accounts unpromising. Indeed, it is fair to 
say that the inability to convincingly address these concerns had led to the eventual 
demise of this early approach. 
 
3.2.3 Normative defeaters 
In her book on testimonial knowledge, Lackey (2008) made the distinction between 
psychological and normative defeaters. Psychological defeaters are defeaters S 
possesses and actually undermines S’s doxastic justification, regardless of whether 
itself is in turn true or justified; whereas normative defeaters are defeaters that S is not 
aware of, but ought to be so.13 In his discussion regarding his preferred account of 
knowledge and epistemic defeat, Pritchard (2016b) investigated at length the role 
played by normative defeaters in difficult Gettier cases—and how anti-luck virtue 
epistemology is well positioned to offer a diagnosis. In fact, it is not hard to appreciate 
why normative defeaters, instead of psychological ones, take centre stage when it 
comes to challenging epistemic cases—for insofar as we consider justification (broadly 
                                                          
12 Thus, any bona fide knowledge case that allegedly involves a defeater would be a case of 
misleading defeat. 
13 For further discussions on what makes knowing a proposition normative, and the epistemic 
significance of those propositions, see Goldberg (2016, 2017). 
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construed) as an essential component of knowledge, any case that involves a 
psychological defeater (deeming S’s belief doxastically unjustified) would be out of the 
question immediately. 
 
However, it is important to note that Lackey’s characterisation doesn’t seem to be 
exhaustive. In principle, there could be defeaters that are neither psychological nor 
normative—true propositions that S is unaware of, and it is not the case that S ought 
to be aware of either. Such propositions are defeaters because had S been aware of 
them, S’s justification would have been undermined. Defeaters of such kind are 
undoubtedly of interest to defeasibility theorists—while psychological defeaters are 
ruled out without much controversy, whether the normativity of the unaware defeaters 
matters to knowledge ascriptions is a question worth exploring. 
 
3.2.4 Types of defeat of interest 
As our primary concern rests in knowledge (particularly, difficult cases where 
instances of JTB fall short of knowledge), we can locate the kinds of defeat of our 
interest with regards to the above parameters. Pritchard (2016b) noted that these axes 
of characterising defeat are in principle independent of each other. This chapter will 
focus on discussing propositional defeaters that are misleading and non-psychological 
(as all genuine/psychological defeaters would uncontroversially undermine 
justification and thus knowledge), while remaining open whether they should be 
rebutting or undercutting. Whether the normativity of defeat would impact on 
knowledge ascriptions will also be discussed.14 With the preliminaries set up, let’s now 
look into the defeasibility view of knowledge in detail. 
 
3.3 Defeasibility theories of knowledge 
3.3.1 The no-defeaters condition of knowledge 
The defeasibility view of knowledge blossomed in the 1970s, with Lehrer & Paxson 
(1969, Lehrer 1970) along with Klein (1971, 1976, 1979, 2004) as main proponents. 
                                                          
14 One might reasonably doubt that whether there can be misleading defeater undermining one’s 
justification that is neither psychological nor normative. I shall present a case that seems to tick all 
these boxes in 3.3.3. 
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To grasp how this ‘fourth condition’ works, consider Klein’s earlier attempt 15  in 
articulating the view.16 
 
Klein’s defeasibility theory of knowledge:  
S knows that p at t1 if and only if 
(i) p is true; 
(ii) S believes p at t1; 
(iii) p is evident to S at t1; 
(iv) there is no true proposition such that if it became evident to S at t1, p would 
no longer be evident to S.17 
 
Klein’s account essentially rules that the justification of one’s belief that p cannot be 
defeated. Consider some of the previously discussed Gettier-style cases. 
 
FAKE SHEEP (see 1.2) 
That there’s a sheep in the field is true (i) and  Smith believes it (ii). Moreover, on the 
basis of his visual perceptual experience, Smith is justified in believing that there’s a 
sheep (iii). However, knowledge is undermined because the no-defeater condition is 
not met—there’s a true proposition that would render Smith’s belief unjustified had 
Smith been aware of it, namely, that the object he sees is actually a rock. 
 
BARN FAÇADE (see 1.2) 
As in FAKE SHEEP, that there’s a barn is a justified true belief of George’s. Despite 
looking at the real barn, George’s knowledge is still undermined. According to 
defeasibility theorists, the no-defeater condition is not satisfied. That he is in barn 
façade county surrounded by fake barns in the vicinity serves as an undercutting 
defeater for George’s justification—as it is stipulated in the story that the façades and 
the genuine ones are visually indistinguishable (in the front) to travellers like George. 
                                                          
15 Earlier attempts of defeasibility accounts are more straight forward and intuitive—later 
developments of the condition became rather complex and long-winded to address challenges. 
16 See also Lehrer & Paxson (1969), p. 227 for their articulation of the view. I opt for exploring Klein’s 
account here because the ‘fourth condition’ in his account is more apparent so that we can refer to the 
no-defeater clause more easily in the coming discussion. 
17 Klein (1971), p. 475. 
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Learning about the façade county George would no longer consider his barn-like visual 
experiences as sufficient grounds for his barn beliefs. 
 
TEMP (see 1.2) 
Similar to BARN FAÇADE, Temp’s temperature beliefs are justified and true but fall 
short of knowledge because an undercutting defeater is present. Had Temp noticed 
that the thermometer is malfunctioning, he would no longer consider the thermometer 
readings as acceptable grounds for his temperature beliefs. 
 
3.3.2 Tom Grabit and the problem of misleading defeaters 
It can be argued that defeasibility theories are too strong as an account of knowledge. 
This lies in the challenge they face in tackling misleading defeaters. It seems that in 
some cases where the unknown defeaters are misleading, knowledge would not be 
undermined. Consider the widely-known case of TOM GRABIT. 
 
TOM GRABIT S saw someone removed a book from the library by concealing it 
under his coat. S was sure that the man is Tom Grabit. Thus, S comes to the belief 
that Tom Grabit stole a book from the library, and plans to report the crime. 
Unbeknownst to S, Tom’s mother has asserted that Tom was out of town on that 
day, and John Grabit, Tom’s twin brother, was in the library instead. As a further 
twist of the story, Mrs Grabit is a pathological liar—the existence of John Grabit, 
Tom’s twin brother, is completely made up; also, unlike what she had claimed, 
Tom was not out of town and was indeed in the library (seen by S) on that day.18 
 
Many (including defeasibility proponents) agreed that S does know that Tom Grabit 
stole the book. S indeed recognised Tom in the library and had never heard Mrs 
Grabit’s false claims. It would be too stringent to consider S’s justification (and thus 
knowledge) undermined due to the faulty testimony (presumably miles away) he never 
heard. If we subscribe to this view to the extreme, we could easily lose knowledge by 
false utterances of any untrustworthy/pathological person we never encountered. On 
the other hand, we can surely make a case that Mrs Grabit’s testimony is indeed a 
rebutting defeater in TOM GRABIT. That she had made those claims is a true 
                                                          
18 Adapted from Lehrer & Paxson (1969). 
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proposition that would provide strong evidence for believing something incompatible 
with P (namely, it is John, instead of Tom, who stole the book from the library). Thus, 
it seems that we wouldn’t want to exclude all of the most far-fetched true propositions 
that would potentially undermine justification had we been aware of them, if we wish 
to preserve many of the knowledge we think we possess. 
 
Defeasibility theorists surely wouldn’t concede that their view is too strong. Indeed, 
they consider Mrs Grabit’s testimony as a misleading defeater that doesn’t amount to 
genuine defeat. A proposition D is a defeater for S’s justification E if and only if E 
supports P but E+D does not. A defeater Dm is misleading if and only if there’s another 
defeater D’ which in turn undermine Dm’s power to defeat S’s initial justification—i.e. 
while E supports P and E+Dm does not, E+Dm+D’ in turn supports P.19 
 
Interlude: Mechanisms of defeat iterations 
Consider the mechanisms of such iterations of defeat20. It would be natural to assume 
that the defeat could either be rebutting or undercutting on each level. Let’s examine 
each of the possible scenarios more closely. 
 
As discussed in TOM GRABIT Mrs Grabit false testimony serves as a rebutting 
defeater supporting that Tom Grabit did not steal the book (for he was out of town). 
Moving to another level, is the defeater that defeats this misleading information 
rebutting or undercutting? It could go either way really, depending on the pathological 
details of Mrs Grabit—if she simply makes random groundless assertions without 
caring about their truths, D’ would amount to an undercutting defeater for Dm (we would 
no longer have sufficient reasons to think that E+Dm does not support P); on the other 
hand, if Mrs Grabit is a pathological liar in the sense that she only seek to utter 
falsehoods (thus indicating that Tom is not out of town and the man in the library is not 
Tom’s twin brother John), D’ would instead be a rebutting defeater for Dm (E+Dm+D’ 
                                                          
19 Admittedly, the notion of misleading defeat is itself difficult to cast out and it is important to note that 
the picture provided here is just a broad characterisation of Dm, and defeat iterations in general. For 
attempts to capture misleading defeat, see Levy (1978) and Klein (1979). 
20 Not to be confused with the higher-order defeat discussions in the literature which concerns facts 
that undermine the cognitive process involved in the belief formation. For a more detailed discussion 
distinguishing higher-order defeat and undercutting defeaters, see Christensen (2010). 
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gives us good reasons to think that Tom indeed stole the book in the library—contrary 
to what E+Dm suggests). 
 
On a similar note, Dm could serve as an undercutting defeater as well. Suppose you 
seem to see a red object in front of you, but again our dear Mrs Grabit asserts that the 
object is illuminated by red lights21. Without knowing that she is a pathological liar, the 
red-light-illumination information undercuts your justificatory grounds that the object 
itself is red. Now can we suggest that further defeat to this misleading undercutting 
defeater could be either rebutting or undercutting, depending on Mrs Grabit’s 
pathological habits (just as we do in TOM GRABIT)? Granted, if she utters random 
claims, the undercutting Dm would itself be undercut—we will reconsider our initial red 
object experience as reliable indicator of truths, having undermined Mrs Grabit 
testimony as reliable grounds for our beliefs; however, it strikes me that intriguingly 
this undercutting Dm cannot be rebutted—say if Mrs Grabit exclusively utters 
falsehoods, meaning that Mrs Grabit’s assertion supports that there are no red lights, 
we sure will have good reasons (E+Dm+D’) to think that the object is indeed red. That 
being said, I don’t think that this rebuts Dm—for Dm being an undercutting defeater 
does not suggest that the object is not red to begin with, it’s just that we do not have 
enough justification to believe that it is red. Now one might say that D’ rebuts on this 
suggestion by claiming the contrary—that we indeed have enough justification. This, I 
think, is a dangerous move that risks conflating rebutting and undercutting defeat 
altogether—for in the process of restoring one’s initial justification regarding the red 
object, doesn’t the undercutting defeater D’ (that Mrs Grabit makes random assertion) 
establish that we indeed have enough justification as well? Is it then also a rebutting 
defeater in virtue of making this claim (contrary to what Dm suggests)? If we wish to 
preserve a clear distinction between rebutting and undercutting defeat, it seems that 
a plausible option is to accept that while rebutting defeat can be further defeated either 
way, undercutting defeat can only be iterated by further defeaters of its own kind. This 
imbalance, I believe, trades on the asymmetry between the two mechanisms of 
                                                          
21 For convenience I develop the undercutting cases analogously with Mrs Grabit’s misleading 
testimonies. Note that I do not think false testimony plays an essential role in cases of misleading 
defeat, and one can construct a case of misleading defeat without testimonial involvements. For 
example, suppose I participated in an experiment testing the effect of a hallucination drug. I would 
have good reasons to doubt what I see as constituting sufficient grounds for beliefs. Such a defeater 




defeat—rebutting defeat tends to collapse into undercutting defeat but not vice versa. 
Since an undercutting defeat offers no positive reasons for believing the (negation of 
the) target proposition, further defeat iterations have no relevant claims to rebut. 
 
3.3.3 The weakened defeasibility account and further problems from misleading defeat 
Consider now the modified defeasibility view that seek to adapt the problem of 
misleading defeaters. As noted above, defeasibility theorists do not consider 
misleading defeaters as constituting genuine defeat (and presumably, only genuine 
defeaters undermine knowledge). Thus, one can take the modified account to be 
replacing the no-defeater clause with the ‘no-genuine-defeater’ clause. In the 
exchange between Levy (1978) and Klein (1979), the modified defeasibility account is 
stated as follow: 
 
S knows that p if and only if: 
(i) p is true. 
(ii) S believes that p. 
(iii) There is some evidence e such that e justifies p for S. 
(iv) Every defeater of the justification for S of p by e is a misleading defeater. 
 
By allowing misleading defeater in bona fide knowledge cases, however, this modified 
account faces the challenge of becoming too weak. As there are various axes of 
characterising epistemic defeat, misleading defeaters come in many kinds. While 
some instances of misleading defeat are benign (as in TOM GRABIT), others might 
be knowledge undermining. Gilbert Harman (1973) notoriously suggested that the 
social aspect of Mrs Grabit’s testimony would impact on our knowledge judgments 
regarding S’s belief. If we imagine Mrs Grabit whispered those claims at home, we’d 
surely feel safe enough to preserve knowledge for S; however, if Mrs Grabit goes out 
and testifies the claims to everyone in the town but S (suppose S is in the library that 
time), the misleading information seems to have penetrated S’s epistemic community 
deep enough to cause trouble—S would seem too lucky to have missed the misleading 




The intuition would become more apparent if one considers another analogous case 
introduced by Harman where the fake news penetration is further institutionalised. 
Consider the following case. 
 
PRESIDENT Suppose Jill reads the newspaper reporting that the president had 
been assassinated. The report is actually true. However, in the attempt to 
suppress the true story, the president’s associates requested major media to 
broadcast fake news that the president is fine in the assassination attempt 
(imagine the paper Jill read was one of the earlier reports that the office failed to 
block). Near all of Jill’s peers received the fake news and believe that the president 
is alive. Jill, by incredible luck, managed to miss all of the broadcasts with false 
reports and peer discussions, and continue to believe (truly) that the president 
was dead.22 
 
Again, it is argued that even though what Jill missed is a misleading defeater, the fact 
that it has been widespread in Jill’s epistemic community had undermined Jill’s 
knowledge in a barn-façade like fashion—despite having the appropriate connection 
with the truth, the nearby fakes surrounding the agent had made her belief too 
(veritically) lucky to count as knowledge. 
 
One possible explanation to connect the anti-luck aspect displayed here with defeat is 
to introduce normativity. One might argue that widespread misleading information, in 
virtue of being very easily accessible (indeed, the broadcasting in Jill’s case is 
intended to reach the whole epistemic community), imposes certain epistemic ought 
to relevant agents. Consider Pritchard’s (2016b) discussion on this score. Suppose 
George is again looking at a barn in a county. Unlike BARN FAÇADE, however, there 
are not fake barns in the vicinity—the twist of the story is that a sign along the road (of 
considerable size such that it is easily visible to all passers-by) misleadingly indicates 
that this is a barn façade county. Now the scenarios of one coming across this sign 
driving through the county is clearly modally close—suppose the sign is considerably 
large and well located such that ‘people couldn’t have missed it’. Suppose now through 
incredible happenstance George indeed missed the sign (he looked aside chatting to 
                                                          
22 Adapted from Harman (1973). 
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his passengers at that very moment), and continue to think that he is looking at 
genuine barns (as he is, the sign is after all misleading). The modally close misleading 
defeater would still undermine knowledge, it is argued, not purely because of the 
modal closeness—but also because of normative considerations of some sort. It is not 
just that George could have easily looked at the sign, he should have looked at it—
after all drivers should pay attention to road signs as information on it are usually 
relevant to driving (or more generally, an epistemic agent should pay attention to 
information in the vicinity concerning the place). Because George is not doing what he 
ought to do as an epistemic agent (noticing obvious informational signs), knowledge 
is undermined even though what he carelessly (and blissfully) missed is misleading. 
 
While the normativity side of the story adds complexity to the case, and epistemic 
reasons to think that knowledge is undermined, it seems that not all the knowledge-
undermining misleading defeaters have to be essentially normative. Sometimes the 
agent might have missed a modally close misleading defeater without being at fault. 
Suppose George’s friend Smith was on the same car and saw the sign. Smith is colour 
blind. As it happens, the sign has a certain red-green colour combination such that the 
word ‘façade’ on the sign is not visible to colour blind people. What Smith saw in the 
county are many (real) barns, and a sign indicating that ‘this is the barn county’ (as 
Smith takes it, people living here are just so proud of their barns that they name their 
county after them). 
 
While there might be inclinations to grant knowledge to Smith, I submit that we really 
should battle against such intuition. Following Harman’s diagnosis of the outreaching 
Mrs Grabit case, it seems odd to grant knowledge exclusively to someone who is more 
informationally deprived than others in the community, despite the fact that what the 
agent missed would have misled him. Developing on the social aspect of the case, 
while the sign had failed to mislead Smith, it is intended to mislead people passing by 
the county in general. People like Smith would have easily fallen victim to the sign 
when their epistemic peers notice the sign and discuss with him—Smith would surely 
concede with what his peers saw, taking into account that himself is colour blind. 
Indeed, George whom we assume is not colour blind is with Smith, and it is of 
incredible luck that George missed the sign himself, keeping Smith’s true beliefs intact.  
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If we agree that Smith does not know about the barns in this case, it would seem that 
misleading defeaters need not be normative in order to undermine knowledge—for it 
is not the case that Smith ought to pick up the misleading information in the epistemic 
environment. He could easily have done so (if George had been more attentive, or 
Smith had encountered others in the vicinity), but being colour blind him missing the 
misleading information had not violated any epistemic norms. 
 
The upshot of the above discussion is that the relation between knowledge and 
defeaters becomes even less apparent, and it is difficult for defeasibility theorists to 
point out when exactly a defeater would undermine knowledge. It is uncontroversial 
that genuine defeaters defeat knowledge. It is also clear that psychological defeaters 
are incompatible with knowledge as well (be it genuine or misleading, I suppose), for 
it is very hard to consider oneself justified (even for externalists like Goldman) if one 
is consciously aware of some propositions that defeat one’s belief. When it comes to 
the domain of misleading defeaters one is unaware of, however, the picture becomes 
gerrymandered. With interconnected social, modal and normative aspects of the 
misleading information all carrying epistemic significance, whether a non-
psychological misleading defeater undermines knowledge doesn’t seem to be a matter 
decidable purely in defeasibility terms. The problem introduced by misleading 
defeaters, to sum up, is this—on the one hand excluding them all from cases of 
knowledge would be too strong a view due to the classical TOM GRABIT; on the other 
accepting misleading defeat simpliciter as compatible with knowledge would be too 
weak due to case like Jill, George and Smith, where knowledge is undermined for 
modal, normative and social reasons. Furthermore, the distinction between benign and 
knowledge undermining misleading defeaters does not seem to have promising 
prospect. Even if we are able to determine when exactly knowledge would be 
undermined taking into account the integrated social, modal and normative aspects, it 
is unclear what role the no-defeater clause plays in such a view at the end of the day. 
 
A further concern that complicates matters for misleading defeaters is the iterations of 
defeat. As mentioned, misleading defeaters are all further defeated. Let’s grant for the 
sake of argument that all misleading defeaters are compatible with knowledge. In 
principle the defeaters (D’) that defeat the misleading defeaters (Dm) can themselves 
be defeated by D’’ (assuming that Dm, D’ and D’’ are all true propositions, that is, D’ is 
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misleading in defeating the alleged misleading defeater Dm). In such cases, 
considering Dm as compatible with knowledge would become problematic—if it is D’ 
that is misleading in defeating Dm, Dm would really be undermining S’s initial 
justification after all. Defeasibility theorists might come to an easy fix to the problem 
by putting a constraint to defeat iterations—that Dm is a misleading defeater only if the 
defeater D’ that defeats it is not itself defeated by any other defeater D’’. Alas, how 
about cases where D’’ is in turn misleading (and thus D’ genuinely defeats Dm, making 
Dm really a misleading defeater)? Following the above constraint, defeasibility theorists 
would have mischaracterised Dm as not being a misleading defeater. The fact that 
there is no non-ad-hoc way to stop the possible iterations of defeat seem to have 
conflated the boundaries between misleading and genuine defeaters and the 
epistemic significance of satisfying the no-genuine-defeaters clause after all. For if D’ 
is defeated by D’’, does it make Dm a genuine defeater really? Notice how easily one 
can come up with a true proposition D’ that misleadingly defeats a genuine defeater 
(there can always be a distant pathological liar story given), we might come to the 
conclusion that either there are no genuine defeaters at all, or that they are not so 
different from misleading defeaters anyway. 
 
3.4 Adequate process and defeat 
This section will explore the relation between adequate process and epistemic defeat. 
As noted in the introduction AP and defeasibility impose very similar requirements to 
our belief formation—while AP demands our belief forming process to survive the 
scrutiny as we unveil the entire situation unknown to us, defeasibility rules that it 
cannot be defeated by truths we are unaware of. The difference seems to be a matter 
of focus—while AP looks primarily at the epistemic goods of an adequate process, 
defeasibility strives to avoid defeaters which are knowledge undermining. 
 
Another potential difference is that early accounts of defeasibility view justification as 
reasons that demand reflective access on the agent’s part, while adequate process 
does not have this internalist commitment. However, such distinction may not be 
essential—although the notion of defeat is traditionally cashed out in internalist terms, 
attempts have been made to account for it in externalist fashion23. In the following 
                                                          
23 See, for example, Grundmann (2009). 
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discussion I shall remain open for both interpretations of defeasibility, thus making its 
comparison to the ecumenical AP easier. 
 
As I conjectured that defeasibility theories of knowledge (DT) and AP are two sides of 
the same coin, let us consider whether DT↔AP. By examining both directions of the 
biconditional, we can appreciate how the adequate process view is different from 
defeasibility theories, and why the former should be preferred. 
 
3.4.1 Does defeasibility entail adequate process? 
Suppose S has sufficient grounds in forming some true belief that P, and there is no 
defeater for S’s belief formation. Now if we take the strong defeasibility view where all 
defeaters (thus including all defeaters S is unaware of) are excluded (call it DTstrong), it 
follows that S’s belief forming process would remain unharmed by any acquisition of 
new evidence—for such defeasibility view rules that there is no further true proposition 
that would undermine S’s existing process. 
 
Let’s put this differently and with more clarity. To establish the conditional DTstrong→AP, 
I argue that DTstrong and ¬AP jointly leads to a contradiction. Consider ¬AP. If adequate 
process is not satisfied in S’s belief forming process, such process fails to withstand 
the scrutiny of maximum evidence expansion (i.e. gaining knowledge about the entire 
situation). This means that there is certain information S obtains during the expansion 
that S’s original process fails to address. On the other hand, it seems that meeting the 
criteria for DTstrong blocks the possibility of there being such information—as there can 
be no true proposition which S is unaware of that would undermine S’s original 
process.24 We thus arrive at a contradiction that there is a proposition that undermines 
S’s process and there cannot be one. 
                                                          
24 With regards to the way processes are undermined, traditional DTstrong suggests that S would 
become unjustified after being aware of the defeater (E+D), which would not apply in AP’s view. But 
as noted we would not limit DTstrong to internalist interpretations. Following AP, let’s suppose an 
ecumenical reading (see Ch. 2) to defeat such that a defeater D undermines S’s process by deeming 
it unsatisfactory under certain epistemic norms with regards to forming the true belief that P (while 
before obtaining D S’s process is satisfactory). Even if one prefers to stay with the internalist 
rendering of defeat, insofar as we take the internalist condition as a more stringent requirement to our 
belief forming processes, the argument would still go through (given that we are only considering one 
way of the biconditional here (from DTstrong to AP)).  
89 
 
Consider now the more tolerant view where all misleading defeaters are taken as 
compatible with knowledge25. Call this DTweak. If we are right in thinking that DTweak is 
too weak in 3.3, then surely I wouldn’t advocate that AP is entailed by it. I will argue to 
establish DTweak and ¬AP in order to reject this conditional. Consider the knowledge 
undermining cases of misleading defeaters such as PRESIDENT. There is little doubt 
that DTweak is met—as all misleading defeaters are compatible with knowledge, the 
misleading broadcast Jill had missed does not violate DTweak. There are still no 
‘genuine’ defeaters, in DTweak lights, for Jill’s belief. I’d like to turn to AP now, and argue 
that Jill’s belief forming process does not remain intact when the entire situation is 
unveiled. 
 
When told that the government is trying to suppress the truth with widespread 
misleading news, can Jill still form her president belief by reading the truth reporting 
newspaper? Of course, one might think, knowing that herself is possessing the reliable 
source of information all along, what bars her from continuing in relying on the 
newspaper to form the belief? As tempting as this verdict may be, I would like to argue 
for the contrary—Jill’s original process is not adequate for the entire epistemic situation. 
Revisiting the AP view: 
 
AP: S knows that P just in case S comes to believe P via process M in the actual 
world, and is ideally permitted to continue believing P via M had S obtained the 
information regarding the entire situation U. 
 
Similar to the strategy adopted as I address certain difficult cases in chapter 2, it strikes 
me that the processes involved before and after Jill learned about the entire situation 
are significantly different. Granted, in both scenarios Jill rightly put trust on the 
newspaper, a reliable source of information, in forming her president belief. However, 
as a holistic approach the epistemic significance must be examined in face of the entire 
epistemic story rather than the very process taken out of context. It is misguided to 
simply ‘pick out’ from the story the agent’s processes ‘before and after’, put them 
alongside each other, and compare their likeliness individually. To determine whether 
                                                          
25 Due to the difficulty of determining the epistemic significance among various misleading defeaters 
outlined above, I shall not consider a ‘moderate’ view where only some misleading defeaters are 
included—it is unclear that substantial views of such kind can be articulated at all. 
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a process M really survives in the holistic approach, think of putting M on an epistemic 
‘trial’ against the entire epistemic environment (relevant to P). To defend its case, M 
must demonstrate the ability to withstand reasonable challenges the situation put forth, 
such that the agent is not missing out important aspects of the situation (or important 
information in Foley’s terms) and get things right merely by luck. 
 
Now consider the unenlightened Jill who forms her president belief from reading the 
reliable newspaper. When confronted with the fact that herself is actually extremely 
vulnerable to fake news which had been spread among her community, Jill’s process 
of simply trusting the newspaper (as part of her general trust to the media in news 
reporting) would not be able to address the challenge. What addresses the challenge 
from the misleading defeater in the case is the fact that the newspaper she’s reading 
is the source of information that is exclusively reliable under the circumstances. That 
is, despite the fact that the government is trying to suppress the truth, the newspaper 
report survives as one of the few credible sources for the truth of the matter. Thus, it 
seems to me that a different process is involved in the belief formation for enlightened 
Jill—when confronted with her vulnerability of widespread president belief contrary to 
what she had read in the newspaper, Jill wouldn’t simply describe her belief formation 
by stating that ‘but I read that the president is dead from the newspaper’ (that wouldn’t 
be enough); instead she needs to explain that ‘I know there are fake news out there 
now, but I managed to come across the truth before the government could suppress 
it’. This somewhat reflects that enlightened Jill is not adopting the more naïve trusting-
the-newspaper process. Indeed, such treatment of PRESIDENT is analogous to that 
of BARN FAÇADE discussed in chapter 2—when confronted with the fact that the real 
barn he is looking is surrounded with fake ones, it isn’t enough for George to defend 
his belief simply by saying that ‘I saw a barn in the field’, instead, he needs to explain 
that ‘I know the place is filled with confusing façades, but luckily I was looking at a 
genuine barn—someone in the neighbourhood pointed that out to me (or, I had 
examined the rear and the sides of the barn myself)’.26 
 
                                                          
26 While it might be tempted to think that similar things could be said with regards to TOM GRABIT, I 
think we really should resist this suggestion. As I see it, it comes down to the environmental 
penetration of falsehoods in one’s epistemic situation. I take it that PRESIDENT and BARN FAÇADE 
are akin to each other on this score, while TOM GRABIT seems to be the odd one out. I shall discuss 
how AP evaluates TOM GRABIT in the coming section. 
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This is the general approach to determine whether a process M remains intact in face 
of the entire situation. It is worth noting that there can be other ways in arguing that 
AP is not met given this specific case. As we had compared PRESIDENT with BARN 
FAÇADE just now, it turns out that the two share another commonality in epistemic 
luck. As currently articulated, Jill’s belief in PRESIDENT is incredibly lucky in that she 
is modally vulnerable to forming false beliefs instead—had she encountered the 
widespread TV broadcasts or the discussions on the matter from her epistemic peers, 
she would have been easily misled to form a false belief. Similar to BARN FAÇADE, 
such luck is ‘environmental’ as Jill is indeed having the appropriate connection with 
the truth but is surrounded by modally close falsehoods.27 Now, it strikes me to be 
highly counterintuitive that someone would knowingly form beliefs via a process that 
is unsafe (i.e. process that would easily lead to falsehoods). If we accept this, then it 
is clear that Jill’s original process M, being unsafe under the circumstances, would not 
be an acceptable belief forming process in the holistic lights.28 
 
If one accepts one of the arguments above, PRESIDENT would be a case where 
DTweak is met but AP is not. It follows then DTweak does not entail AP. 
 
3.4.2 Does adequate process entail defeasibility? 
Consider the other side of the biconditional. If S’s process remains intact in face of the 
trial of the whole epistemic story, does it follow that there would be no defeater for S’s 
process? As an account of knowledge, AP surely needs to exclude at least all genuine 
defeaters29—for it is relatively uncontroversial that they are knowledge undermining. 
Intuitively this seems to be the case—if there is a defeater (not further undermined by 
other truths) that speaks against S’s existing process M (either in rebutting or 
undercutting fashion), S being aware of it would no longer form the belief(s) via M. 
Now if DTweak holds only the no-genuine-defeater clause, it seems that AP entails 
DTweak. 
                                                          
27 Pritchard (2005). Note that a certain robust virtue epistemology view (Sosa 2007, 2009) disagrees 
with the verdict here and maintains that the subject knows in virtue of having the right connection with 
the true belief. It might be expected that cases such as PRESIDENT would analogously amount to 
knowledge in Sosa’s lights. 
28 For a more detailed discussion of AP and safety, see chapter 5. 
29 To avoid the problem of iterations let’s suppose genuine defeaters are strictly undefeated such that 
no further true proposition (misleading or otherwise) in turn defeats them. Let’s suppose also that 
DTweak is committed to the exclusion of only these defeaters. 
92 
 
Similar to 3.4.1, I shall establish the conditional by arguing that AP and ¬DTweak jointly 
leads to a contradiction. We know that if AP is met, S would continue to form his/her 
belief that P via M after being aware of all relevant propositions with regards to the 
truth of P. We also know that if DTweak falls short, there exists a genuine defeater D for 
S’s belief forming process30. By the nature of a defeater, we know that had S been 
aware of D, S would no longer form his/her belief that P via M (or, in older accounts, 
S would be no longer justified in believing P given E+D). In virtue of the defeater being 
genuine, we know that no other proposition in the entire story would in turn defeat D. 
Thus, the epistemic significance of D to S’s process would not change by other true 
propositions. It follows that after being aware of all relevant proposition in the story, S 
would not continue to form his/her belief that P via M (due to the undefeated defeater 
D he/she is now aware of). This contradicts the consequence from AP, thus, AP→ 
DTweak. 
 
The story complicates as we consider misleading defeaters—since the epistemic 
significance of Dm is indeed changed by other propositions. In particular, we would be 
interested in instances where the epistemic significance of Dm decreases to the extent 
that knowledge is preserved. The classical TOM GRABIT case offers exactly such 
scenario. Since DTstrong excludes all defeaters (genuine or misleading), it falls short in 
explaining why S knows in TOM GRABIT. As DTstrong is too strong, I have to reject that 
AP entails DTstrong. 
 
I had argued in 3.3.2 that in TOM GRABIT S knows and DTstrong is not met—in 
particular, there is a rebutting defeater (that Mrs Grabit testifies that Tom was not in 
the library) for S’s justification. To offer the desirable verdict for TOM GRABIT and 
reject that AP→ DTstrong, I shall argue that AP is satisfied in the case. One noteworthy 
epistemic good S enjoys is that his belief is safe—given that Mrs Grabit isn’t going out 
to tell everyone about her delusional claims, S wouldn’t have easily came across her 
misleading testimony. However, it strikes me that AP is stronger than safety—while 
unsafe beliefs would render a process inadequate (as in 3.4.1), safe beliefs wouldn’t 
                                                          
30 Of course, DTweak could fall short because one of the JTB conditions is not met as well. However, I 
take it that AP encompasses the tripartite conditions (with an ecumenical reading for J, I shall discuss 
the notion of justification and its connection to AP in the last chapter). Thus, any uninteresting 
negation of DTweak due to ¬(JTB) would result in a contradiction to the AP view either way. 
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secure an adequate process. In other words, just because S’s belief is safe does not 
mean that S would continue to form the belief via the same process after learning the 
whole story—knowledge can be undermined for non-modal reasons (e.g. the case of 
TEMP). Let’s examine whether M in this case survives the scrutiny of the entire 
situation U independent from safety. 
 
S forms the belief that Tom Grabit stole the book from the library through witnessing 
someone (who S is sure to be Tom) hid a book under his coat and exited the library. 
Would this belief forming process M withstand challenges put forth by U? Granted, 
there exists one true proposition Dm that had S came across it S would be misled and 
no longer form his belief that P via M. However, the holistic approach in AP champions 
that the epistemic significance of the entire phenomenon cannot be fully determined 
by the individual components constituting it—just as we cannot pick out one’s 
individual process to examine its significance without considering the epistemic 
situation one is in (in 3.4.1), it is also misguided to think that the overall epistemic 
significance for individual defeaters can be assessed out of the context of the whole 
story. Instead of examining what Dm had done individually to S’s process, ask what 
impact Dm made to M under the circumstances outlined by U. That is, we should not 
just inquire what Mrs Grabit’s claims would have done to S’s process, rather we need 
also to take into account that her claims are misleading and far-off—what would some 
misleading and far-off claims have done to S’s process? 
 
From this perspective, I argue that the far-fetched misleading information uttered by 
Mrs Grabit has not constituted any reasonable challenge on the table such that S must 
address—knowledge does not demand one to consider and rebut all potential 
information that might confuse oneself. Note that this is not to say that Dm in such a 
case does not amount to defeat—instead I am examining the epistemic significance 
of such defeat on the holistic perspective, and suggests that it is not enough to 
undermine knowledge. Surely, being only aware of what he saw in the library, 
unenlightened S would not be able to offer any answer to Mrs Grabit’s pathological 
lies should he be confronted with her. However, it strikes me that such a challenge 
should not be raised on the trial considering the entire story—particularly the fact that 
it is a piece of misleading information with little to no social penetration in S’s epistemic 
community. I therefore suggest that S would have no problem standing by his 
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unenlightened M of visually recognising Tom Grabit in the library. When confronted 
with the fact that a pathological liar testifies the contrary at her house, S could rightfully 
object that ‘but I cannot go out to find all of the pathological people and reject their 
false claims (that are at odds with my beliefs) before committing to my well-grounded 
beliefs—those are their problems, not mine!’ Not only do I submit that S would 
withstand such unreasonable challenge with this response, I also think that such a 
response is in the arsenal of unenlightened S (indeed, in the arsenal of any rational 
epistemic agents), rather than exclusively for S who is aware of the whole story. 
 
If I was right in arguing that S’s original process withstands Mrs Grabit’s challenge, 
TOM GRABIT would be a case where AP is met but DTstrong is not. It follows that AP 
does not entail DTstrong. 
 
3.5 Concluding remarks—misleading defeaters and the holistic approach 
In 3.2, I explicated the problems misleading defeaters present to defeasibility theories 
of knowledge—since only some misleading defeaters are knowledge undermining and 
it is difficult to further distinguish among misleading defeaters, defeasibility theories 
(DT) are either too strong or too weak. Being logically weaker than DTstrong but stronger 
than DTweak, and offering desirable verdicts from misleading defeater cases like 
PRESIDENT and TOM GRABIT, the adequate process view seems to be well placed 
in tackling the problem of misleading defeat. 
 
Importantly, AP does not confront the problem ‘head on’ to determine what lies in Dm 
that undermines knowledge—the prospect of doing so remains dim in my opinion. 
Rather, AP offers to dissolve the problem by examining difficult misleading defeat 
cases from another perspective.31 It is misguided to take S’s process and the individual 
misleading defeater out of the whole story to examine whether the latter undermines 
the former. The full epistemic significance of an individual component in a knowledge 
story can only be assessed when that component is put under the context of the entire 
epistemic environment (U). This is especially true for misleading defeaters, as they 
are by definition undermined by other proposition(s) in the case. Adequate process 
                                                          




proposes to evaluate S’s epistemic status holistically—against the entire epistemic 
situation instead of its individual components. From this new perspective, Jill in 
PRESIDENT falls short of knowledge not because the newspaper report she read is 
rebutted by the broadcast, but because her process of trusting the newspaper as a 
common source of information cannot withstand the challenge of her vulnerability to 
fake news under the epistemic environment she’s situated (i.e. the news manipulation 
by the government). On the other hand, S in TOM GRABIT knows not merely because 
the proposition of Mrs Grabit’s claims is further defeated by other true proposition(s), 
but because S without knowing about Mrs Grabit can disregard such far-fetched 
possibility of being misled and continue to trust on his own visual recognition in the 
library—that the defeater is misleading and far-fetched is something S can appreciate 
only when the overall epistemic situation is under consideration. 
 
Viewing the problem of misleading defeat from the holistic perspective also avoids 
getting into the trouble of iterations of defeat. Instead of inquiring what impact a fourth 
order defeat (D’’’) would have to the misleading defeater Dm, AP simplifies the matter 
and inquire instead whether the situation as a whole (E+Dm+D’+D’’+D’’’…) is one such 
that S’s original process would be adopted by a rational and responsible agent who is 
perfectly informed. 
 
In this chapter I had considered how taking a holistic approach of epistemic 
evaluations such as AP would shed light on difficult issues we encounter in 
defeasibility theories. Our journey of theoretical comparisons continues in the next 
chapter, where we move our attention from the holistic evaluation of the external 
epistemic situation to that of cognitive agency—specifically, we will consider the 
prominent virtue theoretic view on knowledge, and whether the holistic approach of 









Adequately Informed Virtue Epistemology 
 
4.1 Introductory remarks 
S knows that P only if S’s true belief is a product of S’s ability. Despite having heated 
debates about how to cash out this condition in detail, many contemporary 
epistemologists had at least conceded that such platitude of knowledge, often referred 
to as virtue epistemology (VE), is generally correct (Sosa 2007, 2009, 2010, 2015; 
Greco 2003, 2007, 2009, 2012; Pritchard 2012; Kallestrup and Pritchard 2013, 2014; 
Turri 2011, 2016). This chapter explores a minimal rendering of the ability condition 
modified from Duncan Pritchard’s modest virtue epistemology. I argue that knowledge, 
in virtue of being a cognitive achievement owned by certain subject1, is committed at 
the very least to a minimal requirement of competence manifestation. 
 
However, it is important to note that this proposal differs from Pritchard’s weak ability 
condition, and for that matter other stronger virtue theoretic views, who take VE as a 
condition that connects true beliefs to our cognitive agencies, and offers a diagnosis 
for difficult cases (i.e. the Gettier cases). To this end, I follow Jennifer Lackey’s (2007) 
argument against what she called the Deserving Credit View of Knowledge (DCVK), 
and maintain that we need not deserve credit for everything we know. As a result, the 
proposed minimal ability condition is much weaker than DCVK (or for that matter, any 
account of VE in the market), to the extent that satisfying the condition does not even 
exclude classical Gettier cases. Instead, I argue that this minimal condition serves a 
different (more limited) role of demanding certain standard of cognitive ownership in 
our knowledge. 
 
This chapter first discusses the view of robust virtue epistemology, and Pritchard’s 
argument from epistemic dependence against such view; following that, I shall sketch 
Pritchard’s weakened ability condition, and argue that it is still too strong; afterwards, 
                                                          
1 Pritchard (2016b) made similar remarks regarding the ability condition. 
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I shall introduce the even weaker ability condition and discuss its epistemic 
significance. 
 
The chapter ends by looking into an interesting case against VE, and argue that 
accompanying VE with the adequate process (AP) condition would shed light to the 
situation. Through the lens of adequate process, I suggest how VE would be benefitted 
by taking a holistic approach on competence. Far from being ad hoc conjunctive 
conditions, the two actually complement each other neatly in depicting the overall 
world-to-agent epistemic picture of knowledge. 
 
4.2 Robust virtue epistemology 
4.2.1 Epistemic evaluations as performance evaluations 
Many virtue epistemologists hold that virtue theoretic condition (of various sorts) alone 
would suffice for knowledge. Call this view, following Pritchard, robust virtue 
epistemology (RVE). According to RVE, knowledge just is the successful epistemic 
product of cognitive agency. The success of performance in activities could be 
evaluated in many ways—with regards to epistemic activities it would be natural to 
think that success is rated in terms of the acquisition of true beliefs. However, it is clear 
that mere success in our cognitive activity is not enough for knowledge. As various 
Gettier cases had shown, one can obtain a true belief and fail to know. To this virtue 
epistemologists give the following diagnosis: in cases where a true belief falls short of 
knowledge it seems the truth of the acquired belief (the success) had very little to do 
with the agent—in the sense that the former is a product of the latter’s cognitive 
competence, which consists in agents’ cognitive faculties. Consider FAKE SHEEP: 
 
FAKE SHEEP Smith is in the country and sees a sheep-shaped object across the 
field. He thus forms the belief that ‘there is a sheep in the field’. As it turns out, 
he’s looking at a rock that is incredibly sheep-like in shape from distance. Smith 
nonetheless believes truly, however, because there indeed is a sheep in the field, 
hidden behind the rock and not visible from Smith’s location.2 
 
                                                          
2 Adapted from Chisholm (1966). 
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Let’s focus on virtue epistemologists’ diagnosis of this infamous story. There’s no 
doubt that Smith successfully acquired a true belief—that there’s a sheep in the field. 
Moreover, it is also obvious that Smith employed his cognitive competence in obtaining 
the belief—he formed the belief based on seeing a ‘sheep’ in the field. However, virtue 
theorists claim that the true belief is not a product of Smith’s competence in a specific, 
important sense. 
 
Why a specific sense? Because more generally speaking, that any belief is a product 
of cognitive agency is undeniable, it would seem. Beliefs (or any other doxastic states 
really) are essentially produced by our cognitive faculties. For Smith, that there’s a 
sheep in the field is a product of certain cognitive processes initiated from his visual 
perception. Whether or not the corresponding perceptual stimulus (the sheep-shaped 
rock) leads to successful recognition—in this particular case it does not, for Smith 
takes the rock to be a sheep—wouldn’t change the fact that whatever belief(s) resulted 
(be it ‘there’s a sheep’ or ‘there’s a rock’) is a product of Smith’s cognitive processes. 
 
In what specific sense then is his true belief not a product of his ability? While it is the 
case that the belief is true and is a product of Smith’s cognition, the truth of the belief 
has nothing to do with him. Granted, it is Smith who sees the sheep-shaped object 
and thereby forms the belief; however, whether the belief so formed is true is a 
separate issue, in Smith’s case his belief is true due to the hidden sheep behind the 
rock, which is not perceived by Smith at all. Thus, it seems that on this score the 
success (i.e. getting to the truth) is not creditable to the agent’s cognitive process. 
According to VE, this additional ‘creditable’ relation between truth and competence, 
or—as Sosa puts it—the aptness condition, is necessary for knowledge. 
 
Considering analogous cases in other non-cognitive performance evaluations might 
help to illustrate the notion of aptness. Consider the case of archery—the athletic 
performance that virtue epistemologists are infamously fond of. Imagine a skilful 
archer making a shot, thereby hitting the bullseye. Note that there are two aspects 
regarding such shot—it is successful (hitting the bullseye) and it is competent (the shot 
displays the archery skills of the archer). Note also that these two aspects seem to be 
independent from one another—a shot can hit the bullseye regardless of whether it is 
skilful (imagine a novice luckily hitting the target); on the other hand, a shot can display 
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archery skills whether or not it actually hits the target (after all, even the most skilful 
archer cannot hit the target every time—those missing shots nonetheless display 
skills). Building on that structure virtue epistemologists propose a third evaluative 
notion for performances—aptness. Aptness is not a separate factor for performances, 
nor is it a mere combination of success and competence, rather it necessitates the 
conjunction of success and competence, and on top specifies a relation between the 
two. When the shot is apt, it is successful because of its competence displayed. Not 
only must the experienced archer’s shot be skilful and successfully hitting the bullseye, 
such success has to be creditable to the skills displayed in that shot. To see how 
adding the relation differentiates aptness from the mere conjunction of success and 
competence, imagine an expert archer fires a skilful shot, a strong gust of wind blows 
the arrow off, but the wind is so strong that it also moves the target towards that 
direction—the arrow after all hits the bullseye, several inches from its original position. 
Here the shot is successful and competent, but not apt—for the success is due not to 
the expert’s skill, but rather to the incredible happenstance of the wind moving both 
the arrow and the target accordingly. The gust of wind seems to have demolished the 
causal relation between the two conjuncts. 
 
Indeed, the case described above seems to follow the recipe for Gettier-style cases—
where one forms certain beliefs on some good epistemic grounds, ‘goes off the target’ 
due to some bad luck unbeknownst to one (the ‘sheep’ is really a rock, or the gust of 
wind blowing the arrow off), but gets the true belief anyway because some further 
unexpected states of affairs—again unbeknownst to one—somehow make the 
proposition true (a sheep is there behind the rock, making ‘there’s a sheep’ true, or the 
gust of wind incredibly repositioned the target perfectly too).3  It is not difficult to 
appreciate how the virtue theoretic condition, which aims to exclude cases of such 
kind, is supposed to work as a theory of knowledge. Take belief formation as a specific 
kind of performance, in which success is evaluated by whether the belief is true, and 
competence by whether the belief is creditable to the agent’s cognitive ability, aptness 
in such cognitive performance is thus evaluated by whether the acquisition of truth is 
creditable to the agent’s cognitive ability. 
 
                                                          
3 See, for example, Zagzebski (1994) for a recipe for standard Gettier cases. 
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Consider FAKE SHEEP. Smith successfully forms a true belief and had done so 
competently. However, since the truth of his belief has nothing to do with his 
competence (but rather with the existence of the unseen sheep), Smith’s belief is inapt. 
Thus, VE rules that Smith does not know. 
 
In addition to the alleged success in resolving Gettier-style cases in RVE, VE generally 
also enjoys certain strengths as an account of knowledge. One advantage is that it fits 
well within a broader theoretical framework of performance evaluations—knowledge 
is just a species of apt performance, while analogous features could be observed in 
other activities (for example, the accurate shot credited to the skilful archer). 
Accounting for knowledge as such would therefore not be arbitrary or ad hoc—we do 
not invent new conceptions and add them to knowledge, so to speak, just to get rid of 
the undesirable Gettier counterexamples. Another strength of the virtue theoretic 
approach is that it offers explanation to why knowledge might be more valuable than 
mere true beliefs—a concern that dates back to Plato’s Meno. We credit the 
experienced archer’s skilful shot but not the novice’s lucky shot, despite the fact that 
they are equally accurate—for the accuracy of the former displays competence and 
the latter does not. Similarly, knowledge is distinct from mere true beliefs in that the 
success also demonstrates the agent’s cognitive prowess, which is supposedly 
epistemically valuable.4 A final point I would like to remark concerning the advantages 
of VE—something I shall return to later in this chapter—is that it highlights the 
ownership of knowledge. Unlike truths which are independent from agents, knowledge 
is an epistemic status that essentially belongs to someone. All instances of knowledge 
involve a subject who knows certain proposition(s). Virtue epistemologists attempt to 
specify the relationship, or a requirement for ownership if you will, between the 
proposition known and the person knowing it. Particularly, S possesses knowledge of 
P just in case the truth of P is the product of S’s cognitive competence. While I am not 
suggesting that other theories necessarily fail in accounting for such epistemic 
ownership, I believe VE has the edge on this score, for being more explicit in 
                                                          
4 The last allegation might be a bit brief and is surely open to challenges. Yet for present purpose I will 
leave the discussion of the value problem at this point. Proponents of virtue theories might expand on 




elucidating why my knowledge is mine (as remarked by Pritchard 2016b)—because it 
is produced by my cognitive competence and so credited to me. 
 
There are different lines of virtue epistemology. One notable point of differentiation 
concerns how the ‘because of/is creditable to’ relation should be unpacked. Sosa 
(2007, 2009, 2010, 2015) and Turri (2011, 2016), for example, are inclined to read the 
relation as certain competence manifesting its disposition(s) in obtaining the 
success—that seeing a sheep manifests the disposition of our visual perception to 
recognise objects; Greco (2007, 2009, 2012) and Pritchard (2012) hold that the 
relation pertains to causal explanation—that our visual perceptual ability plays a 
salient role in explaining our cognitive success (getting the true belief that there’s a 
sheep). For the purpose of this chapter I would put this differentiation aside—a general 
characterisation of VE would suffice for the minimal ability condition I have in mind. 
Thus, I would try my best to remain theoretically neutral on this matter in my following 
discussion. Remarks about VE, for example, that knowledge is apt beliefs or 
successful product of cognitive agency, that a belief is apt when its truth is creditable 
to one’s competence etc., should be taken as virtue epistemology in its generic form. 
 
4.2.2 Pritchard on epistemic dependence and the failure of RVE 
Robust virtue epistemology is the view that knowledge is just the successful epistemic 
product of cognitive agency (or simply, apt beliefs). As hinted earlier, I believe that 
RVE is ultimately unsatisfactory. 
 
The prominent reason for such a failure is its inability to accommodate various 
scenarios of what Pritchard (2015) called epistemic dependence in knowledge. The 
notion epistemic dependence suggests that sometimes whether one knows can 
depend upon factors that are external to one’s cognitive agency. 
 
This surely needs more unpacking—insofar as one accepts the factivity of knowledge, 
whether one knows would always depend upon factors external to the subject. 
Whether or not the targeted proposition is indeed true is a matter entirely independent 
from the subject, and rests rather on states of affairs in the external world. If ‘there is 
a sheep’ is a true belief, its truth surely wouldn’t be dependent upon any person’s 
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epistemic status—but rather the fact that there’s a sheep in the field. However, 
consider the notion of aptness, it actually entails the truth condition—granted, whether 
the target proposition is true does not rest on one’s apt belief; but it is still the case 
that whenever one’s belief is apt it is true. Therefore, RVE suggests that whenever 
aptness is satisfied, the belief has to be true. 
 
What Pritchard suggested is a dependence of a different kind—which is meant to 
challenge the alleged robust relation between knowledge and apt beliefs. Pritchard 
claimed that even in cases where one’s belief is apt (that the believed proposition is 
true and is creditable to one’s competence), one’s epistemic status can depend upon 
the external environment—a factor that is independent from aptness. This claim is 
directly at odds with the RVE thesis—that whether one knows is determined solely by 
virtue theoretic conditions. 
 
How exactly does epistemic environment impact on her knowledge? Part of the 
answer lies in what Pritchard called environmental luck. Environmental luck is a form 
of veritic epistemic luck that is supposedly incompatible with knowledge, in virtue that 
it is a matter of luck that one’s belief is true (Pritchard 2005). However, it appears that 
aptness is compatible with environmental luck. To see this, consider BARN FAÇADE. 
 
BARN FAÇADE George is driving through the country. As he looks through the 
window he sees a barn-shape building across the field, thus coming to believe 
that ‘there’s a barn in the field’. The building he spotted is indeed a genuine barn—
however, unbeknownst to him, there are many fake barns in the vicinity, so 
cleverly disguised that, visitors who had not taken a closer look would most likely 
mistaken them as barns. It turns out that George is looking at one of the few 
genuine barns in the area.56 
                                                          
5 The original case was credited to Carl Ginet and was first published by Goldman (1976). 
6 Kallestrup and Pritchard (2014) offered a more elaborated epistemic twin earth case comparing the 
epistemic status of two physical duplicates. Their possessions of knowledge differ because the modal 
profiles of their targeted belief diverge unbeknownst to them (say, one is in barn façade county and 
one is in a normal environment). In virtue of being duplicates, it is hard to imagine that they should 
differ in their manifested competence, given that their actual interactions are both veridical and their 
experience should be identical. Their difference in epistemic status seems to lie merely in the modal 
profiles of their true belief—something independent of one’s cognitive agency, and so not accountable 
by the notion of aptness. For the purpose of the present discussion, I shall focus on the shorter, more 
popular barn façade case. 
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To challenge RVE as a sufficient condition of knowledge, Pritchard makes two remarks 
on BARN FAÇADE—that George’s belief is apt and that George’s belief falls short of 
knowledge. 
 
Let’s consider the first claim. One’s belief is apt just in case the cognitive success is 
creditable to one’s competence. In virtue of successfully recognising a real barn, it 
would seem that George’s barn belief is indeed apt—there is nothing ‘intervening’ 
between the subject and what makes the belief true (contra FAKE SHEEP), the 
successful recognition indeed displayed the competence of his perceptual faculty.7 
Revisiting the archery analogy—the experienced archer could have analogously faced 
a scenario which, unbeknownst to him, many of the targets in the vicinity are 
holograms, and it is a sheer matter of luck that he had fired his shot to a real target. 
Now had he decided to shoot at another target, his shot would easily have been 
unsuccessful—he would have hit nothing. However, it seems that insofar as he luckily 
picked up the real target, the achievement of the successful shot itself would not be 
affected by the luck of such selection—his shooting the bullseye nevertheless 
displayed his archery skill, despite the fact that it is lucky that the skill is displayed. 
Now aptness only rules that competence on the agent’s part must be manifested in 
obtaining the success, it does not require that such manifestation could not be lucky. 
Thus, it seems that we ought to credit the achievement to the archer’s competence. 
Analogously, the cognitive success of George (the true belief that there’s a barn) 
should also be considered as George’s achievement creditable to his visual 
recognition, in virtue of his (albeit luckily) seeing the real barn. 
 
Consider now the second claim. It is undeniable that George’s apt belief signifies 
certain cognitive achievement, which is at least a positive epistemic status. The 
question that follows, rather, is whether this cognitive achievement is sufficient for 
knowledge. Pritchard argued that it is not. According to Pritchard (2005, 2007, 2009, 
2012, Pritchard, Millar & Haddock 2010), it is a platitude of knowledge that it is 
incompatible with luck. Since aptness is conceptually compatible with environmental 
luck and knowledge is not, there are bound to be cases where the former is met while 
                                                          
7 Beside Kallestrup and Pritchard, the claim that there could be lucky apt beliefs is conceded also by 
notable robust virtue epistemologists such as Sosa. While other RVE advocates, including Greco and 
Turri offered arguments against such claim. 
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the latter is not. In FAKE BARN, George’s cognitive achievement falls short of 
knowledge because his belief, while aptly true, could very easily be false (had he 
looked at another ‘barn’ nearby) given the unfavourable epistemic environment. It 
seems that knowledge should be a more specific kind of cognitive achievement which 
demands certain degree of modal stability of one’s true belief, and is consequently 
more intolerant to luck than mere cognitive achievements. 89  Therefore, Pritchard 
suggested that an anti-luck condition not accounted for in virtue theoretic terms should 
be added in order to fully account for knowledge. Pritchard called this insufficiency 
problem of RVE negative epistemic dependence—in that an agent could lose 
knowledge due to unfavourable environment external to her cognitive agency. 
 
Environmental luck is just part of the story and Pritchard offered in his epistemic 
dependence objection to RVE. The complete charge against such view, as he claimed, 
is double-bind. Not only is the ability condition insufficient, it is also accused for being 
unnecessary—in that there are possible scenarios such that the epistemic 
environment would be so favourable that it enables inapt beliefs to be considered as 
knowledge. The idea that one could obtain knowledge due to favourable environment 
external to one’s cognitive agency is what Pritchard called positive epistemic 
dependence. The thought, originally due to Jennifer Lackey10, is that our acquisition 
of knowledge is not always creditable to our own effort (at least not to a large part11). 
Take typical testimonial cases for example. We rely mostly on other’s cognitive labour 
to acquire certain information. If I were to visit an unfamiliar city and wish to go to a 
particular location, it makes sense (and is surely the better strategy) to rely on the 
locals’ cognitive competence—their mastery in travelling around that area—instead of 
                                                          
8 Note that Sosa bites the bullet and maintains that George does have knowledge in FAKE BARN, 
thus addressing the sufficiency challenge. However, I do not intend to offer in-depth evaluations for 
every virtue theoretic view on the market—who surely would have different strategies in tackling 
FAKE BARN. The lesson here is that insofar as we grant our intuition that George fails to know, along 
with the theoretical commitment that knowledge is incompatible with luck (Sosa, biting the bullet, had 
to deny this; see also Hetherington (2013) for argument against this view), barn-façade style cases 
would pose a genuine sufficiency challenge to RVE in general. 
9 For further discussions on the anti-luck platitude of knowledge and how the AP view address this 
issue, see Ch 5. 
10 Lackey (2007, 2009). 
11 Indeed, it is noteworthy that this is where Lackey and Pritchard’s views on testimony diverge. While 
Lackey maintains that the agent deserves no credits for the success at all, Pritchard holding the weak 
ability condition argues that testimonial success is still significantly (just not primarily) creditable to the 




my own. Now suppose that I depend entirely on other’s testimony in finding the way 
(successfully) to the national museum in Edinburgh.12 Insofar as we are prepared to 
say that I thereby know the way to the museum (which is a very plausible claim if we 
accept the transmission of knowledge by testimony), such a case would be a challenge 
to RVE, for it seems that we now have an instance of inapt knowledge—the truth of 
my belief seems to have nothing to do with my competence but is rather mainly 
creditable to that of the testifier’s. Conversely, are we prepared to say that the true 
belief is only knowledge for that other person, but not for me? Following the virtue 
theoretic lines, it seems that we have to. However, to deny that we could obtain 
testimonial knowledge seems too radical a position to hold. After all, much of the 
beliefs we hold are gathered from other epistemic agents, it doesn’t seem plausible 
that what we know are all creditable to our own competence in RVE’s lights. 
  
Just as there are various strategies to tackle FAKE BARN, virtue epistemologists paid 
efforts to explain away the problematic epistemic reading in testimony—for example, 
by employing a more lenient ability condition such that the acquired belief is still 
significantly creditable, albeit to a lesser extent, to subject’s cognitive agency, in the 
act of receiving testimony. But more on that later—for now I should stress that 
Pritchard’s epistemic dependence argument against RVE presents a double-bind 
problem to the ability condition. It does not deny that virtue epistemologists would be 
able to resolve the sufficiency problem or the necessity problem independently. 
Instead, Pritchard argued that no single robust virtue theoretic proposal could address 
both positive and negative epistemic dependence at the same time. The problem is 
‘double-bind’ in the sense that the sufficiency and necessity counterexamples are 
pulling the ability condition towards opposite directions—while the latter demands a 
more lenient competence manifestation in order to accommodate standard testimonial 
cases, the former imposes a more stringent requirement such that luck could be ruled 
out purely in virtue theoretic terms. Bearing this structural difficulty in mind, the hope 
of articulating a stable ability condition which satisfactorily addresses both challenges 
seems less promising.  
 
                                                          
12 Adapted from Lackey’s Chicago tourist case (2007). 
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While I do not reject such possibility altogether, it is not my intention to evaluate them 
here. As noted at the beginning I defend only a minimal rendering of the ability 
condition that has no business in offering an account sufficient for knowledge. Thus, I 
would put aside half of the double-bind problem—namely the negative epistemic 
dependence of RVE—and focus only on discussing the testimonial case, in other 
words whether the ability condition is necessary. Finding a necessary place of the 
ability condition to knowledge would thus be the main objective in the coming sections. 
 
4.3 Weakening the ability condition 
4.3.1 Pritchard’s weak ability condition 
How then should the ability condition address the case of testimony? As hinted above 
I believe that once we give up RVE—the thesis that virtue theoretic condition on its 
own is sufficient to account for knowledge—we could put aside one horn of the 
dilemma (the sufficiency problem in FAKE BARN) and accommodate paradigm 
testimonial knowledge by weakening the ability condition. To this end, Pritchard (2012) 
endorses what he called modest virtue epistemology. 
 
According to Pritchard, the ability condition could be weakened by the extent to which 
the cognitive success is creditable to one’s cognitive agency in cases of testimony. In 
its general form virtue epistemology had not specified the degree to which the success 
needs to be creditable to the ability. Consider how virtue epistemologists could avoid 
the troubling phenomenon in testimonial knowledge by requiring a lesser role on the 
agency part. Let’s concede that the cognitive success of knowing the way to the 
national museum is mainly creditable to the ability of the testifier—this, argued 
Pritchard, does not however negate the possibility that some smaller, yet still 
significant role could be played by the subject who receives the information. For 
example, when I wish to get to the museum and therefore ask for directions, certain 
measures on my part take place to give myself the best shot in obtaining the 
information—I wouldn’t have asked just anyone, or have believed anything they say. 
Instead, I demonstrate my ability to select an informant (say, an apparently sensible 
adult who looks like a local, perhaps not holding a map or a camera looking around 
the place like myself), my ability to comprehend whatever he conveys, and my ability 
to filter away obviously false responses (say, if you were to tell me to get back to the 
108 
 
airport, take the first available flight and the pilot will bring me to the museum, I wouldn’t 
have trusted you). Imagine now after all these hassles I found an informant, and he 
helpfully explained the correct directions to me, leading to my success in arriving at 
the museum at last. It seems right to say that I do know the directions, the truth of my 
direction-related beliefs are mainly creditable to the informant, but I should take some 
credit in obtaining the truth too.13 
 
Before proceeding, a subtle distinction is in order—it seems that in meeting the ability 
condition there are two renderings in which the cognitive success is said to be 
creditable to the cognitive agency, in one sense we can say that the truth of the belief 
is creditable to one’s ability; in another we say that one’s ability is creditable in enabling 
one to obtain the true belief, though it is not necessarily directly creditable in the truth 
of the belief per se. It seems that the ability involved in testimonial cases pertains 
exclusively to the latter enabling sense. To illustrate the distinction consider an 
analogy in sport team achievements. A successful basketball team might have had 
multiple wins in a season—and the wins might be rightfully credited to the players, 
who displayed great individual and team competence; however, it seems to me that 
the wins could also be credited to the managerial team of the club in a different sense. 
After all, it is the manager’s incredible work that made possible the assembling of such 
a strong roster with incredible team chemistry, it only seems right that the acquisitions 
of those wins is at least partly (and indirectly) creditable to the manager’s ability—
although he surely isn’t creditable for making the shots or executing the plays that 
constituted the wins per se. Similarly, in testimonial cases it seems that I didn’t really 
aim at the truth of the beliefs myself, but rather employed my skills in enabling myself 
to obtain relevant truths from the work of others. Let’s call the former direct-truth-
aiming skills ‘first order competence’ and the latter enabling-obtainment-of-truths skills 
‘higher order competence’. It strikes me that both competences could rightfully be 
credited for cognitive success, thereby satisfying the ability condition—unless 
epistemologists have further motivations to limit the condition to a particular type of 
                                                          
13 Here I put aside potential objection that young children may not demonstrate abilities of this sort. 
For one thing, the plan here is to be as charitable as possible with regards to testimonial competence; 
for another, VE might bite the bullet and maintain that young children in that case indeed lacks the 
intellectual sophistication to be display virtue in such cases. What I wish to put forth in the coming 
sections however is an objection that should apply more generally to mature epistemic agents. 
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competence, I would be entitled to knowledge about the museum’s directions in virtue 
of skilfully obtaining the truths from the work of others. 
 
While it is unclear whether Pritchard has this subtle distinction of competence in mind, 
his discussion on the abilities displayed in obtaining testimonial knowledge surely falls 
under the higher order category outlined above. In testimony, our competence might 
be playing an indirect, lesser albeit still important role in our success. It seems 
plausible then for Pritchard to maintain that our cognitive success should at least be 
significantly, though need not be primarily, creditable to our cognitive agency. In other 
words, our cognitive ability should play a salient role in explaining, though need not 
necessarily be the overarching factor to, our success.14 Embracing this weak ability 
condition, paradigm testimonial cases pose no challenge to virtue epistemology as a 
necessary condition to knowledge, since in such a case at least some competence on 
the agent’s part is displayed in the process of acquiring the truth. 
 
It is worth noting that according to Pritchard, this modest line of ability condition does 
not entail aptness—a central notion held dearly by other virtue epistemologists.15 As 
one’s epistemic competence needs not be the overarching explanatory factor to the 
acquisition of truths, Pritchard’s weak ability condition does not demand one’s 
cognitive success to be ‘because of’ one’s competence (for example, testimonial 
beliefs would be inapt despite satisfying the weak ability condition, since my getting 
the true belief is not ‘because of’ my ability but rather the testifier’s ability). Since the 
‘because of’ relation is theoretically laden in the literature to indicate the stronger 
causal explanatory reading of competence—meaning ‘primarily creditable to’ or ‘being 
the overarching factor for’, instead of the more general reading (as I take it) such as 
‘creditable to’ or ‘a product of’, in my following discussion I would avoid using ‘aptness’ 
and ‘because of’ in my characterisation of the general position for VE, and stay with 
the (I think) neutral expression that one’s belief formation is virtuous just in case one’s 
cognitive success is creditable to/a product of one’s cognitive competence. Putting the 
                                                          
14 Higher order competence highlighted above is perhaps a type of salient, yet not overarching, factor. 
Note that I do not thereby claim that this kind of competence exhausts all non-overarching salient 
factors. 
15 Kallestrup and Pritchard (2016) is explicit on this remark.  
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terminological clarifications aside, the point I really wish to push forward here is that 
even this weaker ability notion is too strong for my liking. 
 
4.3.2 The case of passive testimonial knowledge 
As Foley remarked, our judgement about epistemic status depends heavily on the 
details given (and emphasised) in the story. In the above descriptions of the 
testimonial case, I believe I had been particularly charitable to the idea that my getting 
the truth is somewhat creditable to my competence—I did a lot to give myself the best 
shot for the true belief. But is that always the case for testimonial knowledge? I want 
to argue that at least in cases where we passively receive others’ testimony, rather 
than actively seek for information we need, it is much less clear how the success could 
still be creditable to me. 
 
After I visited the museum, I stopped by a local bar in Edinburgh to get a drink. The 
people I met there, who told me that they were Edinburgh locals, kindly inform me 
many claims about the city. Being a visitor unfamiliar with the place, I am not in a 
position to doubt the assertions they made. Trusting on their goodwill to inform me, I 
take their word for it and believe what they claimed. Now I actually learned 
considerably more about Edinburgh—as it turns out nothing fishy is happening in the 
case, let us suppose. People in that pub are honest fellows who want to help me 
understand more about the city. I, by opting to believe in their say-so, obtained a lot of 
true beliefs regarding Edinburgh. Do I then know those propositions (say, that the 
author of Sherlock Holmes was born here)? 
 
I’m attracted to say that I do. After all, we obtain many new information from others 
without necessarily inquiring them (i.e. actively seeking for their truths) in the first place. 
Not only are we at times not engaging in active inquiries, usually we are even unable 
to make the inquiry because we lack relevant background information (indeed, if I don’t 
even know what Sherlock Holmes is, how am I supposed to ask them if its author 
came from Edinburgh?) On the other hand, to posit that one knows via testimony only 
if one is actively inquiring the matter sounds very odd—if the sources of information 
are just as good/reliable (imagine it is the same person you were conversing, in one 
scenario you asked the person whether the author was born here and he replied ‘yes’, 
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in another the person informs you the same content without you asking), why should 
we favour active inquiry over passive reception, to the extent that the former amounts 
to knowledge and the latter falls short? Why is it that your epistemic status should 
depend upon whether or not you seek for the information in the first place? 
 
To appreciate further the oddity of this imbalance, consider the other side of the story. 
Suppose you are the local good fellow in the pub who told me that the author of 
Sherlock Holmes was born in Edinburgh. You would have thought that your words 
amount to testimony to me—regardless of whether or not I asked you for the 
information in the first place. However, the denial of passive testimonial knowledge on 
the receiving end means also the denial of active testifying on the testifier’s part—that 
is, your claims cannot amount to testimony unless you were asked to do so (just so 
that I can play my part in significantly acquiring the truth). From the view of the testifiers 
this is surely a bizarre position to hold.16 
 
Suppose then I do know from the pub locals that the author of Sherlock Holmes was 
born in Edinburgh. Let’s examine whether such cognitive success is creditable to me. 
I concede that the following competences are likely in play on my part: 
 
i. I listened and comprehended reasonably well to enable my receiving the 
content of what people testified, making possible my belief formation; 
ii. I did not pick the testifier myself, but once the pub fellow testified something 
for me, it is still up to me to judge whether he is a trustworthy source in this 
regard—if he tries to give a lecture on the history of Chinese classical poetry, 
I might have good reasons to doubt his authority over such field. Since 
knowledge of this sort requires a really specific expertise that just isn’t easy to 
come by (unlike casual trivia about one’s home town), and the chance of 
encountering an expertise on this field in a local bar in Edinburgh isn’t very 
                                                          
16 Testimonial knowledge has a huge body of literature that would add complexity to the said cases. 
One worry here is that I’m too gullible in the pub case to know. While I do not intend to explore in 
detail the extended debate, I think it is at least a plausible view that in virtue of engaging in common 
social epistemic practices and in fact having a reliable source of information the agent is entitled to 
testimonial knowledge despite lacking any significant credits. The main point I wish to make here, 
however, is that putting gullibility and its impact on testimonial knowledge aside, the epistemic status 
pertaining to testimonial activities should not be determined by whether or not the agent seeks for the 
information actively—which seems to be what the weak ability condition requires to enable partial 
manifestation of cognitive agency. 
112 
 
promising. The judgement of testifier’s authority over relevant field is thus a 
competence possibly displayed in passive testimonial cases. 
iii. As in active testimonial cases, I could also filter obviously false assertions. I 
may know very little about Edinburgh, but I do know it is not a city in China. If 
the local testifies that Shanghai and Edinburgh are of walkable distance and 
advises me to make a short trip for Shanghai tomorrow morning, I would not 
have believed so—I would even cease to take his other testimonies seriously. 
 
Indeed, these competences are present whenever we receive testimony—for example, 
even when no outlandish assertions were made and iii does not effectively filter 
anything, the filter is nonetheless there. The thought however is that i-iii altogether do 
not satisfy even the weak ability condition. If i-iii are all the competences one displayed 
in forming the belief (again, I’m trying to be as charitable as possible when considering 
potential competences), the success (truth acquisition) would not be creditable to 
one’s competence at all, I don’t think. Let’s set the preliminaries straight and examine 
carefully along i-iii. In order to be creditable for the success, I take it that the 
competence should at least involve efforts/measures to considerably17 improve the 
likelihood of success. This is what I meant by giving oneself ‘the best shot’ in success 
by selecting a testifier that seemingly knows the way—it increases the chance of my 
getting the correct answer, to some extent. When the expert archer fires his best shot, 
his competence involved—including practices such as taking aim at the bullseye; 
holding certain position between his arms and wrists; checking if the wind is too wild 
that might impact on the stability of the shot etc.—all serve the purpose of improving 
the shot’s accuracy. Take the higher order competence analogy in the basketball team 
management. When the manager takes credit for building a successful team18, he 
didn’t merely check that the team hadn’t recruited any bad players (that would only 
prevent him from being blameworthy for losses, but not make him praiseworthy for 
                                                          
17 Or ‘significantly’, sticking to the weak ability condition terms—note that I didn’t employ words like 
‘overarchingly’ or ‘primarily’ which imply the stronger condition. 
18 Note that following many virtue epistemologists who have a specific rendering of competence 
manifestation, there’s a disanalogy here in that I don’t think the winning of the games themselves 
manifested the managers’ competence. Instead, the basketball manager case is analogous with 
testimonial cases only to the extent that they both involve what I call higher order competence—their 
abilities do not directly amount to success themselves, but instead aim at enabling/putting one in the 
position for success. 
113 
 
wins, I think), rather he should have made considerable efforts in assembling a group 
of good players. 
 
Analogously, I think i-iii at best serve only as the prevention of outlandishly false 
beliefs—that is, I am at best just not blameworthy for false beliefs, but also not 
praiseworthy for true ones. Consider iii, isn’t it precisely the prevention of obviously 
false beliefs? Granted, by inductive reasoning the exclusion of certain falsehood does 
increase the chance of success. Alas, the impact is really incredibly small. What the 
competence excludes are just propositions that are hardly sensible for believing in the 
first place. There is a vast number of sensible claims such competence cannot help 
with (say, whether the author of Sherlock Holmes was born in 1859 or 1860). When I 
am in the bar and the testifiers feed me with a bunch of unfamiliar information, insofar 
as their claims stay within the realm of common sense, the competence in iii effectively 
offers little to no help at all for my chances of securing truths. Thus, iii cannot be a 
salient factor for the cognitive success. That is, the success is not significantly 
creditable to my displaying competence iii; similarly, i would not be a salient factor for 
any success either—since it is just the prerequisite competence to make possible 
belief formation, listening and understanding what testifiers say surely do not speak to 
the truth of the proposition at all. 
 
At last, consider ii, which is a competence with more interesting epistemic 
underpinnings. When you passively receive information in a classical literature lecture, 
and correctly judge that a classics professor is trustworthy when it comes to ancient 
Chinese poetry, it seems right to say that your competence had significantly put you 
in a position to succeed rather than to fail. You appropriately put trust on a person who 
is an expert in the relevant field (contrast, for example, if you trust that classics 
professor while he’s forecasting the probability of economic recession in the coming 
financial year, your chance of getting things right would be significantly worsened). 
However, such competence has a limited scope of applicability. When it comes to 
Edinburgh trivia, how should one judge whether or not a testifier is trustworthy? Is 
there such a thing as a trivia expertise anyway? Unlike professional fields, trivia claims 
are often scattered and easily made up. Unlike highly specified knowledge, it is also 
relatively accessible to the general public, such that you’d lack the legitimate reason 
to doubt the person’s (who you’ve met in a pub) authority over the topic. I think in 
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cases of this sort, the decision to trust the testifier rests upon a good faith that one 
normally offers truthful information to others. Effectively, I simply take the person’s 
word for it as a conformity of a (perhaps groundless) socio-epistemic norm19. Mind that 
I am not suggesting this practice is problematic—I only want to remark that even if we 
grant (as I do) that it is acceptable, it wouldn’t be a ‘competence’ that is creditable for 
the success it brings. My leap of faith in humanity does no epistemic work in improving 
my chances of success, unfortunately. In the successful basketball team case, if the 
manager does nothing in enabling team success, but merely trust that his players 
would bring their very best to win every game (as he should, believing in the players). 
Again, there isn’t necessarily a problem with such (perhaps laissez-faire) managerial 
style. But whenever the team is indeed winning, we wouldn’t say the success is 
creditable to the manager at all. 
 
4.3.3 A minimal ability condition and the ownership of knowledge 
From the discussion above I hope I had presented a case that in passive testimony it 
doesn’t seem very plausible that our success is creditable to our competence. 
Nevertheless we still want to say that we do know the information as a result of their 
testimony—how many times in our lives had we learned little fun fact—that we never 
heard of and have no way to tell whether or not they are true—simply by trusting others’ 
telling? My proposed way out of this puzzle is to endorse an even weaker ability 
condition.20 It seems that in certain testimonial cases where the epistemic environment 
is particularly friendly, knowledge does not require cognitive success to be creditable 
to one’s competence. Specifically, it does not demand our competence to contribute 
to a better epistemic position for success in any significant way (contra Pritchard). 
 
If the relation between true beliefs and competence is not bridged by creditability, how 
should the ability condition be spelt out? I say we do not need the bridging relation 
between success and ability to begin with—we do not need our competence to 
                                                          
19 Whether our practices of testimony are really ‘groundless’ hinges on a more general debate about 
the structure of warrant. Wright (2004) and Coliva (2016), for example, hold that our entitlement to 
testimonial knowledge requires the background assumption that people’s say-so are usually reliable; 
while Pryor (2004) suggests that such assumption is not necessary. On the other hand, while Wright 
maintains that background assumptions should themselves be warranted, in Coliva’s view they could 
be groundless. 
20 I do not reject the possibility of alternative solution for virtue epistemologists. I am only offering a 
potential view which I think complements well with the adequate process account. 
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contribute to the betterment of our epistemic position (or improve our chances of 
success, if you will). Sometimes when the epistemic environment is particularly 
enabling, the required epistemic work of securing success could be done entirely 
outside of one’s cognitive agency (such as the testifier’s own competence). I also 
conjectured that we don’t need a link between the world and our competence (at least 
not in virtue theoretic terms) in order to account for knowledge—such task is left for 
the proposed adequate process theory. In turn, the ability condition would just be a 
necessary condition for knowledge which plays a quite different role. If this should hold 
we could be content with an ability condition that consists simply in success and 
competence (or, in Sosa’s term, accuracy and adroitness, i.e. the double-A structure). 
To elaborate, it is a necessary condition for knowledge that one’s cognitive success is 
a product of (but is not creditable to) one’s competence. 
 
Here I argue that ‘being a product of’ and ‘being creditable to’ one’s competence 
should not be taken as interchangeable terms. The latter seems to have embedded in 
it some sense of ‘because of’ relation; while the former, as I take it, simply states the 
conjunction of accuracy and adroitness. Importantly, while I think that by being 
creditable for the success one’s competence plays a role in explaining the truth (or at 
least, in explaining why one is able to obtain the truth), merely being a product of one’s 
competence does not imply such a role—the success could be a product of the 
competence, without needing the latter to have anything to do with the fact that it is 
successful. Consider again the laissez-faire manager who had done nothing for putting 
the team in the position to win—what he does is just to operate the organisation, 
arrange games, pay the salaries, sort out the venue etc. Suppose further the team is 
very successful nonetheless, due to the sheer excellence of the individual players. 
Now the winning of games surely has nothing to do with the manager, and so is not 
creditable to his ability; however, the team playing the games in the first place—be it 
winning or losing—are all products of his managerial work. Thus, the manager is 
‘virtuous’ in the sense that, a. the team is winning (not to his credit), and b. it is his 
work/skills that constitute the playing of the games by the team. In other words, his 
work had produced a winning team (whether or not it is due to his efforts that the team 




Coffee machine: The coffee machine in the office is not known to be producing 
particularly good coffee. Yet today it incredibly made an exceptional latte for John. 
One cannot deny that this good coffee (the success) is a product of the machine—
regardless of the quality it is after all the machine that produced it; but we can 
insist that the goodness in the coffee is not creditable to the excellence of the 
machine—sometimes the ordinary can produce incredible things, creditable 
perhaps to luck. 
 
Successful alumni: A mediocre school is known for providing sub-par education 
to its fellow students. Still, there are bound to be some brilliant graduates who 
achieve high accomplishments later in their lives. They are still rightfully called 
‘products’ of that mediocre school, no matter what the school is their alma mater, 
where they came from; but their success, it would seem, wouldn’t be creditable to 
the sub-par education they received from the school, rather it would even be 
natural to credit their diligence in overcoming the educational disadvantage they 
began with. 
 
So a belief is ‘virtuous’ insofar as it is the person’s cognitive competence which 
produced it, and that it turns out to be a success (i.e. a true belief). Call this the minimal 
ability condition for knowledge. Of course, it is not hard to recognise that the minimal 
condition does not predict the right verdict for even the most standard ‘intervening’ 
kind of Gettier cases. Earlier on I remarked that virtue epistemologists take ‘success 
being a product of cognitive agency’ in a specific sense, while generally speaking any 
belief formed by the agent, it would seem, would be a product of one’s agency—after 
all beliefs are all cognitive outcomes of the agent. The minimal ability condition 
precisely takes this more general reading of ‘success being a product of agency’ here. 
In FAKE SHEEP, we would say that Smith enjoys a true belief and it is Smith’s 
perceptual faculty which produced it (the belief, regardless of its truth value). So the 
ability condition is met for Smith’s belief, but this is fine—it is not the objective of the 
minimal ability condition to account for knowledge as a whole anyway. The virtuous 





One may further protest though that since generally speaking beliefs are products of 
cognitive agency this condition hardly amounts to any constraint on knowledge at all—
all beliefs would be virtuous then, under such condition. And what particular goods do 
this condition bring anyway, if it is possessed by all of our beliefs? To address this let 
me refine my saying that generally beliefs are products of cognitive agency—that is, 
such is the case under normal epistemic circumstances. But the condition still 
excludes certain cases of abnormal belief formation. Particularly, beliefs that are not 
grounded by one’s cognitive agency but are nonetheless irrationally held; and beliefs 
that are products of some ability/mechanism which is not part of one’s cognitive 
agency. If Jack is an irresponsible epistemic agent who doesn’t care about abiding 
any epistemic rules, he might form the belief that ‘there’s a sheep’ when he sees 
nothing, or he might believe that ‘there’s a horse’ when he sees a sheep. In such cases 
the minimal ability condition is not met, since Jack does not form his beliefs in 
accordance with what his visual faculty instructs him21, his beliefs are not considered 
as products of his cognitive competence. Consider another the peculiar case where 
the beliefs one have are not really produced by one’s own cognitive faculties—
suppose Thermo is an agent who forms various beliefs regarding the temperature 
around him. His beliefs are formed by a reliable process that yields to truths most of 
the time. The reason of this reliability is that unbeknownst to him a thermometer had 
been plugged into his brain, such that whenever he ponders about the temperature he 
is informed by the thermometer, instead of his own cognitive faculties. Again, we can 
rightfully say that Thermo’s belief in this case is not produced by his competence, at 
least when the thermometer doesn’t seem to be an ability that belongs to him (or 
considered part of his cognitive architecture). 
 
It seems to me then that the minimal ability condition is substantively excluding 
something—at the least it requires one to form beliefs in accordance with one’s 
cognitive faculties, and also demands that the beliefs must be produced by 
mechanisms that belong to the subject. It is in this sense that satisfying the ability 
condition helps us to explain why my knowledge is mine—it is my cognitive agency 
that had produced it. Indeed, explaining epistemic ownership strikes me as the 
                                                          
21 Incidentally, the justification condition (if one holds that it is essential to knowledge) also falls short 
under the AP account. For such view on justification, see chapter 6. 
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irreplaceable role for virtue epistemology, and this is the primary motivation for 
endorsing the minimal ability condition as necessary for knowledge. 
 
4.4 Adequately informed and minimally virtuous process 
4.4.1 Adequate process must be one’s own process 
In this section, I shall consider how the minimal ability condition outlined above and 
the proposed AP view might complement each other. I maintain that the ability 
condition is not here to close any gaps in accounting for knowledge. The load of 
accounting for knowledge—offering appropriate readings for a wide range of epistemic 
evaluation cases, remains on adequate process’s shoulders. However, being able to 
predict the correct reading across cases doesn’t mean it could also explain why the 
knowledge belongs to that person. 
 
Consider TEMP which we discussed in previous chapters. Temp has a safe modal 
profile of beliefs credited to the hidden agent who diligently adjust the thermostat 
according to the broken thermometer’s readings Temp looks at. I argued that the 
essential reason Temp falls short of knowledge is the inadequate process in his belief 
formation, rather than the lack of competence manifestation—what matters most in 
the story seems to be that he needs to correctly identify the source of his information 
and put trust on it. Indeed, if he had been made aware about the whole story, he would 
have continued to look at the thermometer, depending on it to form reliable 
temperature beliefs, trusting not the thermometer’s mechanics itself, but rather the 
hard work of the hidden agent. Although virtue theorists could still insist that the 
aptness condition works on the case (for mistaking the source of reliability, Temp’s 
belief didn’t manifest the competence of ‘informant selection’), it strikes me that the 
core issue here does not have much to do with what ability of his that is involved, but 
how well he had a grasp on the entire situation as he forms the corresponding beliefs. 
 
However, we can imagine a case where the minimal ability condition matters. If it 
doesn’t matter whether it is the thermometer or the evil demon who feeds you with 
truths (as long as you had not mistaken the source), in principle we can devise a case 
such that your cognitive agency is massively misleading, you were told so, and you 
continue to ‘know’ the world in virtue of this epistemic transparency. Let me explain 
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such a case. Suppose Steve is a brain-in-a-vat whose experiences are manipulated 
by a scientist. But the ‘benevolent’ scientist told Steve the whole story at the beginning, 
assuring Steve that he would only feed Steve with ‘veridical’ experiences—
experiences that would track truths in the external world, that is, he would be 
stimulated to have a hand-like visual experience only if there’s a hand in the external 
world. Effectively Steve would be like being plugged into a virtual reality headset that 
plays exactly the visual information that he would have seen outside the device (a 
laboratory with advanced apparatus and working scientists). Knowing all that, does 
Steve know, say for example, that a scientist is drinking a cup of coffee? 
 
Structurally the case does seem very much like Temp, and the adequate process is 
satisfied (I don’t see why a rationally ideal person won’t use ‘virtual reality headset’ of 
such kind to form corresponding beliefs, when one is assured that it tracks reality). 
Thus I’m inclined to think that Steve does know via trusting what his experiences 
indirectly show. However, I would also argue that this case does not take out Steve’s 
competence significantly—his beliefs are still arguably products of his agency, I think. 
Granted, his perceptual faculties fail to function as they normally do, all the 
experiences he received had been artificially stimulated. The perceptual data can’t be 
considered ‘products’ of Steve’s cognitive competence. However, I think the case is 
much like that of testimony in a phenomenally different way—after all, the scientist do 
the best of his ability to ‘report’ the truths indirectly to Steve through the stimulation, 
and Steve trust on his report, albeit a representation of truths of a very different way 
than verbal testimony. We could think of Steve, in acquiring knowledge, not as having 
perceptual justifications stemming from his sensory faculties, but as successfully 
putting trust on the scientist’s ‘tellings’ about the surroundings. In this way, the minimal 
ability condition is met in the way passive testimonies are. 
 
Let’s try our best to remove even the ‘trusting’ competence in the case. Suppose the 
scientist doesn’t bother to stimulate corresponding experience, but rather directly 
induces all the true beliefs to Steve by brute force. I concede that such scenario might 
be hard for us to imagine—even in testimony where we don’t have direct contact to 
the truths, it at least seems to our agency that it comes from somewhere, some 
comprehensible source of information (i.e. people’s tellings). How are we supposed to 
understand what it’s like to have all our beliefs induced? There wouldn’t be mental 
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imagery of grounds of any kind for Steve’s beliefs, rather he is fed with a variety of 
mere propositional contents (such as a scientist is drinking coffee, or Trump won the 
election as the US president). He can’t help but to believe them as the beliefs are 
directly induced. In fact let’s say he possesses more true beliefs than anyone—the 
scientist induces the entire database of truths to him. Suppose the case is designed 
to meet the adequate process requirement—Steve was completely informed about the 
situation, and holds the induced beliefs being aware that they are all true guaranteed 
by the scientist. Given all these there’s again no reason why Steve wouldn’t form 
beliefs in this way (alas, he has no choice, but if he had he would have conceded that 
this way effectively grants him truths and insofar as obtaining truths is still an epistemic 
good for him as a BIV he would have chosen to form his beliefs in this way)—there’s 
no deception and the belief forming method even tracks the truths. It also seems that 
the minimal ability condition is not met—the induced beliefs don’t seem to accord with 
any of Steve’s cognitive faculties, nor produced by mechanism that belongs to Steve 
in any imaginable way. Notice that Steve couldn’t even display trust in the scientist 
testimony—he doesn’t decide with his cognition to form the corresponding beliefs, 
doesn’t comprehend what the scientist tells (if it’s merely propositional contents that is 
presented to him), so in that sense he doesn’t even form the beliefs, not by himself 
(although beliefs are being formed in his mental states). Does Steve possess 
knowledge? 
 
While the verdict is tricky to get for such bizarre case, I don’t think he does, not in the 
way we normally take knowledge to be. What distinguishes knowledge and truths is, 
at least, the former is a particular state of an agent regarding his/her relation to the 
world, while the latter only pertains to the world independent from any agent. 
Knowledge is supposed to belong to someone—it would make little sense to ponder 
about a non-agential reading of knowledge (without taking it metaphorically, cf. 
1.3.3.2). Specifically, knowledge are true beliefs that belong to the agent’s cognitive 
life, without the agent’s cognition taking part it is really hard to imagine how certain 
doxastic states (true as they may be) could really be epistemically evaluated at all. 
One can say they are truths, one can perhaps even grant they are mental states 
containing truthful propositional contents, but they being produced by a machine rather 
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than the cognitive agency of Steve make me speculate they aren’t even epistemic 
states, let alone knowledge.22 
 
4.4.2 Holistic virtue epistemology 
So the adequate process account needs the minimal ability condition to explain why 
our knowledge is ours. I suggested at the beginning that AP and VE complement each 
other well—what does adequate process do to improve on the VE view? Put shortly, 
adequate process naturally suggests a holistic approach to competence that is 
somewhat overlooked in virtue epistemology. Let me explain. Suppose we grant for 
the moment that RVE holds—that knowledge is apt belief. Consider the following case: 
 
INTERROGATION John is a superintendent. An important interrogation for a case 
he’s in charge is undergoing, and he is observing the suspect, Tom, in the next 
room (one that have those semi-transparent glasses where you could see the 
other room but not vice versa). But John’s colleagues are tricking him—he’s 
actually looking at a screen displaying holographic images (of Tom and the 
interrogator). The voice he hears was Tom’s, but it was recorded earlier that day, 
plays in the room again just to trick John. 
 
John certainly fails to know that Tom is being interrogated. This looks very much like 
a standard intervening case aptness is able to address—John fails to know because 
the true belief that Tom is in the other room has nothing to do with what John sees 
and hears. But what if his faculties contradict in verdict? Suppose John indeed sees 
Tom through the glass, but is still hearing the recordings? Or that John actually hears 
Tom’s interrogation live, but is unknowingly looking at holographic images? Notice that 
independently any of the two sources (that display aptness) would suffice for 
knowledge, but when a belief is grounded by apt and inapt performances at the same 
time, what should the verdict be? Surely John seems epistemically worse off 
                                                          
22 Indeed, one can argue that mental contents of such kind fall short of even being beliefs, or any 
doxastic states that epistemologists take interests on. Additionally, insofar as the AP view encompass 
beliefs, it would not be met in cases of this sort. To this end, I do not insist that AP necessarily needs 
a separate minimal virtue condition—if anything, this reflects how such minimal condition is really 
essential in any epistemic evaluation, such that epistemic account of various sorts are implicitly 
committed to it one way or another (consider the problems Foley’s account encounter in chapter 1 
when he attempts to reduce cognitive agency to mere propositional attitudes in epistemic 
evaluations). After all, it is what make possible any epistemic states that we take interests in. 
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compared to when he only has one apt source, but do we go so far as to say that he 
does not know whenever another inapt source comes into play? Or do we think that 
John is in a better position to know when he sees Tom but hears the recordings, 
compare to when he hears the interrogation but sees the holograms? If so, how do we 
explain such favouritism of the aptness of certain faculties over the others? 
 
Note that cases like INTERROGATION are not meant to undermine VE. Rather I 
would like to suggest a modification of the account that strikes me as more appealing—
call this holistic virtue epistemology. The holistic approach takes our agent’s cognitive 
agency as a whole in our epistemic evaluation, to determine whether one’s 
competence is manifested overall. Talks in existing VE often focus on manifestations 
of particular cognitive faculties, but a more accurate depiction of our cognitive 
exercises should really be taking all our faculties together and determine whether an 
overall cognitive performance is apt. When a basketball player makes a shot you 
wouldn’t just credit his shooting hand—the other hand is helpful with maintaining 
shooting stability, his sight takes the aim, his legs jump to add strength to his shooting, 
his entire body maintains a balance to keep the shooting rhythm etc.—and there are 
abilities he displayed in enabling the shot (moving to the appropriate position, 
collaborating with teammates etc.). Analogously, in our cognitive activities it is often 
hard to attribute success to a particular faculty—as seen in INTERROGATION at least 
we could appreciate that visual and auditory perception often go hand in hand. The 
cognitive performance for our cognitive agency as a whole is surely a complex 
mechanism to evaluate—and I don’t claim that in INTERROGATION I am able to 
determine and explain favouritism towards, say, John’s visual perception over his 
auditory one. Indeed, this may be why virtue theorists focus their discussion on just 
one competence—it is more manageable to keep it simple when illustrating their 
positions. They may very well hold such holistic view tacitly, and agree with my 
remarks here that in practice cognitive performances most often involve a complex 
synthesis of the agent’s various competences. In this sense I do not consider the 
holistic approach an original and novel view of mine. I simply wish to explicitly consider 
this somewhat underdeveloped point. 
 
After the disclaimers, let me consider how the adequate process account fits well with 
holistic virtue epistemology. Consider the AP view: 
123 
 
AP: S knows that P just in case S comes to believe P via process M in the actual 
world, and is ideally permitted to continue believing P via M had S obtained the 
information regarding the entire situation U. 
 
In other words, it would still be (normatively) acceptable for S to employ the original 
process to arrive at his belief that P had the complete story been uncovered to him. I 
believe AP offers us a new perspective to help us consider our overall cognitive 
performance. To determine whether one apt competence trumps other inapt ones is 
to determine whether the agent would still form the target belief on the overall basis. 
Let’s consider more concretely what verdicts AP would give here. While cases of solely 
apt competence (e.g. John forming his interrogation belief only from one veridical 
perceptual faculty, visual or auditory) surely satisfy AP—he would have no problem 
continuing to form such belief via the same faculty after the whole story is unveiled; 
cases involving an integration of apt and inapt competences may fall short in this 
regard—it is not as clear that John would still consider his process as a whole as 
acceptable if he realises that he is partly mistaken. However, this is not necessarily 
the case—it might be that despite the partially inapt process John still thinks that his 
process has done enough all things considered (perhaps because he thinks the 
veridical part of his competence is more significant than other faculties when it comes 
to his interrogation beliefs). Of course, given that some competence is inapt, it wouldn’t 
be an ideal way of belief formation. What we ask here is whether it is an acceptable 
way23—would you still consider it acceptable to believe P via M (consisting an apt 
visual but inapt auditory competence, for example). If so, then our overall belief 
forming process (importantly, the cognitive competences involved24) as a whole is 
adequate, or good enough, in attaining the success. I don’t claim that it would make 
the question easier to answer (they are after all tricky cases of epistemic evaluation)—
but I think that’s the right question to ask in the first place, given that we want to 
consider the performance of our overall cognitive competence. This particular 
epistemic assessment turns out to be the requirement articulated by AP. 
 
                                                          
23 See the full AP account in chapter 2, more on the notion of acceptable ideality in chapter 6. 




4.5 Concluding remarks—holistic epistemic evaluations 
I would like to end this chapter with a final remark on the broader perspective. As the 
discussion goes I had made numerous criticisms (or at least some reservations) 
towards epistemic evaluations that take an ‘atomistic’ approach—to begin with we 
have the targeted belief that is the candidate of knowledge. Following that 
epistemologists often look into individual cognitive faculties (VE), particular cognitive 
processes (reliabilism), missing information (Foley’s adequate information view), or 
particular defeaters (defeasibility accounts) that they take to determine one’s epistemic 
status. My positive claim is that as a cognitive activity that involves complex 
interactions between our mind (itself an intricate integrated system) and the world 
(which, as Foley puts it, is lush with facts that radiate out in all directions), epistemic 
evaluations are not something that could be broken down into particular characteristics 
of its constituents. Instead the proposed AP view is a holistic approach that aims to 
study epistemic phenomena by understanding how the constituents are integrated and 
what the overall epistemic outcome looks like. It evaluates how the agent’s overall 
belief forming process (with his/her integrated competence displayed) fares in the 
totality of states of affairs—the successful epistemic outcome is also a complex 
cognitive state of interconnected grasp regarding the subject matter (perhaps like 
understanding), it just turns out that we call some particular true propositions one holds 
knowledge. 
 
As we proceed to part 3 of the thesis, I shall move on from the discussion of holism in 
knowledge. Instead, I shall explore another important theme in the AP view—that 
knowledge is in its nature ecumenical. By considering the proposed theoretical 
framework in application I shall argue that while there is only one epistemic standard 
outlined by the AP account, there may be many ways to achieve that standard, 
depending on one’s theoretical commitments. Chapter 5 is an example of how the AP 
as an ecumenical theory can be applied in various forms. In particular, I will discuss 
the anti-luck platitude of knowledge and how AP might accommodate this platitude by 
assuming certain epistemic norms. In chapter 6 I shall explore an application of the 
AP view on epistemic justification. I will argue that this would yield an ecumenical view 















Adequately Informed Process without Luck 
 
5.1 Introductory remarks 
This chapter concerns the relationship between anti-luck epistemology and the 
proposed adequately informed process view (AP). That knowledge is fundamentally 
incompatible with veritic epistemic luck is a widely held idea in epistemology.1 The 
project of anti-luck epistemology, in particular, aims at constructing a set of conditions 
such that one could eliminate veritic epistemic luck from one’s cognitive achievements, 
and in so doing put one in a good position for knowledge. In this chapter, I shall offer 
an evaluation of the anti-luck project from the perspective of the AP account. I argue 
that not only are the two compatible, they actually fit naturally together in some way, 
under a certain very plausible assumption. 
 
The discussion of this chapter is threefold. In section 5.2 I highlight the merit of anti-
luck epistemology, and argue that knowledge in its nature requires us to eliminate luck 
when forming our beliefs. Section 5.3 takes a closer look on specific modal accounts 
of knowledge and their anti-luck manoeuvres. Section 5.4 introduces the AP account 
of knowledge, and attempts to encompass the safety principle in the former. By doing 
so, I hope to establish that a. any account of knowledge needs to eliminate veritic luck; 
and b. the account of adequate process is able to address this issue. On a broader 
perspective, encompassing safety in AP demonstrates the latter’s ecumenicity and 
capacity in displaying multiple epistemic features under various epistemic norms. 
 
5.2 Anti-luck epistemology 
5.2.1 Veritic luck and the protection from errors 
We certainly want our beliefs to be true rather than false. Indeed, one of the reasons 
why knowledge is so desirable is that it is factive—when we know some propositions, 
                                                          
1 Williamson (2000), Sosa (1999), Pritchard (2005, 2007, 2009, 2012, 2016b, Pritchard, Millar & 
Haddock 2010). The anti-luck platitude as Pritchard describes it, however, is becoming more 
controversial, as epistemologists begin to challenge it. For discussions regarding lucky knowledge, 
see Hetherington (2013) and Sosa (2007). 
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they must be true. In other words, when we think that we know, then unless something 
goes wrong and we had actually been mistaken in this regard (i.e. we actually fail to 
know), the known propositions would be true. But for what matters, knowledge seems 
to do more—most epistemologists agree that knowledge is not merely true belief. Not 
only does knowledge grant us truth, it does so with certain manner of stability. It would 
seem that random true beliefs alone do not entitle us to know—to go further from mere 
true beliefs, we would at least need some assurance that we do not otherwise make 
mistakes so easily by the way we come to the beliefs. This is a valuable asset because 
just as true beliefs are desirable, false ones are equally (if not more) undesirable—
possessing them might be costly for us. If all we really care is to have as many true 
beliefs as possible without worrying about the costs of false ones, we might as well 
believe in everything. This, of course, sounds absurd. Thus, if we are to think that 
knowledge differs from mere true beliefs in that it offers protection from errors of some 
sort, it wouldn’t be so difficult to appreciate how knowledge is incompatible with veritic 
luck. 
 
Let’s take a closer look into what ‘veritic luck’ amounts to. According to Pritchard, one 
is veritically lucky if one’s belief is only true as a matter of luck. Now, if knowledge is 
compatible with this, then one’s beliefs (despite being true) could have been easily 
false. In other words, cognitive errors are among the realm of easy possibilities, we 
are, so to speak, unprotected. 
 
5.2.2 Luck in Gettier cases 
Perhaps the most vivid way to illustrate how the anti-luck project is crucial to 
accounting for knowledge is by examples of luckily obtained true beliefs. Indeed, a 
reason for an anti-luck condition to be an essential feature of knowledge is that nearly 
all Gettier style cases introduce certain luckily obtained true beliefs (with obvious 
exceptions, of course, to counterexamples against anti-luck accounts themselves) to 
generate the intuitions of the subjects’ lack of knowledge. Consider the following case: 
 
FORD S sees Nogot, a colleague in his office, drives in a Ford every morning. S 
thus comes to believe that he owns a Ford. Further, S also infers that someone in 
the office owns a Ford (F). However, unbeknownst to him, Nogot does not own a 
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Ford, the Ford he had been driving is in fact owned by some other person, who 
kindly lend the car to Nogot. However, F is true nonetheless, as Havit, another 
colleague in the office, indeed owns a Ford.2 
 
There is no doubt that S possesses a true belief—that someone in the office owns a 
Ford. However, it is very counterintuitive to consider such belief as knowledge. Why 
might that be so? The natural response is of course that S had misunderstood—he 
falsely believes that Nogot owns a Ford, but from it nevertheless arriving at the true 
belief that F; while it is actually Havit who owns a Ford that corresponds to F’s truth. If 
Havit hasn’t got a Ford, S’s belief would have been false. As we consider deeper, 
however, it seems that whether Havit owns a Ford does not do much to S’s belief 
formation per se, rather it only changes the truth value of F; if S’s belief formation 
actually has any bearings on the truth of F, such that S seeing Nogot in a Ford indeed 
indicates that Nogot owns a Ford, then the Havit side of the story would become 
irrelevant. If this is the case, it seems that the more fundamental problem of the case 
lies beneath the inability of S’s belief formation to protect S from making mistakes 
easily than the good luck that turns the unprotected belief into a true one. In FORD, 
S’s belief formation (by seeing Nogot with the Ford) made no contribution at all to the 
truth of F, there is nothing in the belief formation that stops S from believing falsely, it 
is just lucky that in this case the belief turns out to be true when Havit’s Ford comes 
into play. 
 
The case of Nogot represents a scenario where S’s method had nothing at all to do 
with the truth of F. However, this is not necessarily the case for all luckily true beliefs. 
In fact, the anti-luck intuition would become ‘purer’ in cases where one’s belief forming 
method actually connects to the truth, but falls short purely in protecting against easy 
possible errors. Consider the following case that illustrates what Pritchard termed as 
environmental luck: 
 
BARN FAÇADE George is driving through the country. As he looks through the 
window he sees a barn-shape building across the field, thus coming to believe 
that ‘there’s a barn in the field’. The building he spotted is indeed a genuine barn—
                                                          
2 Adapted from Lehrer (1965). 
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however, unbeknownst to him, there are many fake barns in the vicinity, so cleverly 
disguised that, visitors who had not taken a closer look would most likely mistaken 
them as barns. It turns out that George is looking at one of the few genuine barns 
in the area.3 
 
Again, it is undeniable that George’s belief is true. What’s more, in this example one 
could even make a strong case that George’s belief forming method indeed has some 
bearing on the truth of P—after all, he is looking at the real barn and therefore has 
direct perceptual contact with what makes the proposition (that there is a barn) true. 
Unlike S in FORD, George is actually creditable to some extent for his cognitive 
achievement4 when looking correctly (albeit luckily) at the real barn, his belief forming 
method connects appropriately, it seems, to the truth. We have to grant credit when 
credit is due—George at least acquires some level of cognitive achievement by luckily 
looking at the real barn and successfully identifying it as a barn. 
 
The question that remains is whether we think such achievement suffices for 
knowledge. I take it that the case strikes us as falling short of knowledge, while 
admittedly such intuition is weaker than that of FORD. Indeed, whether George knows 
receives more controversy among epistemologists than Gettier cases that are not 
environmental in nature. Sosa (2007), for example, believes that this type of cases 
amount to a certain kind of knowledge—in virtue of the subject aptly obtaining the truth 
from his ability (perceptual in the case of BARN FAÇADE)—but he too conceded that 
intuition seems to suggest the contrary at first sight, after which he attempted to explain 
away this judgment and maintain that one really has some form of knowledge in BARN 
FAÇADE. However, along with Pritchard, I’m inclined to consider beliefs of this sort do 
not amount to knowledge of any kind. 
 
Here is a diagnosis of why we had a difficult time in judging this case. According to 
Pritchard (2012), knowledge needs to entertain two necessary conditions—the anti-
luck condition and the ability condition. In virtue of obtaining the true belief from looking 
at the real barn with his well-functioning eye sight, George satisfies the latter condition, 
                                                          
3 See 1.2, adapted from Goldman (1976). 
4 As discussed in chapter 4. 
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and thus contributing to our judging that he obtains cognitive achievement (and Sosa’s 
thinking that he knows); however, Pritchard points out that knowledge is less tolerant 
to veritic luck than cognitive achievement is. While one’s success (in attaining the true 
belief) could be creditable to one’s ability, this does not necessarily protect one from 
making easy errors. In fact, BARN FAÇADE illustrates just that—George’s perceptual 
competence, while significantly contributing to his obtaining the true belief, had done 
nothing in the context to prevent George from ‘nearby’ falsehoods. Such way of belief 
formation permits too much possibility of error than knowledge could allow—if we grant 
that the way we come to believe P could easily lead to falsehoods, how would we still 
insist that what we believe by this method are true anyway? This is what drives our 
intuitions against George’s barn belief as a candidate of knowledge, and if one really 
wishes to bite the bullet and maintain that knowledge can be lucky, the idea of easy 
errors would at least be undeniably uncomfortable to swallow. 
 
5.2.3 Luck vs risk 
Before turning to accounts that aims to fulfil the anti-luck condition, it is worth noting 
that Pritchard (2016c) recently introduces a new approach to the condition. The new 
approach, termed as anti-risk epistemology, is motivated from the thought that what 
fundamentally undermines knowledge is epistemic risk—the easy possibility of 
errors—instead of veritic epistemic luck (that one’s belief is true as a matter of luck). 
The ideas are incredibly similar, and I believe that being general in remarking that 
knowledge is not compatible with beliefs that are easily false, anti-luck theorists could 
really apply my previous discussion to either approach if they so please. In the coming 
discussion, I would mainly continue to adopt the more common terminology of anti-
luck epistemology. However, when it comes to specific articulations of the account of 
safety in the following sections, I would differentiate the approaches in more detail. For 
the time being, I would just add that neither of the specific articulation would affect the 
way adequately informed process encompasses safety, as we will see in 5.4. 
 
5.3 The sensitivity and safety principles in anti-luck epistemology 
5.3.1 Accounting for luck 
Knowledge is incompatible with easy possibility of falsehood. If this is so, then it would 
be helpful to specify exactly how we could avoid the latter. Let’s consider in this section 
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specific theories of knowledge with their attempts to eliminate epistemic luck—the 
sensitivity and the safety principles. Dealing with the possibility and closeness of 
falsehoods of S’s beliefs, sensitivity and safety are essentially modal accounts of 
knowledge—ones that make knowledge ascriptions by considering the modal profiles 
of the subject’s belief formation. Therefore, to appreciate how sensitivity and safety 
work, let us first look at the modal nature of luck. According to Pritchard (2005): 
 
If an event is lucky, then it is an event that occurs in the actual world but which 
does not occur in most of the nearest possible worlds to the actual world.5 
 
It is important to understand what it means for a possible world to be ‘nearby’ or ‘close 
to another’. In Lewisian terminology, possible worlds are ordered according to 
similarities with one another.6 Suppose one takes the actual world as the centre of the 
ordering, worlds that mostly resemble the actual world would be the nearest/closest 
worlds; while possible worlds that are drastically different—in that a great deal had to 
be changed to the actual world in order for those worlds to hold—are considered as 
far-fetched possibilities. In light of this framework of world proximity and the notion of 
possibility construed under it, an event is lucky if it occurs in the actual world but does 
not hold in most of the worlds that are only slightly different from the actual. Take 
winning a lottery as a paradigm case for lucky events. Suppose your ticket was drawn 
out as the winner in the lottery, i.e. the event holds in the actual world. However, in 
most of the other similar scenarios the event does not hold—the configurations of 
some colour balls could have altered slightly, leading to different outcomes of lottery 
winners, and in those cases you would have lost the lottery. 
 
On the other hand, the account of risk has a slightly different focus. For one thing, 
unlike luck, the notion of risk is not mainly backward-looking—risk essentially concerns 
what could easily occur without exclusively concerning the past (i.e. whether an actual 
event could easily have been otherwise)7 . Secondly, when we talk about risk, we 
concern only events that are undesirable. It would be very odd to talk about the risk of 
                                                          
5 Pritchard (2005), pp. 128. 
6 Unlike the current AP model, which ranks possible worlds according to their alignments with relevant 
epistemic norms. 
7 Indeed, Pritchard further suggests that risk is in turn forward-looking—it really concerns what could 
easily occur in the future. See Pritchard (2016c) for more discussions. 
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the occurrence of certain favourable events. Putting the pieces together, risk amounts 
to potential undesirable outcomes with easy possibility of taking place. Consider a car 
accident as an example of risk. The risk of an accident is high when it could very easily 
occur (i.e. occurs in some very close possible worlds) given certain states of affairs, 
say when one has consumed too much alcohol; on the other hand, if one is reasonably 
sober for driving, car accidents would not occur so easily (at least compared to the 
first case), the risk therefore becomes relatively low. 
 
Let us get back to luck for the moment. The general account described above could 
apply to any instances of a lucky event. However, since our concern pertains to its 
impact on knowledge, what we care about is specifically luck about our formation of 
true beliefs (or cognitive successes), i.e. epistemic luck. Even such specification is not 
enough—not all epistemic luck is knowledge undermining. As Pritchard put forth, 
epistemic luck could be benign or veritic, and it is only the latter that we seek to 
eliminate. 
 
There are various kinds of benign epistemic luck that involves luck for the subject to 
obtain the target true belief—it could be luck that the subject is capable of the said 
belief formation; or the luck that certain evidence is available to him/her. However, just 
because the appropriate connection between the subject and the belief is luckily 
attained would not undermine S’s epistemic status. After all, once the ability or 
evidence are (luckily) obtained, there is no luck/risk involved in S’s way of belief 
formation, it offers the protection from errors just as well as ability and evidence that 
are gained not as a matter of luck. 
 
Veritic epistemic luck, however, is the harmful species of the family. It is the kind of 
luck that one’s way of forming beliefs leads to truths. In other words, when S is 
veritically lucky in obtaining a certain true belief, then his/her belief formation offers no 
protection from error whatsoever, such a method of forming beliefs could easily have 
led to falsehoods. This, as discussed in the previous section, is intolerable for 
knowledge. Thus, presumably any effective anti-luck manoeuvre should exclude all 
and only instances of veritic epistemic luck. 
 
An analogue of this for the notion of risk would be epistemic risk. It is noteworthy that 
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unlike luck, there is no distinction between benign and veritic risk—all epistemic risks 
are, obviously, undesirable and thus incompatible with knowledge. Just as epistemic 
luck concerns the modal implausibility of actual cognitive success (such that it does 
not hold in many of the modally close scenarios), epistemic risk amounts to the modal 
proximity of potential cognitive failures (which is an undesirable epistemic event). In 
other words, it is the risk that one’s belief forming method would easily lead to 
falsehood. On this score, it seems that there is no essential difference between what 
risk and veritic luck are up to—but the account of risk seems to offer a more direct 
treatment to knowledge (for not requiring one to make a further theoretical distinction 
in ‘benign and veritic risks’). 
 
5.3.2 The sensitivity principle 
Let’s consider two of the better known modal accounts that attempt to block veritic 
epistemic luck. The sensitivity principle was introduced as a modal condition of Robert 
Nozick’s (1981) Tracking theory of knowledge. As the name suggests, Nozick’s 
account rules that S’s belief forming method must ‘track’ the truth. Nozick holds that 
knowledge is undermined in Gettier cases because the subjects’ beliefs, despite being 
true, are insensitive to falsehoods—the subjects would form such a belief via the same 
method even if it were not the case. Since the beliefs are formed regardless of their 
truths, Nozick suggested that the belief forming methods fail to track the truth. Let S 
be the subject and P be the target proposition, the sensitivity principle is stated as 
follows. 
  
If it had not been the case that P, S would not have believed that P. (i.e. 
¬P□→¬Bs(P))8 
 
Consider how the sensitivity principle blocks instances of veritic epistemic luck. Given 
the subject’s belief forming method M, the closest scenarios where P turn out to be 
false are scenarios in which S would not have believed in P. This resonates with our 
strategy of ensuring one’s own belief formation to offer protection from close error 
possibilities—when sensitivity is met, S could not have easily formed a false belief 
(that is, in modally close scenarios) with his/her existing method M. Consider FORD 
                                                          
8 Nozick (1981). 
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for example, S’s belief that F falls short of knowledge because despite his belief being 
true in the actual world, his belief forming method fails to track the truth across a wide 
range of close possibilities—had it been the case that Havit owns no Ford, F would be 
false; while S, mistakenly thinking that Nogot owns a Ford, would continue to believe 
in F. In BARN FAÇADE, George’s true belief is again insensitive. Had he been looking 
at another barn-like objet in the vicinity (which could have easily happened), he would 
end up not looking at a barn while still thinking to himself that he is. 
 
In 5.3.1 I argued that a potential anti-luck account should exclude all and only 
epistemic luck of the veritic sort. It had been suggested that the sensitivity principle, 
despite being effective in eliminating luck in belief formation, turns out to be too 
powerful on this score—such that some of the bona fide epistemic cases with luck that 
are tolerable to knowledge actually falls short in meeting sensitivity. Consider Sosa’s 
trash chute case (1999): 
 
TRASH CHUTE On my way to the elevator I release a trash bag down the chute 
from my high rise condo. Presumably I know my bag will soon be in the basement. 
But what if, having been released, it still (incredibly) were not to arrive there? That 
presumably would be because it had been snagged somehow in the chute on the 
way down (an incredibly rare occurrence), or some such happenstance. But none 
such could affect my predictive belief as I release it, so I would still predict that the 
bag would soon arrive in the basement. My belief seems not to be sensitive, 
therefore, but constitutes knowledge anyhow, and can correctly be said to do so.9 
 
Following Sosa, I concede that knowledge should be ascribed to the subject in TRASH 
CHUTE. Given that S’s belief (regarding the bag reaching the basement) is true, why 
would the extremely rare error possibility that it could have been snagged midway 
hinder our epistemic status? As stipulated in the case, such happenstance is rare and 
thus presumably far-fetched—it does not hold among the range of closer possible 
worlds. If this is so, it seems that no knowledge undermining veritic luck is in play in 
TRASH CHUTE, it is not a matter of luck that S’s belief so formed is true. Indeed, S’s 
belief formation does not seem to involve luck of any sorts—in a wide class of similar 
                                                          
9 Sosa (1999), p. 145-146. 
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scenarios, S would have acquired similar evidence, competently judged that the bag 
would reach the basement, and arrived at the true belief. 
 
However, under the existing account, S’s belief formation is insensitive. This is so 
because the scope of possible worlds that concerns the sensitivity principle is a 
dynamic matter depending of the truth values of P across the modal profile. Instead of 
looking only at scenarios that are closest to the actual world, sensitivity rules that we 
must consider the closest worlds where P is false. That is, even when the truth of P is 
so modally secure that it holds in all of the closest worlds, the sensitivity principle 
requires us to look at outer spheres (i.e. more far-fetched) of possibilities for a not-P 
world and assess our doxastic pattern. This results in potential theoretical overkills like 
TRASH CHUTE, where S’s belief formation is insensitive to far-fetched error 
possibilities, even though it offers protection from errors in a wide range of reasonably 
close scenarios. If it is the latter that is essential for the anti-luck platitude of knowledge, 
then a weaker account is called for. 
 
5.3.3 The safety principle 
The safety principle is articulated in face of sensitivity’s shortcomings10. Consider the 
formulation of the safety principle outlined by Pritchard (2009): 
 
S’s belief is safe if and only if in most nearby possible worlds in which S continues 
to form her belief about the target proposition in the same way as in the actual 
world, and in all very close nearby possible worlds in which S continues to form 
her belief about the target proposition in the same way as in the actual world, the 
belief continues to be true.11 
 
As one might notice, the conditions specified in safety works basically as the rejection 
of knowledge undermining veritic luck. When the way one forms the belief in the actual 
world continues to lead to true beliefs in a wide class of nearby possible worlds, much 
in the world has to change (i.e. only in far-fetched scenarios) in order for that method 
to generate errors. Thus, if one’s belief is safe, then such belief is protected from easy 
                                                          
10 See Sosa (1999) for more discussions. See Becker and Black (2012, Becker 2007) for a 
contemporary defence of sensitivity. 
11 Pritchard (2009), p. 35. 
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falsehoods. Note that unlike sensitivity, safety only requires one to look at modally 
close scenarios (nearby possible worlds). Thus, in TRASH CHUTE, S’s belief is safe—
in a wide class of nearby worlds, the bag would have reached the basement 
(remember that it being incredibly snagged in the middle is considered a far-fetched 
possibility), such that had S continued to believe in P, P would still be true in those 
worlds. 
 
To appreciate how it fares in addressing Gettier cases more generally, consider FORD 
and BARN FAÇADE. As the subject in FORD comes to believe that someone in the 
office owns a Ford (F) by supposing Nogot owns a Ford (note that Nogot does not own 
one actually), his belief would be easily false—in a wide variety of close scenarios 
where no other people in the office owns a Ford, the subject would be left with a false 
belief that F. Thus, safety rightly judges that S does not know. Similarly, in BARN 
FAÇADE, despite visually perceiving the real barn thus truly believing that there is a 
barn, in a wide class of nearby worlds George could have looked at another barn-like 
object in the vicinity and arrived at a false belief. Again, safety determines that George 
falls short of knowledge. 
 
So far so good for safety. One aspect in the condition, however, needs to be cleared 
up—as we asked in the sensitivity principle, what is the scope of possible worlds 
around the actual world that safety needs us to investigate? How far should we go 
from the actual world in order to make sure that it is not easy enough for our belief to 
be false? As cited from Pritchard, one considers the ‘very nearby’ and the ‘nearby’ 
worlds. Carter and Peterson (2017), however, suggested that worlds that are just 
slightly far off than these two classes should be considered as well, if a considerable 
amount of them result in the subject’s false beliefs. Yet this only adds a further 
complication—it would seem that the question of scope would become vulnerable to 
a sorites-style challenge. Carter and Paterson offered a calculus of safety such that all 
possible worlds (including far-off ones) could be considered, with weights proportional 
to their proximity to the actual world. In his more recent work Pritchard (2016c) also 
reckoned this challenge and remarked that knowledge should be completely intolerant 
to errors in very close worlds, completely tolerant in the most far-fetched worlds, and 




As for epistemic risk, one would need an account of safety such that in a wide class 
of nearby worlds the belief forming method S uses (or intends to use) would not lead 
to cognitive failures (i.e. false beliefs). As Pritchard suggested, it differs with the anti-
luck approach in that the latter focuses on continuing in possessing the true belief 
across worlds, while the former specifically excludes the formation of false beliefs, but 
clearly allows the scenarios of forming no belief at all12. Pritchard maintains that the 
anti-risk project would be more precise in dealing with the issue at hand—after all, 
what we concern is essentially the protection from errors. 
 
As with the anti-luck approach, the more comprehensive formulation of the account of 
epistemic risk in terms of world ordering would be that knowledge is completely 
intolerant to high risk (false beliefs in very close possible worlds), completely tolerant 
to low risk (false beliefs in the most far-fetched worlds), and exhibits a continuum of 
increasing tolerance between the two extremes13. 
 
5.3.4 Towards a modest anti-luck epistemology 
While one can make a strong argument that knowledge at least requires protection 
from errors (i.e. safe beliefs), the more ambitious proposal that knowledge just is safe 
belief doesn’t seem to stand. In particular, there are instances where knowledge is 
undermined even though one’s belief is safe. Consider TEMP as discussed by 
Pritchard. 
 
TEMP Temp forms his beliefs about the temperature in the room by consulting a 
thermometer. His beliefs, so formed, are highly reliable, in that any belief he forms 
on this basis will always be correct. Moreover, he has no reason for thinking that 
there is anything amiss with his thermometer. But the thermometer is in fact 
broken, and is fluctuating randomly within a given range. Unbeknownst to Temp, 
there is an agent hidden in the room who is in control of the thermostat whose job 
it is to ensure that every time Temp consults the thermometer the “reading” on the 
                                                          
12 It strikes me that the anti-luck approach, albeit in less straightforward manner, permits close worlds 
in which S forms no belief at all too. Though one needs to look more into the details of the condition’s 
formulations. I grant however that the anti-risk formulation indeed offers a more straight forward 
picture regarding this. 
13 Pritchard (2016c), p. 563. 
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thermometer corresponds to the temperature in the room.14 
 
Reading from the broken thermometer provides Temp with a robust protection from 
errors—given the diligence of the hidden agent unbeknownst to Temp, the temperature 
of the room corresponds perfectly to the random thermometer readings, such that 
whenever Temp acquires the temperature beliefs from consulting the thermometer in 
a wide class of close scenarios (that is, so long as the hidden agent keeps working), 
his beliefs so formed would be true. The idea however is that such safe beliefs fall 
short of knowledge. Temp, after all, is looking at a broken thermometer. His beliefs are 
only true because the room temperature itself has been tampered with to follow the 
thermometer’s random readings. Pritchard, as a safety proponent himself, concedes 
that Temp seems to have displayed the wrong direction of fit in his cognitive 
successes—it is not our beliefs that correspond to changes in the world but instead 
the world that changes in accordance with what we believe. While anti-luck 
epistemology may be successful in protecting the subject from false beliefs by 
securing certain modal stability of the belief’s truths across close scenarios, it evidently 
doesn’t guarantee an appropriate connection between one’s cognitive successes and 
one’s belief forming method. This motivates a modest view of anti-luck epistemology. 
That is, the anti-luck platitude is an essential facet of knowledge that plays an 
irreplaceable role in any account of knowledge; that being said, anti-luck conditions 
such as safety would not suffice for knowledge—in particular, the appropriate 
connection between the acquisition of true beliefs and one’s belief forming processes 
does not seem to be accountable in purely modal terms. 
 
5.4 Adequately informed process and anti-luck epistemology 
5.4.1 Revisiting the AP view 
If we grant that the protection from errors is at least an important facet of knowledge, 
it is of theoretical advantage that one’s account of knowledge could accommodate 
some form of anti-luck elements. This section investigates the relationship between 
adequately informed process and anti-luck epistemology. In earlier chapters, I 
articulated a new account of knowledge as adequately informed process (AP) inspired 
by Foley (2012) and Wright (1993, 1994), one that is constructed under the intuition 
                                                          
14 Pritchard (2012), p. 260. See also my discussion in 1.2. 
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that S knows as long as S’s belief forming process remains intact upon unveiling the 
entire situation unbeknownst to S. Indeed, if luck is considered a common theme in a 
wide class of Gettier-style cases, I would like to think that unbeknownst information is 
even more central to the construction of knowledge stories in general. As far as I’m 
aware, every knowledge story in the literature highlights the informational discrepancy 
between the state of affairs apparent to the hero of the story and some happenstance 
unbeknownst to him/her. The account I formulated pertains to a certain positive 
condition that aims to eliminate the possibility of knowledge undermining unbeknownst 
information in any given knowledge story. More specifically, such a requirement 
supposedly blocks the possibility of any unbeknownst information which is harmful to 
the connection between the belief forming method and the truth. Let M be the process 
S relies on in forming the target belief, and U be the set of all propositions that hold in 
the case. The AP account is stated as follows: 
 
AP: S knows that P just in case S comes to believe P via process M in the actual 
world, and is ideally permitted to continue believing P via M had S obtained the 
information regarding the entire situation U.15 
 
Granted, it seems exceedingly difficult for us to identify every proposition that is 
contained in U, and many of the propositions do not seem to matter with regard to P. 
Indeed, as the scope of U includes every fact that holds in the world, a vast number of 
facts would be irrelevant. As Foley suggested, facts ‘radiate out in all directions’, and 
it is unclear whether there’s a limit to the number of propositions that hold in a given 
situation. The focus of my account is not that knowing all of them is important 
epistemically to S’s belief that P. Rather, U is considered to be the totality of states of 
affairs, and what matters to the epistemic evaluation of S’s belief is how S’s original 
way of forming the belief performs under information about such states. 
 
If S’s original way of forming the belief continues to lead S to believe P after unveiling 
the complete story, then no unbeknownst story detail had affected the connection 
between S and his true belief. That is, S’s original epistemic status would remain intact 
in the case as a whole. Thus, whichever case that satisfies this condition would be a 
                                                          
15 See Ch 2 for more details of the articulated account. 
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case where S’s original belief forming process is adequate enough to lead to true 
beliefs in the complete story. This is what makes one’s epistemic status considered as 
knowledge, or so I argued.16 
 
5.4.2 AP and safety 
In 5.2 I had suggested that knowledge is fundamentally incompatible with veritic 
epistemic luck. Therefore, it would be dialectically favourable for any account of 
knowledge to demonstrably eliminate such luck. In what follows I attempt to do so with 
the adequately informed process account. While the protection from errors is not the 
chief objective of AP, I believe that given certain assumptions it would be able to 
perform the anti-luck manoeuvres just as well. Suppose a case is such that AP holds 
but safety does not. It follows that S’s belief forming process produces easily false 
beliefs (from failing safety), and upon reckoning so S would continue to form his belief 
via such process (from satisfying AP). This idea—that one would knowingly employ a 
belief forming method that could have easily led to false beliefs—strikes me as 
extremely counterintuitive. I believe that the uncomfortable feeling we find in this 
consequence trades on a very plausible norm of belief formation, call it subjective 
safety: 
 
(SS) If one considers certain M as easily leading to false beliefs, then one should 
not form any belief that P by M. 
 
As stated at the beginning, we as epistemic agents wish to avoid false beliefs as much 
as to obtain true ones. When a certain method easily leads to falsehoods, employing 
it would go against such an aim. As one might see, such a norm is not equivalent to 
safety, in that safety demands protection from errors regardless of whether one is 
aware, while SS only requires one not to form beliefs by ways one judges as error-
prone. Therefore, the commitment to SS would not be hindered even if one rejects 
safety. 
 
However, coupled with the AP view where the entire situation is considered in our 
epistemic evaluations, an objective protection from errors can be achieved. With the 
                                                          
16 For further motivations and arguments for the proposed view, see Chapters 2. 
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aid of SS, let’s get back to our initial suppositions: 
 
Reductio argument for AP→S 
(1) There are cases which AP holds and safety does not (¬(AP→S)); 
(2) S in these cases would knowingly form the belief that P by methods that would 
easily lead to false beliefs; (from 1) 
(3) No epistemic agent should form any belief that P by methods he/she considers as 
easily leading to false beliefs (SS) 
 
Insofar as we assume that SS holds, since (1) and SS jointly lead to a contradiction, 
by reductio (1) is false. Therefore, we have ¬(AP^¬S), which is equivalent to AP→S. 
 
In summary, if one commits to SS, then meeting the conditions of AP entails meeting 
that of safety. As the argument is initiated from the principle of protection from errors 
on safety’s part rather than specific safety conditions, the entailment follows regardless 
of whether one employs the anti-luck or anti-risk approach. Similar entailment results 
can be devised for sensitivity theorists, if one commits to a subjective sensitivity norm 
ruling that one should not believe P if one considers one’s method is insensitive. 
Consider, for example: 
 
(S SENSITIVE) If one considers that certain M would lead to one’s belief that P 
regardless of whether P is true, then one should not form any belief that P by M.17 
 
5.5 Concluding remarks—epistemic norms and the elimination of luck in AP 
Knowledge demands a certain degree of protection from errors, and the safety 
principle is the most direct way of addressing this issue. In this chapter, I propose that 
given a very plausible epistemic norm in subjective safety, the adequate process 
condition would entail safety, and thereby offers the protection from errors knowledge 
requires. 
 
Moving forward, in chapter 6 I shall continue to explore on the role of epistemic norms 
                                                          
17 To my ears, this norm seems less intuitive than its safety counterpart. As argued in 5.3.2, there are 
reasons not to follow such a norm. The point here however is that the AP view is versatile in 
accommodating various principles depending on one’s theoretical commitments. 
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in AP. In particular, I will extend the theoretical framework of AP to epistemic 
justification, and examine whether knowledge and justification fit well with each other 
under the AP view. I shall also argue that justification thus construed is ecumenical in 
nature, and consider several interesting implications of such an account for puzzling 









Adequately Informed Process and Justification 
 
6.1 Holistic approach in Knowledge and Justification 
Roughly, one knows just in case one’s belief forming process remains intact when the 
entire situation is unveiled. In the previous chapters I explored the possibility of this 
view of knowledge and distinguished it from other prominent views as being a holistic 
approach to epistemic evaluations. In particular, I considered how examining the 
epistemic significance of individual epistemic components from the holistic perspective 
would give us new ways of responding to challenging cases. It seems to me that this 
holistic take on knowledge is really a general approach and can be applied to other 
epistemic notions. This chapter is thus a speculative attempt to extend holistic 
epistemology beyond the concept of knowledge—I shall explore what a holistic take 
on epistemic justification1 would look like (in a nutshell).2 
 
Traditionally, the tie between knowledge and justification is close—it is commonly 
thought that if one knows that P then one is justified in believing that P. In the post-
Gettier era of epistemology, many epistemologists continued to consider justification 
as an essential component of the notion of knowledge; others however began to 
question whether knowledge requires justification (particularly by internalist lights). 
Even for epistemologists who consider knowledge as a basic epistemic concept, its 
relation to justification remains intimate3. 
 
                                                          
1 There’s a common distinction between pro tanto and all things considered justification. Following the 
holistic approach and from my previous discussion of the AP account of knowledge one can naturally 
expect that it is the latter (being epistemically justified taking everything into account) that I am up to 
here. 
2 I cannot stress enough that such a view is tentative and is meant only to explore on the possibility of 
extending the applications of the holistic approach. I’m not naïve enough to believe that a new theory 
of justification can be motivated in one chapter. Indeed, as we shall see the proposed view on 
justification share many affinities with existing accounts (perhaps revamped with a holistic lens). 
3 Littlejohn (2012) for example examined the epistemic norm that one ought not be justified that P 
unless one knows that P. 
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By viewing epistemic justification from the holistic perspective I do not intend to 
develop a substantial account that I consider to be better than other candidates on the 
market—in fact my tentative account would end up being similar to some of the existing 
views. Instead, the proposed account is meant to compliment the AP view on 
knowledge (APK), as one might expect. Call such an account the Adequately Informed 
Process Account of Justification (APJ). In the following sections I shall articulate the 
account, examine some of its characteristics, and investigate the relation between APK 
and APJ to see what they predict regarding knowledge and justification. 
 
6.2 The Adequately informed process view on justification 
6.2.1 Outlining the account 
Let’s start with the AP view on knowledge articulated in chapter 2. 
 
APK: S knows that P just in case S comes to believe P via process M in the actual 
world, and is ideally permitted to continue believing P via M had S obtained the 
information regarding the entire situation U. 
 
How would an AP view on justification be different from APK? A common view in 
epistemology is that while knowledge is factive, justification is not4. Consequently, 
knowledge imposes a more stringent requirement on the external states of affairs—
not only should the agent display good grounds for the belief(s), the world has to 
cooperate as well such that what the agent believes accord with the actual situation. 
This is reflected in many of the accounts of knowledge where a specified connection 
between agent and the world is essential—look no further than the current proposed 
view, where one’s process is scrutinised against the whole epistemic situation. 
Epistemic justification, on the other hand, intuitively is not constrained by the world in 
this manner—in particular, it seems that there can be justified false beliefs. Instead, 
justification mainly imposes requirements on the agent’s part—of being a capable or 
responsible belief former. Note that this is not to say that epistemic justification does 
not care about whether the belief so formed is true—aiming at truths, as we shall soon 
see, indeed seems to be an important goal as one seeks to justify a belief. The point 
                                                          
4 Having said that, factive views on justification are given a more serious consideration in recent years 
(see Littlejohn, 2012). 
147 
 
is that, unlike knowledge, a subject S can be justified in believing that P while failing 
to secure the truth of P—that is, despite S’s reasonable efforts in doing so (with what 
is available to him/her). Suppose this is what characteristically distinguishes 
knowledge and justification, one might expect respective accounts of the two notions 
to reflect such a distinction—while knowledge assessments take into account the 
entire epistemic situation, justification assessments take into account the entire 
epistemic situation available to S. That is, instead of putting S’s process on trial against 
the totality of states of affairs U, APJ limits the relevant information for assessments to 
S’s total evidence (E).5 Consider below the adequately informed process account for 
justification. 
 
APJ: S is justified in believing that P just in case S comes to believe P via process 
M in the actual world, and is ideally permitted to believe P via M under S’s total 
evidence E. 
 
Like that of APK, S’s process M is good enough if it is acceptable in the ideal epistemic 
situation regarding P. Unlike APK, such ideality is restricted to what the agent has as 
evidence—that is to say, if APJ is satisfied, an ideally rational agent with S’s total 
evidence would deem it acceptable to believe P via M. Since an epistemic agent is 
always in possession of his/her own total evidence at the time (unlike APK with U), 
what characterises the idealised epistemic situation for APJ is just the agent’s 
epistemic practice—while S and the ideal agent are stipulated to be informationally on 
par, the latter forms beliefs in accordance with all normative ideals regarding the 
epistemic. Similar to APK, note that this is not to say that another agent would be 
required in the epistemic evaluation of APJ (nor that S is required to be on par with 
such an agent’s ideal epistemic standard), rather this only outlines the standard to 
which S is being evaluated against—being justified is a matter of meeting the 
normative standards (deemed acceptable, not perfectly ideal) as an epistemic agent 
with his/her belief formation in lights of the information available to him/her. I shall 
elaborate of the notion of acceptable ideality in the coming section (6.2.3). 
 
                                                          
5 Similar with U, I assume here that evidence is propositional. A body of evidence consists in a set of 
propositions. Staying with the ecumenical spirit, the APJ view is open to any account of what is 
considered an evidence. 
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6.2.2 Epistemic norms and justification 
With the unbeknownst information out of the picture of epistemic evaluation for APJ, 
the major factor affecting justification consists in the holistic performance of M given 
what S has as evidence. Importantly, such performance is evaluated against M’s 
accordance with all epistemic normative ideals. A full account of APJ thus requires 
more elaborations on the relationship between S’s process, his/her total evidence and 
various epistemic norms. 
 
Norms are rules that instruct us what we ought to do—since our major concern in APJ 
is how an agent forms his/her beliefs, let’s focus our discussion on relevant norms that 
guide our belief formation, instead of assertions or other actions. Suppose an ideal 
agent would form his/her beliefs exactly as he/she should do, given his/her evidence. 
Since the account involves an ideal epistemic agent, it can be suggested that I follow 
a ‘virtue approach’ to epistemic norms. Consider such approach outlined by Sarah 
Wright (2014). 
 
One ought to believe p only if the intellectually virtuous person would believe p in 
similar circumstances.6 
 
It is noteworthy that Zagzebski (1996) actually proposed something very close to this 
as an account of justified beliefs, which reflects the plausible intimate relation between 
such a norm of belief and the notion of justification. On this score, APJ is in turn very 
close to Zagzebski’s view. On the other hand, like APK, I take APJ to be an ecumenical 
approach—an intellectually virtuous person would have various aspects of ‘ought’ to 
consider when deciding whether to form certain belief(s). Certain epistemic norms 
would be in play in some epistemic situation and less significant in others. An 
intellectually virtuous person is one who always ‘does the right thing’ all things 
(epistemically) considered, when it comes to belief formation. 
 
With regards to what one ought to believe, Wright discusses a helpful distinction from 
the ancient Greek tradition that illustrates two goals an inquirer might pursue—
between telos (final end) and skopos (local target). As Wright explained, a doctor’s 
                                                          
6 Wright (2014), p. 240. 
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target (or skopos) when practicing medicine skills is to save the life of the patient—
however, inevitably people might still die despite the doctor’s making all the right 
decisions in the practice. It seems that whether the patient is saved and whether the 
doctor has practiced medicine well are separate matters—and it is the latter, argued 
the Stoics, that determines whether one is a good doctor and is the overall final aim 
(telos) of being a doctor. Analogously, when it comes to epistemic evaluations, there 
are two aims an inquirer strives for—obtaining true beliefs, and demonstrating good 
belief forming practices. Thus, Wright introduced what she called the ‘dual-aspect 
norms of belief’. 
 
One ought to believe p only if one can believe it 
(1) in accordance with the intellectual virtues 
(2) with the aim of believing the truth78 
 
Just as in the practice of medicine, these two goals can come apart. Consider the 
following epistemic case by Wright. 
 
Koko is given the choice between what is in envelope A and what is in envelope 
B. Koko knows that a die was cast, and if it turned up 1 then $100 was put into 
envelope A. She also knows that another die was cast for envelope B, and if it 
turned up 1, 2, 3, or 4 a $100 bill was placed in that envelope. Both envelopes are 
sealed in front of her. Which should Koko take? Given this information it seems 
rational for her to take envelope B since it is four times more likely to give her the 
same payoff. But there are general probabilities and there is what happened this 
time. As it happens there is $100 in envelope A and nothing in envelope B. So 
there is some reason to choose envelope A—it will make Koko richer. Of course, 
she doesn’t know this. Which envelope ought Koko to choose? 
 
It can be argued that norm (1) requires Koko to take envelope B, in that she ought to 
follow probability as a guide to her decision—choosing an envelope that has a higher 
chance for her to gain $100 (and more relevantly, to be correct with regards to 
                                                          
7 Or ‘any appropriate epistemic aim’, in Wright’s modified account. Note that I would stick with the 
truth aim in my discussion to simplify the matter. 
8 Wright (2014), p. 246. 
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determining which envelope contains $100) is the rational move, given what she 
knows; on the other hand, there is another sense in which she ought to choose 
envelope A. She would have been $100 richer doing so—but not only that, as norm 
(2) instructs, this would be the right move as she would be actually choosing correctly 
with regards to determining which envelope contains $100. 
 
Following Zagzebski, when it comes to justification, it seems that (1) is the norm to be 
prioritised. Again, this is not to say that justified beliefs do not aim at obtaining truths—
that remains the target for a good belief forming practice. However, when things 
happen out of the agent’s control (situation unknown to the agent) and his/her beliefs 
are false, the fact that he/she adopts a good belief forming practice should remain 
intact. Insofar as APJ concerns the ideality of S’s belief forming process with regards 
to what S has as evidence, it is the norm of following intellectual virtues that is in play 
for epistemic justification. 
 
Intriguingly, such dual-aspect norms of belief would converge in APK—in that when it 
comes to the notion of knowledge, one cannot successfully follow norm (1) without 
also successfully following norm (2)9. As all propositions (including ones unavailable 
to S) are taken into account in knowledge evaluations, the truth of the target 
proposition is included in U. If we assume that an ideal epistemic agent follows the 
truth norm of belief, whatever Si believes given the whole story U would always be 
true. 
 
S is justified in believing P just in case an ideal epistemic agent would deem it 
acceptable to form the belief via the same process given S’s evidence. Similar to APK, 
the relation between S’s belief formation and normative ideals can be expressed in 
formal terms. Suppose all accessible possible worlds are ranked by a set of epistemic 
normative ideals N10—such that the ideality of a possible world W is determined by 
                                                          
9 Another interesting note is that the other way around doesn’t seem to stand—say in case of TEMP 
discussed in previous chapters, Temp’s process successfully tracks true temperature beliefs across 
wide class of similar scenarios, but it would not be adopted by an ideal epistemic agent with perfect 
information. 
10 Following Kratzer (1981, 1991) and Beddor (2017), who also rank worlds by some normative 
standard N—Beddor (2017) in particular adopts such modal framework in articulating his view on 
justification as a specific type of deontological modal. Another approach to justification by Smith 
(2016) also involves world ordering in terms of what he called ‘normalcy’ of worlds, presumably 
involving a metaphysical rendering of normality for possible worlds. APJ here is different from these 
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the degree to which it accords with N. Since we are concerned with the epistemic 
justification of our beliefs, suppose further that N consists specifically of epistemic 
norms of belief. Call the set of worlds that aligns perfectly with N ideal epistemic worlds 
Wi. A process M for believing P is ideal just in case S forms the belief via M in at least 
one Wi. 
 
6.2.3 Ranking ideality, and degrees of justification 
Requiring one’s process to be ideal in this sense seems to be too strong for the notion 
of epistemic justification—it would be too much to expect our everyday belief formation 
to be in perfect accordance with all relevant norms of belief. Thus, similar to APK, we 
need a more tolerant account where suboptimal (but good enough) M would still 
constitute justified beliefs (cf. acceptable ideality in 2.3.1). Suppose S believes that 
there’s a sheep in the field. Normally speaking we would think that S’s visual 
recognition of it being a sheep would suffice in justifying the belief. But such a process 
is arguably short of optimal—an ideal agent can surely improve on M by also taking 
into account information from other sensory modalities, the sounds of the sheep 
bleating, the smell of the sheep, the softness of the wool on it—if S is determined to 
make it right, he could even do a genetic test on the sheep. On the one hand, S in this 
case is providing more evidence to support his sheep belief; on the other, given that 
all the evidence is available to S all along, S with the improved process M’ forms his 
belief in a more ideal fashion compared to M—giving oneself the best shot in securing 
true beliefs is presumably a normative ideal with regards to belief formation, and M’ 
definitely fares better than M on this score. 
 
Insofar as we grant that visual recognition alone in S’s sheep belief constitutes 
justification, epistemic justification does not seem to require one’s process to be 
perfectly ideal with respect to norms of belief; instead, M only needs to be ‘adequately 
ideal’, in the sense that N would characterise M as an acceptable process (i.e. ideally 
permitted) with regards to forming the target belief P, given what S has as evidence. 
As a holistic approach, such an epistemic evaluation would involve the entire process 
M (see chapter 4 for the epistemic significance of assessing one’s process ‘as a whole’) 
                                                          
existing frameworks in that what ranks the worlds for APJ are epistemic normative ideals pertaining to 
our belief formation. 
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being scrutinised by S’s total evidence (see chapter 3 for holistic assessments of 
epistemic situation) for its overall performance vis-à-vis a variety of epistemic norms. 
This makes APJ a hybrid account on justification—there is in principle no one 
predominant norm which constitutes justification by itself, some process would score 
better on certain norms and some on others. Say, a process may enjoy excellent 
support from statistical evidence but falls short when it comes to the modal risk of 
errors; another process may be praised for being epistemically cautious in belief 
formation but subject to criticism for being too dogmatic once a judgment is formed. 
According to the APJ view, S’s belief is justified if the process’ ‘overall score’ of ideality 
given E is acceptable—when there is at least one acceptable world Wacc (that is, 
worlds that align with N to a significant degree, albeit not perfectly) such that S forms 
the belief via M. This is what ‘ideally permitted’ amounts to in APJ. 
 
It is a common view that justification comes in degrees. A natural way for the proposed 
APJ view to account for such a phenomenon is to dissect further among Wacc and rank 
them by the extent to which they accord with N. Worlds ranked beyond the acceptable 
sphere contains processes that constitute unjustified beliefs. On the other hand, 
worlds in Wi contain ideal processes that amount to the maximum degree of 
justification, in that the way S forms the target belief follows all relevant epistemic 
norms to perfection11. In between the two extremes lie instances of justified beliefs we 
commonly encounter everyday as epistemic agents—a spectrum of justified beliefs 
within Wacc such that their justifiedness can be further ranked by their degrees of 
alignment with N. M1 constitutes more justification to P than M2 just in case the world 
W1 where S believes P via the former aligns better with N compared to the world W2 
where S believes P via the latter. 
 
6.3 Exploring further characteristics of justification under APJ 
6.3.1 Minimal ability condition 
In chapter 4, I argued that knowledge at least requires one’s cognitive success to be 
a product of one’s cognitive competence. With certain modifications, I suggest that 
some form of minimal ability condition likewise applies for APJ. While cognitive 
                                                          
11 Presumably, this is what an ideal epistemic agent would do whenever he/she forms a belief. I list it 




success is not necessary (as far as APJ is concerned justified beliefs needn’t be true), 
one’s belief forming process M that constitutes justification should still be a product of 
one’s own competence—so that one can claim epistemic ownership of one’s justified 
beliefs (see chapter 4 for similar remarks on knowledge). 
 
Since cognitive success is not required, one would naturally expect that the creditable 
relation between success and competence would not apply either. It is true that in case 
of justified belief what the epistemic agent aims (skopos) is also to obtain true beliefs, 
however, only norm (1) outlined by Wright concerning intellectual virtues is necessary 
in APJ—so long as S’s belief is formed as an intellectually virtuous agent does, APJ 
allows M to simply aim at truths but play no significant role in securing them in the 
actual world. 
 
6.3.2 APK and APJ 
One of the main questions this chapter seeks to explore is the picture of the 
knowledge-justification relation under the proposed account of adequately informed 
process. In particular, consider a common supposition regarding the relation between 
the two notions—does knowing that P entail being justified in believing that P? 
Knowledge and justification under the AP view clearly have a close tie to one 
another—both involve a holistic epistemic evaluation of the agent’s belief forming 
process, impose a suboptimal but ‘good enough’ requirement to the process, where 
the epistemic goodness of M is measured with respect to its overall alignment with 
epistemic norms of belief. The defining feature that distinguishes APK and APJ rests in 
the scope of information relevant to their respective epistemic evaluations—while APK 
looks into the entire epistemic situation U for relevant information regarding P, APJ 
only considers the total evidence E that is available to the agent. 
 
Intuitively, conditions laid down in APK seem to be more stringent than that of APJ as 
the former demands a process to survive scrutiny of a bigger picture (S’s evidence 
and the rest of information S is not aware of) compared to the latter (which concerns 
only S’s evidence). Indeed, as U consists of all propositions in the situation, E is a 
subset of U. As a result, any M that is good enough for the entire state of affairs would 
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seemingly be good enough for the state of affairs that S grasps (for it is just part of the 
entire states of affairs). If this is so, then satisfying APK entails satisfying APJ. 
 
Can there be cases of APK without APJ? Can it be that the information S is unaware 
of actually undermines some of the evidence S has in E which speaks against P—
such that S’s process, despite not adequate from S’s perspective, is all in all adequate 
from the holistic point of view? Recall the case of misleading defeat in TOM GRABIT—
suppose now the misleading defeater DM (that Mrs Grabit testifies that the person in 
the library was not Tom) is available to S in his total evidence, considering only what 
is available to S (i.e. E), wouldn’t an ideal epistemic agent judge that S’s process is 
unacceptable (that is, to continue in believing what he saw and disregard Mrs Grabit 
testimony)? I grant that in this case APJ is not met, but it is also clear to me that 
knowledge is undermined as well. Surely, that Mrs Grabit is a pathological liar would 
amount to a defeat against DM. However, this is no reason for the original process to 
disregard Mrs Grabit testimony—for all S initially know Mrs Grabit’s (being the mother 
of Tom) testimony should be considered legitimate. APK concerns how one’s original 
process fares in the entire situation, if the original process involves disregarding 
seemingly legitimate defeaters, it strikes me that an ideal epistemic agent would not 
regard it as an acceptable way of forming beliefs—even though the defeater turns out 
to be misleading when one is perfectly informed. Indeed, this affords an explanation 
to why all psychological defeaters (misleading or genuine) are knowledge 
undermining—it violates our norms of belief that legitimate evidence ought to be 
respected. 
 
More generally, consider what a situation would look like if APK is met and APJ falls 
short—an ideal epistemic agent would form the target belief via M given the whole 
story but would not do so given the available evidence. This seems to be a deeply 
puzzling epistemic position to hold. 
 
Another interesting note on the relation between knowledge and justification pertains 
to the degrees of justification. It appears that how justified one’s belief is and whether 
it constitutes knowledge do not display a robust correlation—in that more justified 
beliefs do not secure knowledge any better than less justified ones. As stated above, 
knowledge requires the external world to cooperate with our best cognitive efforts. 
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Going back to the sheep case in 6.2, when everything went well S’s visual recognition 
of the sheep would suffice for knowledge, while his gathering all sorts of justification 
(such as the genetic test results) can be in vain if he’s actually been radically deceived. 
The AP account is able to explain this phenomenon. In 6.2.3, the degree of justification 
is determined by the extent to which S’s belief formation aligns with relevant epistemic 
norms under S’s evidence. It strikes me that this sets the ceiling of epistemic status to 
M (a process devised under S’s evidence)—the ideality of S’s belief forming process 
is at best the extent it aligns with N given E, any further scrutiny of M from the situation 
unbeknownst to S would either make no impact or hinder the original alignment—it 
would be odd to think that some information S is unaware of would improve on S’s 
unenlightened process (with regards to following norm (1) anyway—M could turn out 
to be a better process than S expects with regards to aiming at truth due to some 
epistemically friendly circumstances unbeknownst to S). Now, a possible scenario 
where less justified beliefs (with process M) amount to knowledge while more justified 
ones (with process M’) fall short would be one where the entire situation U makes no 
impact to the ideality of M (an ideal agent would still consider forming the target belief 
via M acceptable all things considered), whereas the alignment of M’ to N is 
substantively undermined considering U (to the extent that an ideal agent would no 
longer form the target belief via M’ considering the entire situation)—despite the fact 
that initially M’ aligns more with N than M does given E. 
 
On a related note, a natural concern that follows is whether knowledge comes in 
degree just as justification does, given the close tie between APK and APJ. According 
to APK, one knows just in case one’s process is ideally acceptable with regards to 
relevant epistemic norms vis-à-vis the entire situation—doesn’t the satisfaction of 
norms N come in degree (just as in APJ), such that some process M aligns more with 
N than others given U? Is APK committed to the idea that some M constitutes ‘more 
knowledge’ than others for epistemic agents? While a few epistemologists may 
consider this as a theoretical advantage if a certain view predicts that knowledge is 
gradable12, many others would not receive such a consequence so well. As I view it, 
the AP view does not champion the gradability of knowledge any more than other 
accounts (who consider justification as a component of knowledge) do. What APK 
                                                          
12 Most notoriously, see Hetherington (2001). 
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amounts to is the idea that one knows when one is justified given the entire epistemic 
situation as evidence. If one is legitimate to issue concerns regarding gradability for 
knowledge thus construed, it shouldn’t be a problem particular to AP—rather it should 
be a challenge for any theorists who encompass justification (one way or another) into 
their knowledge views, that is, insofar as they are also committed to the standard view 
that justification is gradable.13 
 
6.4 APJ in application 
In the following section I shall apply APJ to a range of epistemological problems 
pertaining to justification. While I do not claim that APJ is able to offer the best 
resolutions to all of the problems presented, I do find it intriguing in how versatile the 
ecumenical account can be in the attempts of addressing them. I shall first examine 
APJ’s take on the new evil demon problem, and then proceed to discuss problems with 
multiple premise closure in the lottery and the preface paradoxes. 
 
6.4.1 Ideal epistemic agent vs new evil demon 
Suppose Smith and his epistemic counterpart Smitty are epistemically on par in terms 
of their intellectual capacities and information possessed. While Smith is a normal 
agent in an usually epistemically friendly environment, his counterpart Smitty is 
unfortunately victimised by an evil demon, who feeds Smitty with the same (but non-
veridical) experiences as Smith’s. Both Smith and Smitty are responsible epistemic 
agents (again, they are on par in this regard) who follow relevant epistemic norms in 
their belief formation. However, while Smith’s belief forming processes are generally 
reliable, all of Smitty’s processes are unreliable. 
 
                                                          
13 I shall attempt to give a prima facie response to this worry in general. While there are ways within 
one’s theoretical arsenal to account for a certain phenomenon (such as the gradability of K), it does 
not follow that our target notion must display such a phenomenon (and importantly, nor does it follow 
that one’s theory suggests so either). I consider AP advantageous in being able to account for 
gradable justification within its theoretical framework, but that doesn’t mean that one must commit to 
gradability of knowledge or justification as well. Consider when one is taking a test and 50 is the 
passing score. While there is a spectrum of passing scores which consists of various degrees of 
performance (50-100), the availability of such further performance assessments wouldn’t undermine 
the fact that ‘passing’ remains an absolute notion. Similar things could be said about knowledge. Take 
APK for example, while the passing line is drawn by acceptable ideality, one’s belief-forming process 
can surely perform better in terms of its alignment with N. However, it strikes me that such better 
performances needn’t be related to the notion of knowledge in any ways familiar to our understanding 
of the latter—not any more than the relation between the evaluations of passing and achieving high 
marks in a test. 
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The new evil demon is a common problem raised by epistemic internalists in their 
critique of justification theories that demand certain level of truth conduciveness in S’s 
belief forming processes. As epistemic counterparts Smith and Smitty are equally 
responsible epistemic agents who possess the same amount of evidence, it is argued 
that they should not differ in epistemic justification. This is at odds with process 
reliabilism, and possibly other externalist theories of justification, which would typically 
consider Smitty’s systematically unreliable beliefs as unjustified. 
 
Of course, one way to tackle the new evil demon challenge is to reject that Smith and 
Smitty possess the same amount of evidence. A considerable number of 
epistemologists14 think that while Smith has as evidence the proposition that ‘I have 
two hands’, Smitty does not possess such evidence—for his apparent hand-
experiences are non-veridical. As mentioned in fn. 5, APJ is open to any account of 
evidence—if one subscribes to views like E=K, Smitty is at least less justified in many 
of his beliefs compared to Smith. Considering what he has as evidence (note that all 
his non-veridical experiences wouldn’t count) his beliefs are clearly not as well 
supported as Smith’s.15  
 
However, not everyone is willing to bite the bullet and suggest that Smitty is really less 
justified. For the sake of argument I would grant that Smitty and Smith are evidentially 
on par, and explore how APJ might address the new evil demon in a more internalist 
friendly fashion. In this regard, it is not difficult to see how AP fits naturally with the 
responsibilist intuition in the new evil demon. Insofar as Smith and Smitty have the 
equal amount of evidence (as we granted) and their belief formations align with the 
epistemic ideals N just as well (for they are epistemic duplicates), APJ would have no 
problem in assenting that they are on par in their justification statuses. 
 
6.4.2 Lottery, preface, and the hybrid nature of APJ 
Before getting into various paradoxes, it is important to note that there would be 
instances where justification ascriptions are less intuitive. The difficulty of making 
judgements is often inherited from the paradoxical nature of the cases. Thus, it is not 
                                                          
14 Most notably, Williamson (2000), see also Unger (1975), Littlejohn (2012). 
15 Note that for Littlejohn (2012), Smitty in this case would even be outright unjustified in many of his 
beliefs because they are non-veridical. 
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the aim of APJ to offer definitive verdicts to every troubling scenario. Instead, it would 
be helpful enough for the proposed account to offer an explanation in its terms as to 
why the difficult cases are difficult. With this in mind, consider the lottery paradox. 
 
Tommy enters a lottery. There are 1000 balls in the lottery, each corresponds to 
a ticket and exactly one winner would be drawn out. Tommy holds ticket number 
1. The drawing had just taken place. While Tommy had not checked the results, 
he judges that winning the lottery would be a highly unlikely event (the chance of 
him winning is 0.001). Reasoning from this statistical unlikelihood Tommy forms 
the belief that ticket number 1 is a loser (L1). 
 
While there’s undoubtedly some good reasons for Tommy to believe L1, it seems 
puzzling in that Tommy is reluctant to claim that his ticket is a loser merely from 
his statistical grounds—as he had not checked the lottery result, ticket 1 could 
very well be the winner due to incredible luck. What is more puzzling is that, if 
Tommy follows the same reasoning in believing L1, he would have equally good 
grounds in believing that other tickets are losers too (L2, L3, L4, …, L1000). But this 
cannot be true, as Tommy also knows that there is exactly one winner. 
 
The question at hand, first and foremost, is whether Tommy’s belief that L1 is justified. 
Different theorists disagree in verdicts in this regard. Process reliabilism is usually 
unpacked in probabilistic terms—a belief is reliably formed (and therefore justified) if 
its corresponding process has a high enough level of truth conduciveness, yielding 
more true beliefs than false ones. According to this account, Tommy’s lottery belief is 
justified—basing on the statistical evidence his L1 belief is highly likely to be true 
(P(L1|E)=0.999). On the other hand, there can be alternative views which reject the 
probabilistic take on justification. For example, Smith (2016) argued that despite being 
highly likely, the falsehood of L1 is in some sense a modally close scenario—nothing 
abnormal needs to happen for ticket 1 to be the winner. Smith thus developed a theory 
of justification in terms of what he called ‘normalcy’. Since it is not out of normality or 
one’s expectation for any given ticket to win, the sheer probabilistic evidence that ticket 




APJ is a hybrid view where both probabilistic and modal facets of one’s process can 
be taken into consideration. While Tommy’s process aligns with certain normative 
ideals in that it yields mostly true beliefs; it departs from other ideals such as ‘forming 
your belief in such a way to avoid close error possibilities’. For this reason, it is fair to 
say that any belief formed purely on the basis of probabilistic evidence is at best 
suboptimal. The question remains, however, whether such a less than ideal process 
is adequate enough for justification—whether M aligns with N to a sufficient extent, 
under the APJ framework. This is a hard judgement to call, and would vary depending 
on how one weighs the roles of probabilistic and modal likelihood respectively in N. 
Personally, I’m inclined to think that the extremely high degree of (purely) probabilistic 
evidence would suffice in justifying beliefs—given Tommy’s information, an ideal 
epistemic agent would consider Tommy’s probabilistic reasoning as an acceptable 
way to form his belief that L1. This is by no means the orthodox verdict of APJ—people 
who renounce probabilistic evidence as acceptable grounds may well deny justification 
in Tommy’s case while endorsing APJ, they would just suggest that an ideal agent 
wouldn’t consider Tommy’s process as acceptable. 
 
As noted above, another puzzling thing about the lottery case is that, while Tommy’s 
belief that his ticket is a loser seems to be justified from his probabilistic grounds, he 
is reluctant to declaring its truth (L1). If one is committed to the knowledge norm of 
assertion, however, a potential explanation might be available—one can maintain that 
Tommy’s justified belief that L1 falls short of knowledge, and since one ought not assert 
a proposition unless one knows it, Tommy’s reluctance to assert L1 is epistemically 
appropriate. In other words, if APK falls short in Tommy’s case, the AP view would be 
well positioned to explain Tommy’s reluctance to claim L1. The question that remains 
is this: would APK be satisfied purely on the basis of probabilistic evidence? Let’s 
explore on two potential reasons why APK arguably falls short. 
 
In the story, it is specified that the lottery had taken place. Thus, the totality of situation 
U includes the truth of whether L1 (let’s suppose that ticket 1 indeed loses in that case). 
One strategy of arguing that sheer statistical evidence does not amount to knowledge 
is to point out that Tommy’s probabilistic reasoning ceases to be an acceptable way 
of belief formation after he is perfectly informed about the situation (in particular, the 
lottery result). When everything is uncovered and the result is available to enlightened 
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Tommy, there would be numerous ways to obtain the truth that L1—for example, by 
reading the newspaper/TV broadcast announcements, by witnessing the draw in 
person etc. However, that the ticket is highly likely to lose isn’t one of the viable ways, 
it would seem—why would Tommy settle for sheer chance (/consider it good enough) 
if confirmation of the truth is readily available? Suppose Tommy’s friend Ellie wonders 
about the lottery result. Learning that Tommy has been perfectly informed on this 
matter, she asked him whether L1. Imagine now if Tommy told Ellie ticket 1 is a loser 
because its chance of winning is incredibly slim, Ellie would hardly consider this an 
informative response. ‘Yes, we all knew the chance was slim. But is L1 actually the 
case for this instance? I thought you told me you were informed about the result!’ If we 
concede that Ellie’s criticism to Tommy’s response is legitimate, it would seem that 
sheer probabilistic grounds wouldn’t be acceptable when the agent has other means 
to confirm what actually obtained (which is always the case if the agent is perfectly 
informed).16 
 
Let’s consider an alternative strategy. Another way to show how Tommy’s process fall 
short of knowledge is to suggest that it is unsafe (Pritchard 2005)—as there is a close 
possibility that ticket 1 is the winner (all it has to happen is that a different ball in the 
vicinity is drawn). Insofar as an ideal epistemic agent is unwilling to adopt a process 
that would have easily led to false beliefs (see the subjective safety (SS) principle 
discussed in chapter 5) Tommy’s statistical evidence would not be sufficient for 
knowledge. A potential objection to this approach is to suggest that similar things can 
be said about justification as well, it would seem. Unlike Gettier cases, the case of 
lottery does not involve any significant epistemic difference between E and U—
probabilistic evidence seems to offer the same evidential support for P regardless of 
                                                          
16 While this line of argument (together with its interesting verdict) seems plausible, I must admit that I 
have some reservations in fully embracing it. In particular, the APK view is developed from Foley’s 
observations on ‘knowledge stories’ (cases where knowledge is undermined due to some important 
details of the story the agent had missed) and is intended to address them first and foremost. We 
should be cautious in applying APK to explain other epistemic phenomena, especially when it is clear 
that lottery cases like Tommy’s aren’t quite the same in structure compared to knowledge stories—
Tommy’s probabilistic support for P itself isn’t undermined by any fact unbeknownst to him in the 
situation, he knew it all along that sheer chance doesn’t confirm what actually obtains. Even if we 
concede with the above argument that Tommy’s original probabilistic support is not acceptable after 
he has been perfectly informed, it might well be a result of some very different epistemic reasons 
(than why a process doesn’t survive in knowledge stories we previously discussed). My hunch is that 
this has to do with the relation between probabilistic evidence and full belief, as well as how 




whether E and U is under consideration. Why consider APJ satisfied, when given E 
Tommy’s process would have easily led to false beliefs? One way of addressing the 
challenge is to suggest that knowledge and justification impose different requirements 
with regards to the processes’ alignments with N—while the former demands safety 
(more precisely, the SS norm) as a minimal requirement for acceptable ideality, the 
latter doesn’t. Indeed, bearing in mind how probabilistic evidence is a controversial 
kind of evidence in its own right, it wouldn’t be so surprising that two epistemic notions 
(knowledge and epistemic justification) place different weights on its significance. 
 
If one accepts one of the two arguments above, Tommy’s belief that L1 amounts to 
justification (plausibly) but not knowledge under the AP view—he has good reason to 
think that L1 is true given his evidence, but such reason has not done enough in 
securing L1’s truth for knowledge (perhaps due to its modal fragility). Going back to 
the puzzle we started with, this explains why Tommy is hesitant to announce that his 
ticket has lost—if assertions requires a higher standard of certainty, such that one 
ought not assert P unless one knows that P, then it makes sense that Tommy, not 
knowing that his ticket has lost, is not prepared to make such a claim. 
 
Another puzzling thought outlined above concerns whether justification is closed under 
multiple premise entailment—if S is justified in believing P and justified in believing Q, 
while P^Q jointly entail R, would S then be justified in believing R? While the principle 
enjoys certain intuitive appeal, it often runs into dilemmas in concrete cases. In the 
lottery paradox, Tommy seems to have good probabilistic reasons to believe that each 
ticket is losing (L1, L2, L3, …, L1000), but L1, L2, L3, …, L1000 jointly entail that all tickets 
are losers. Following multiple premise closure of justification (MPCJ), Tommy would 
be justified in believing that all tickets are losers (L1-1000). But L1-1000 is clearly false—
for Tommy also reckons that one of the tickets must win. To APJ that allows for 
probabilistic evidence to be the sole grounds for justified beliefs, it follows that MPCJ 
does not hold—the probability would be steadily lowered as more propositions are 
added to the conjunction (L1^L2^L3…), when probabilistic reasoning is the only 
grounds for one’s beliefs, then at some point the conjunction would cease to be 
justified as the likelihood of its truth is no longer high enough. Another way for APJ to 
deny justification of L1-1000 in the lottery paradox is to suggest that an ideal agent would 
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not believe L1-1000 as there is a genuine psychological defeater to such belief—that 
one ticket is a winner. 
 
As I expressed earlier, this is not the only way APJ can go. Suppose one is committed 
to Smith’s (2016) view of justification and rejects that Tommy is justified in believing 
even a single lottery proposition in the first place, MPCJ  can be preserved for even L1 
would be considered unjustified. Nevertheless, arguments against MPCJ would 
likewise arise in other cases such as the preface paradox—and I suspect that APJ 
would offer a different treatment according to the theorists’ commitments. To see this, 
consider the preface paradox17. 
 
Imagine someone had just completed a long and masterful book on certain topic. 
In the preface of the book, however, the author concedes that she is sure that 
there will be some mistakes she made here and there in the book. This doesn’t 
negate that she is a rigorous and intellectually virtuous researcher (if anything 
conceding possible mistakes and owning responsibilities even display intellectual 
humility on her part)—she seeks to justify every claim she made in the book with 
relevant evidence to the best of her ability. Again, we come to a dilemma of 
justifying a conjunctive proposition, this time with non-probabilistic evidential 
support—it seems that each of the claims the author made in the book is 
independently well justified, but due to the overwhelming number of claims made 
in the book, it is highly unlikely (thus hard for her to justifiably believe) that no false 
claims were made (P1-N). 
 
Smith’s theory of justification maintains that the author is indeed justified in believing 
the conjunctive proposition that all claims in the book are true. Just as in the lottery 
case, the reason supporting P1-N is purely probabilistic—the author has no particular 
reason of doubting any of the claims she made, other than the fact that the chance of 
it to all be true considering the size of the book is extremely low. But probabilistic 
likelihood is not what constitutes justification according to Smith’s account—the author 
should have no problem believing P1-N because it being true is among the most normal 
scenarios that could happen (there needs to be no explanation for it to hold given the 
                                                          
17 Introduced by David Makinson (1965). 
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author’s evidence, in this sense, P1-N is expected to hold despite the low chance); 
instead, for there to be any claims in the book to turn out be false (¬P1-N), there needs 
to be certain explanation to account for the mishaps (after all, the author had been 
extremely diligent in offering evidence for each of the claim in the book). When it 
comes to believing in accordance to normality in Smith’s terms, P1-N indeed has the 
edge over ¬P1-N. If this is so, MPCJ remains intact under Smith’s account—the author 
is justified in each individual claim she made in the book, and she is justified in 
believing that all claims in the book are true as well.18 
 
Let’s consider the versatility of APJ as a hybrid account here. Epistemologists who 
hold the normic view on justification can still embrace APJ by holding that following the 
‘normic’ norm of belief (that one ought to calibrate one’s beliefs according to what 
would normally be the case) is a minimal requirement for acceptable ideality—
processes with purely probabilistic grounds would therefore be unjustified. MPCJ 
under APJ thus construed can be preserved—should the theorist also think that the 
perfect alignment of the author’s process with the normic norm outweighs its violation 
of the probabilistic norm (that one ought to form one’s beliefs in accordance with the 
probabilistic likelihood of their truths). The flexibility comes in, however, when one 
considers an APJ view where the two norms are both considerably respected in 
various degrees. Here’s a proposed view of weighing the two norms where both the 
lottery and the preface paradoxes can be accommodated (alas, to my liking at least). 
Suppose as we do above in the lottery case that the mere alignment with the 
probabilistic norm (to a high degree) is a suboptimal but acceptable way of belief 
formation. This is at odds with the idea that the normic norm constitutes a minimal 
requirement for acceptable ideality, but compatible with the supposition that the 
alignment with the normic norm is to be prioritised over that of the probabilistic norm 
when it comes to ranking ideality. If we allow for all that in our APJ view, our justification 
verdicts can accommodate difficult cases of various sorts—in the lottery Tommy would 
be justified (but not know) in believing that L1 but not justified in believing that L1-1000; 
                                                          
18 Smith (2016), Ch. 4. Indeed, preserving MPCJ is one of the theoretical advantages Smith considers 
the normic account possesses over the probabilistic view. 
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while in the preface the author would be justified in believing both P1 and P1-N.19 More 
importantly, they would be justified in virtue of following different norms. 
 
Admittedly, in virtue of considering mere probabilistic grounds as an acceptable 
process in the lottery case, MPCJ would not hold in APJ thus construed. However, I 
think this is to be expected from a hybrid account of justification which weighs various 
norms of belief in a holistic epistemic assessment. If there is a variety of ways a belief 
can obtain justification, why suppose that they all fall under one particular epistemic 
principle? In Foley’s words, ‘Knowledge is a mutt. Proper pedigree is not required.’20 
It strikes me that the similarly inspired AP view on justification may display such feature 
as well. Furthermore, as a holistic epistemology, it is assumed that the epistemic 
significance of individual justification relations would change in the grand scheme of 
things, and the justification evaluation of the entire epistemic status of conjunctive 
propositions like L1-1000 or P1-N might not be fully appreciated while we fix our gazes at 
individual justified beliefs that constitute them (this is evident as we observe how the 
alignments with N is a dynamic matter that changes as more conjuncts are added). As 
a general remark, keeping in mind that epistemic phenomena inevitably involve our 
cognitive characters, one must consider formal epistemic principles like MPCJ with 
particular caution—the complexity and totality of our cognitive lives might not ‘add up’ 
as we expected they do in the realm of logic. 
 
6.4.3 Postscript: Moral justification 
Just as we have epistemic reasons to believe such and such, we have moral reasons 
to act in the ways we do. As a general holistic approach evaluating cognitive 
phenomena against various norms, it seems that the adequately informed process 
view naturally extends to the overall moral evaluations of our actions. Since the AP 
account, evaluating belief formations by the ideal epistemic standard, can itself be 
viewed as an epistemic analogue of Aristotelian virtue ethics (as seen in the 
                                                          
19 Not all epistemologists would agree that the author is justified in P1-N, especially for people who do 
not think MPCJ holds in the first place. But this further shows the adaptability of APJ, which can 
postulate that the probabilistic norm is in turn a minimal requirement for acceptable ideality. If this is 
so, P1-N would no longer be justified for the author ought not believe something with such low chance 
of being true. Note that such a view is different from the simple probabilistic view as mere probabilistic 
grounds do not necessarily constitute justification, the probabilistic norm is just a minimal requirement 
and one can fall short of the overall acceptable ideality by violating multiple other norms. 
20 Foley (2012). 
165 
 
elaboration of APJ in 6.2)21, I again do not intend for the articulated AP account on 
moral reasons (APM) to be substantially different from the existing virtue theoretic 
approach. Instead, I only lay out the holistic account here to display how it fits well with 
its epistemic counterparts in APJ and APK. 
 
APME: S is justifiedE in an action Φ just in case S comes to the decision to Φ via 
decision-making process M in the actual world, and is ideally permitted to Φ via 
M under S’s total evidence E. 
 
APMU: S is justifiedU in an action Φ just in case S comes to the decision to Φ via 
decision-making process M in the actual world, and is ideally permitted to Φ via 
M given the entire situation U. 
 
APME and APMU are the moral counterparts of APJ and APK respectively. As in the 
epistemic AP view, moral evaluations under APME and APMU are measured against the 
holistic consideration of the set of all relevant moral normative ideals NM.22 S is morally 
justified just in case M is acceptably ideal with regards to NM—when there is at least 
one acceptable world Wacc (that is, worlds that align with NM to a significant degree, 
albeit not perfectly) such that S decides to Φ via M, given E or U. 
 
Another interesting note is that APME and APMU resonate with a common distinction 
between subjective and objective oughts in moral philosophy. 23  The difference 
between APME and APMU lies in whether telos is the exclusive goal one concerns for 
moral justification. Recall that a doctor can practice medicine well given what he knows 
despite making the decision that fails to save the patient (the local target of practising 
medicine, it is argued) due to conditions the doctor is (rightfully24) unaware. In such a 
case the doctor is justifiedE but not justifiedU in his decision to Φ. On the other hand, 
when it comes to APMU, the goals of telos and skopos converge—if APMU is satisfied, 
one cannot successfully fulfil telos without also successfully achieving skopos (that is, 
                                                          
21 I’m grateful to Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij for this methodological remark in a personal discussion. 
22 Which ones are relevant, and to what extent, is again a matter open for debate among moral 
philosophers. 
23 Thanks to Martin Smith for making me aware of this conceptual affinity. 
24 Cf. Stanford Goldberg’s work (2017) on practice-generated entitlement. As a practising professional 
there may be certain information that the doctor should have known—such that not knowing them is 
itself a violation to epistemic norms. 
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if saving the patient whenever possible is a moral mandate for acceptable ideality 
when it comes to practising medicine25). Consider the trolley problem more familiar to 
moral philosophers. Suppose one person is tied to the current track and Jones needs 
to decide whether to pull the lever to redirect the train saving the person. Unbeknownst 
to Jones, five people are tied to the idle track such that if Jones pulls the lever, they 
instead will die. Now, Jones opts to save the one person (unknowingly at the cost of 
five other lives). His decision is justifiedE but not justifiedU—he is justified to pull the 
lever in the sense that it is the right thing to do given what he knows (given his evidence, 
he thinks he is saving a life for no substantial moral cost); however, he shouldn’t have 
done it in the sense that the decision actually makes things worse (not to his 
awareness).26 Had Jones been adequately informed about the entire situation, the two 
justification verdicts would converge—both the right thing to do given what he knows 
and the right action that would actually make things better would be to not pull the 
lever (of course, given that Jones is committed to some form of consequentialism, see 
fn. 26). 
 
6.5 Concluding remarks—justification as an ecumenical evaluation of epistemic norms 
In this chapter, I present an adequately informed process account on epistemic 
justification. It is suggested that one’s belief is justified when it is acceptably ideal (with 
regards to relevant epistemic norms) given one’s total evidence. Not only do 
knowledge and justification fit well intuitively with each other under the AP view, they 
also resonate with the more familiar distinction of objective and subjective oughts in 
moral philosophy. In its applications, I argue that such an ecumenical account of 
justification demonstrates versatility, allowing for a variety of hybrid renderings that 
result in interesting verdicts regarding the lottery and the preface paradoxes. Thus, on 
a broader perspective, this chapter also demonstrates the potential benefits of 
embracing ecumenicity in epistemic evaluations. Particularly, in difficult cases where 
epistemic judgments are hard to call, keeping an ecumenical spirit may be 
                                                          
25 Just as believing the truth whenever possible is an epistemic mandate for acceptable ideality when 
it comes to belief formation. 
26 For the sake of illustrating telos and skopos here I’m simplifying the matter and assuming that some 
consequentialist norm of decision making serves as the predominant norm for moral evaluations. I 
leave it open for moral philosophers to debate whether this is really the case. Moral philosophers who 
differentiate between killing and letting die are welcome to devise their own scenarios to elucidate the 
distinction I made here. 
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explanatorily advantageous in understanding why our judgments could swing either 






An overall report card for AP 
 
If I have to summarise the current research project on epistemic evaluation, it would 
be holism and ecumenicity. 
 
It is when we evaluate our epistemic status holistically can we appreciate the full 
epistemic significance of our cognitive processes in the epistemic situation. This is 
argued negatively throughout the previous chapters. From the failure to always identify 
individual relevant important information in Foley’s account (chapter 1); from the 
accusation from gestalt psychology that psychological experiences cannot be 
accounted for merely by the individual psychological components composing them 
(chapter 2); and from the difficulties to determine the overall epistemic significance by 
evaluating individual process (chapter 4) and propositions in the epistemic situation 
(chapter 3). When we start to evaluate holistically, to see how our integrated cognitive 
process performs overall in the entire epistemic situation, we find out that it doesn’t 
matter whether particular propositions are knowledge undermining misleading 
defeaters—we just need to make sure that we are not overall misled in the epistemic 
situation; and it doesn’t matter that part of our individual cognitive process is vicious—
it suffices if our holistic process is virtuous enough. 
 
It is when we start to look for commonalities in epistemic cases of allegedly the same 
kind by IGA (instead of characterising them top-down with epistemological features by 
TIA) do we realise that these instances of epistemic status are characterised as the 
same kind (knowledge or justification) for different reasons (chapter 6). The 
commonality in them is really that they are all acceptably ideal in the entire epistemic 
situation. No knower can claim herself to be epistemically ideal in every instance. Just 
as our ideal school teacher would accept our diversity of epistemic goodness as a 
cognitive character (by the same token, tolerate our epistemic shortcomings) and 
consider us her good enough students, there are many ways in which a belief forming 
process can be adequately ideal in their accordance with epistemic norms (for 
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instance, see chapter 5). Adopting this more lenient attitude to our epistemic 
evaluations would help us explain why we have particular (and diverging) judgements 
when it comes to difficult epistemic cases—and why it seems so hard to find one 
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